

#### The Editor & Publisher:

Paul W. Wittmer enlisted in the Navy in New York City on October 27, 1942. After basic training and specialized schooling required for submarine duty, Wittmer was assigned to the TINOSA as a Motor Machinist Mate while at Perth, Australia. He made six war patrols aboard her.

At the end of hostilities he was assigned to the ex-Japanese Submarine I-401. Later, he served on board the GROUPER stationed at the submarine base in New London then as an instructor at the submarine escape training device, commonly known as the "Tank".

In 1948 Wittmer left the Navy, to study mechanical engineering and management. He has held positions as a mechanical engineer and consultant and is a former member of the National Society of Professional Engineers, the American Society of Mechanical Engineers as well as others. He edited various newsletters prior to his venture into publishing. He resides in Manchester, Missouri.

#### The Artist:

Jack Monroe was born June 15, 1922, in Denver, Colorado. At an early age he moved to Huntington Park, California. Shortly after graduating high school the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor and he joined the Navy and eventually was assigned to the TINOSA where he made six war patrols on her.


After the war, Monroe attended Compton J.C., U.S.C. and art school. He held positions as accountant, salesman and collection manager and retired at the age of 59.

Since that time he formed his own company and does pretty much what he pleases in the field of art and writing.




## ENCOUNTER

By Allen F. Watrous



## COMBAT HISTORY OF U.S.S. TINOSA

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#### The Author:

Allen Watrous enlisted in the Navy in New Haven, Connecticut on July 19, 1938. He served as a signalman on the cruisers U.S.S. WICHITA and U.S.S. MEMPHIS until in August of 1942 he was assigned to submarine duty. After completing basic submarine school, submarine sound school and a period of training on the U.S.S. R-13 he joined the commissioning crew of the U.S.S. TINOSA at Mare Island Naval Shipyard in Vallejo, California.

Watrous stayed with the TINOSA until February of 1945 when he was transferred to New London, Connecticut for duty on the U.S.S. PORPOISE where he remained until the war was over.

He remained in the Navy until January 1958 when he retired. He spent the next twenty four years working in the Naval Architecture Department at the Electric Boat Shipbuilding Company in Groton, Connecticut, retiring from there in 1982. He presently makes his home in Ivoryton, Connecticut.

# ***ENCOUNTER!***

## **THE TINOSA IN COMBAT**

BY

**Allen E. Watrous**

Patrol Runs 1 – 8

ILLUSTRATOR

**Jack A. Monroe**

Patrol Runs 3 – 8

EDITOR AND PUBLISHER

**Paul W. Wittmer**

Patrol Runs 5 – 10

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First Edition

DEDICATION

to the men who sailed in her.

"EX COMMUNI PERICULO FRATERNITAS"



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## FOREWORD

At TINOSA reunions, memories dimmed by more than forty years are frequently put to the test. "On what run did that happen?" or "What runs was he on the boat?" are questions often asked. This account of TINOSA'S war history, as well as the included appendices is intended to serve as a refresher for such fractured recall.

In 1952 at the reunion in Hartford, I was presented with a copy of the War Patrol reports and personnel records by Don Pier-son. It is these reference units that have been the basis for the following account which has appeared in serial form in the TINOSA triannual newsletter "THE TINOSA BLATT." In the interest of providing a consolidated history of TINOSA, this book is published.

The text embodies the period from the TINOSA commissioning at Mare Island Naval Shipyard on January 15, 1942, to the cessation of hostilities in August, 1945.

No attempt was made to deal with personalities or incidents that were unrelated to combat situations. The names of officers and crew members are mentioned only when they are singled out in the official report. The names of the respective commanding officers are, of course, mentioned frequently, inasmuch as all that happened was due to their initiative. It goes without saying that TINOSA was blessed with aggressive and intelligent captains, capable junior officers, and dedicated and hard working crewmen, all of whom saw her

through danger and adversity and brought her home safely with a proud record.


ENCOUNTER was written, illustrated, edited and published by men who served on board TINOSA during World War II, and it was done for them. Perhaps others will find it of interest.

The illustrations were provided by Jack Monroe, TINOSA'S resident cartoonist, who designed the ship's insignia. Paul Wittmer took on the task of editing and publishing it, and Peg Bentham took the trouble to read through it all and correct the spelling and punctuation, etc. I am most grateful to them all.


Many thanks, also, to the crew members who in the past contributed articles herein, and helped to round out the history.

Allen Watrous

A  
COMBAT HISTORY  
OF  
U.S.S. TINOSA (SS-283)



**TINOSA'S BATTLE FLAG  
ON THE FIRST FOUR WAR PATROLS**



**BATTLE FLAG DESIGNED BY JACK MONROE  
DURING PATROL NUMBER FIVE  
AND USED FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE WAR**

PATROL NUMBER 1  
DANIEL IN THE LIONS DEN

TINOSA arrived in Pearl Harbor on 16 April 1943, fresh from a new construction training period in San Diego. On 3 May, after an intensive training session and upkeep, she took departure, Pearl for Midway, and after topping off, sailed into unknown and hostile waters that were controlled by the enemy. Basking in the glory of a year and a half of victory, little did the Japanese realize that from that day on their doom was sealed! TINOSA was on patrol! "Dangerous Dan" Daspit was in command!

The area assigned TINOSA for her initial sortie was an "Empire Area" bounded by Shikoku on the north, Kyushu on the west, by a line running south from Murota on Shikoku on the east and a line running east from the Ryuku Islands on the south. The focal point of the area was the strait between Shikoku and Kyushu, the notorious Bungo Suido, where much shipping activity was expected. TINOSA arrived on station 17 May at 0230.

The first day was spent submerged about 60 miles south of Bungo Suido at a point that was considered to be an intersection of the sea lanes from the south and the Japanese ports in the area. The day submerged was uneventful.

At 2030 TINOSA surfaced in a heavy

swell. The sky, which had been overcast all day, began to clear and the moon, which was nearly full, peeked out intermittently through the clouds.

At 2045 radar made contact with a group of ships ten miles away. Evaluation of the contact determined that it was a convoy of four ships with four escorts heading northeast at nine knots. TINOSA was abeam to starboard of the contact, and it was necessary to "pour on the coal" to achieve a satisfactory firing position ahead of the target.

By 2316 TINOSA was at a point ten miles ahead of the convoy. To see the targets in the heavy swell and to remain unseen, the sub attempted to run submerged at 40 feet, but depth control was poor and when the enemy was almost in firing range TINOSA broached. The convoy immediately dispersed and the ships headed off on various courses. TINOSA was able to cross ahead of one ship to get into position for a stern tube shot, but when she was almost ready to fire, the target made a radical turn to the right and then another to the left and headed straight for the submarine. When the charging ship was 500 yards away, TINOSA went to ninety feet and attempted to make a sonar evaluation of the situation above.

Sonar made numerous reports of high speed screws close aboard and Daspit decided that it would be injudicious to go up for a look. After an hour, during which there were no depth charges or echo ranging, it was assumed to be safe to take a look. When radar was clear of the water,

contact was made at 6700 yards. TINOSA surfaced at 0112 and attempted an end run, but at 0335 reached the limit of the assigned operating area without being able to attain an attack position and was compelled to break off the attack.

A post attack analysis decided that TINOSA had been detected when she broached and/or when exposing so much top hamper in trying to stay above the swell. The fire control party and sonar team came under some criticism for being unable to establish a clear picture of the target organization, which was attributed to inexperience.

TINOSA's baptism was, at best, an unsatisfying experience. The crew, which had spent an exhausting and harrowing night, was, quite discouraged. The frustration was not done, however, as you will see.

For the next twelve days, TINOSA conducted submerged patrols in various parts of the area without enemy contact other than sampans etc., but on May 29, fate dealt another hand.

One half hour after surfacing, a radar contact was reported at 3-1/4 miles. The target was identified as a 6,000 ton freighter heading northwest at seven knots. Her destination appeared to be Bungo Suido which was about fifty miles away.

The night was very dark and the sea was choppy. Lookouts reported two other ships with the first, one of which was confirmed by radar. The approach was made on the surface. One half hour after making contact, TINOSA fired four torpedoes for-



ward. The water was very phosphorescent and the torpedo wakes were highly visible. Three torpedoes were seen to miss astern but one hit the target.

Two explosions were heard, one of which was definitely identified as a torpedo exploding at the end of its run. Inasmuch as the target was able to maintain speed, it is quite probable that the other explosion was from the same source. One torpedo apparently hit the ship but did not explode, for her crew commenced counter-measures immediately. They began firing their deck gun and making smoke to screen themselves. It was unlikely that they had sighted TINOSA for their gun was firing in all directions.

In an attempt to stop the target before the escort could force a breakoff of the attack, TINOSA went in for a shot from directly astern. The forward tubes were reloaded and twenty minutes after the initial attack, four more torpedoes were fired forward.

The first two were observed to miss close aboard to the left. The last two veered off to the right 30 degrees. These last two had been part of the reload and there was some question as to whether the torpedo gyroscope spindles had been engaged on 0 degrees at the reload. The other two reloads were pulled and found to have been properly set so it may be assumed that the torpedoes that were fired were defective.

By this time it had been determined that there was only one ship and no escorts, so TINOSA reloaded and commenced an end run. The heavy phosphorescence made

TINOSA's wake light up like a Christmas tree, and when the target lobbed two shells in the vicinity, the Captain felt compelled to open the range. At 2159 TINOSA fired four torpedoes forward. The long torpedo run, coupled with the high visibility of the torpedo wakes, enabled the target to avoid them.

TINOSA then crossed astern of the target in an attempt to gain firing position on the starboard side. At 2300, Daspit, fired two torpedoes from 1,000 yards. The first missed ahead, the second hit the target amidships but did not explode. The target started to list but did not slow. Both deck guns were now shooting and the shells were getting closer. TINOSA broke off the attack and submerged to, "mediate sins of omission and comission", as stated in the patrol report.

June 4 TINOSA received a report that an enemy convoy was proceeding northeastward through the East China Sea toward Nagasaki and was ordered to leave the area and intercept. The night was spent transitting the straits between Kyushu and the Ryukyus.

A submarine was sighted at 0600 the next morning. Since it was on a course to intercept the convoy, it was probably SEAWOLF which had also been ordered into the action. A few minutes later the convoy was sighted with the high periscope.

TINOSA bore off to get ahead of the convoy and clear of the other submarine. An attack position was achieved at 0646. There were twelve ships in the convoy, four columns of three ships each with one des-

with a large port angle on the bow and TINOSA would be hard pressed to get into attack position submerged with any "juice in the can."

At 2010 she surfaced, commenced a battery charge and set a course to intercept. At 2248 Tinosa arrived in an attack position seven miles ahead of the convoy, which consisted of seven ships - four merchantmen and three escorts.

At 2259 TINOSA made contact with another convoy, this one headed north. There was a destroyer on the starboard screen, and a PC on the port screen. They were escorting a freighter that had a half loaded tanker in tow. Since, at this time, tankers were a high priority target, it was decided to go after this one.

The night was very dark which made seeing the target difficult, so a dawn attack was planned with an approach from the west to take advantage of the light sky in the east. It must be remembered that TINOSA had expended all torpedoes forward and would be forced to utilize the six remaining fish aft.

At 0341 TINOSA submerged to commence her approach and at 0444 fired four torpedoes. Two torpedoes hit the target, one exploded prematurely and the other missed. The units that hit the tanker were seen to "throw water up the side but were not particularly violent."

The PC on the port screen turned immediately and headed straight for TINOSA in an unfriendly manner. At 0447 TINOSA went deep and rigged for depth charge. The enemy had obviously obtained a good con-

tact, for TINOSA was subjected to a barrage of twelve depth charges, one of which was very close and inflicted considerable damage.

Both gyro compasses were disabled and the trim pump as well.

After the initial barrage the attacking vessel lost contact, for although the depth charging continued until 0542, none of the explosions were close. During the depth charge attack, two distant muffled explosions were heard and were interpreted as the tanker sinking. Not so, as it turned out.

TINOSA surfaced after dark and radioed contact and action reports. At midnight orders were received to return to Midway.

Patrol number one was over and TINOSA was credited with inflicting damage to the extent of 31,600 tons. It was, under the existing criteria, a successful patrol and the combat device was awarded.

It must be said that TINOSA patrol number one did not exactly bring the enemy to his knees. There was, during the early attacks, the confusion that comes with inexperience under actual battle conditions but there was notable improvement as the patrol progressed. Most of the crew was made up of men from the Panama squadron and sub school graduates. As I remember, only seventeen men had ever served on modern fleet type subs and less than ten had made war patrols. From Admiral Lockwood, "It is hoped that the experience gained during the first patrol will bear good results in the second."

-----

FIRST RUN TRIVIA

Duration of Patrol: 47 days

Ship Contacts: 67

Air Contacts: 16  
-----

Binnacle List:

Gil Wendling banged his shin on the Conning Tower ladder while clearing the bridge. Stitches were required. In five days he returned to duty.

Bill Craig suffered an attack of acute appendicitis. Doc Ford disdained the role of surgeon and restored his patient to health with sulphathiozole.

Dutch Lorzing cut his head on a ventilation louver handle and had to be sewn up.

Fun and Games:

In a hotly contested match Al Watrous defeated Screwy Hall and took top prize in the acey ducey tournament, (\$3).

Of Special Note:

LTjg Beck and Willy Wilson RT1c received special mention for their excellent work maintaining the radar equipment.

The early call back from patrol cancelled a shore bombardment assignment and no tears were shed over that.  
-----

**PATROL RUN #1 SAILING LIST**

**OFFICERS**

DASPIT, CO  
OAKLEY, XO  
STRAUB  
HUNNICUTT

BELL  
BECK  
ERICKSON  
ATKINS

**CREW**

CHIEF OF THE BOAT: HALL

BOATSWAINS MATE: HUNT

GUNNERS MATE: STRATTON

TORPEDOMEN: BEMBENEK, BONNER, CONNERY,  
FISHER, LEVY, MORRIS, NISONGER, SENEW,  
VAN-DUSEN

QUARTERMASTERS: DREHER, NOBLE, WATROUS  
FIRECONTROLMAN: DACOSTA

MOTOR MACHINISTS MATES: BAYANS, BURCZYK,  
DALE, GUTHRIE, HAZUKA, HICKMAN, HOWARD,  
JOHNSON, KIRKMAN, LORZING, SHEETS, WILKE

ELECTRICIANS MATES: BERRY, BOSTICK, COOPER,  
HARRIS, KELLAM, LESH, LINTH, MITCHELL

RADIO TECHNICIAN: WILSON

RADIOMEN: FOLEY, RUSTAD, WOOSLEY

SHIP'S COOKS: BIRCHMIER, GOODMAN, GUNN,  
NICHOLS

YEOMAN: BRANTLEY

PHARMACISTS MATE: FORD

SEAMEN: BLONDIN, COOKSEY, FONTANA, GORST,  
MAPLE, MCLAUGHLIN, ANDERSON, HOIALMEN,  
SMITH, WENDLING

FIREMEN: BASS, BURKE, CRAIG, MANN, MARKLEY,  
PHARRIS, REEL, STEVISON, STEIN, SUGHRUE

STEWARDS: DEVILLE, TURNER

**TOTAL 76**



**I BELIEVE I'VE SOLVED THE  
DUD PROBLEM!**





**PATROL NUMBER 2  
A TEE PARTY  
(TINOSA, TENACIOUS TANKERS  
AND  
TERRIBLE TORPEDOES)**

TINOSA arrived at Midway Island from patrol number one on 19 June 1943 to undergo a seventeen day refit, reload, and recreation period. The refit and reload was conducted by the U.S.S. SPERRY (the recreation was conducted by the sailors). Upon arrival, fourteen men were transferred to the relief crew. Everyone else moved into the R & R facility, which, at that time, was the little hotel that had served the Pan American Airlines as a stopover for the big Clipper flying boats that crossed the Pacific prior to hostilities.

Most of the refit consisted of routine maintenance and minor repairs. One noteworthy change to the ship involved an exchange of deck guns. MUSKALLUNGE (or was it LAPON) was going to a coastal area which involved a shore bombardment possibility, so TINOSA's 4"-50 cal. gun was put aboard that sub and her 3"-55 cal. piece was installed on TINOSA. Patrol run number two for TINOSA was to be a sea area about 200 miles west of the atoll known as the "Gibraltar of the Pacific" - Truk!

TINOSA took departure Midway on 7 July on a course and at a speed that would get her on station by 16 July. The assigned

area had considerable potential for targets, for the sea lanes from Japan to Truk ran through the northern part, and the sea lanes from the oil fields of southeast Asia ran through the southern part. There was much hope and every reason to believe that a successful patrol would ensue.

Action came sooner than expected. On 13 July, an intelligence report was received containing information of a Naval Task Force that was enroute from Japan to Eniwetok Island and TINOSA was directed to intercept. She arrived in position to do so at 0700 on the 14th. Scheduled arrival time for the Task Force was the next morning.

As luck would have it, a morning haze came with the dawn and visibility was somewhat limited. Daspit decided that the chance of being surprised by the fast moving ships suddenly appearing from the haze or being spotted by her dawn patrol aircraft dictated that TINOSA submerge.

At 0653 sonar reported hearing high speed screws. A periscope check on the sonar bearing revealed a destroyer coming into sight. Fifteen minutes later an aircraft carrier emerged from the haze and then another and then a heavy cruiser all zigging radically and tracking at 22 knots. The range was 9,000 yards with a large angle on the bow.

More and more ships became visible and it was at length determined that the Task Force consisted of two aircraft carriers, two heavy cruisers, one auxiliary aircraft carrier, one light cruiser, one seaplane tender, and several destroyers. The aux-

iliary aircraft carrier was bringing up the rear, and since it was the ship TINOSA could get closest to, it was selected as the target.

At 0732 at a range of 3800 yards four bow tubes were fired. The torpedoes ran hot, straight and normal, but the long run gave the target time to detect and evade the fish. Daspit had anticipated this probability but could not pass up a shot at so desirable a target.

TINOSA remained at periscope depth since there were no threats of reprisal from any of the escorts. Suddenly there was a barrage of explosions all around the sub which were thought to be aircraft bombs. However no planes were seen.

The Task Force altered course directly away from TINOSA and conducted no further countermeasures. Attack number one was over and again success had eluded TINOSA. At 1900 she surfaced and proceeded to the assigned area where she arrived as scheduled.

TINOSA made her way to the southern part of the area to cover the sea lanes from Asia. The following four days were uneventful without ship or aircraft contact. At 0713, 20 July, the monotony ended, for a ship was sighted on the high periscope heading right for TINOSA.

At 0726 TINOSA submerged. There was a six foot swell running but the winds were light and there was no chop. At 0846 four bow tubes were fired at a range of 1,100 yards. The heavy swell did not permit observation of the torpedo tracks, but sonar reported all units running. There

were no explosions at the estimated time of torpedo impact, but one minute later there were three, which were presumed to be depth charges dropped by the target. The target proceeded on its way with no reduction in speed.

TINOSA surfaced at 0951 and commenced an end run keeping the masts and stacks of the target in sight on the high periscope. Visibility was "spotty". Attack position was achieved at 1526. Eight minutes later two bombers were sighted five miles away at low altitude and headed directly for the sub. Daspit "pulled the cork".

When she submerged, TINOSA was right on the target track. 1634 would have been the earliest that a periscope sighting could be had and then only if the target had not changed course. When the periscope was raised at that time one aircraft was seen still patrolling in the place where TINOSA had submerged and the target was now 11,000 yards away with a 90 degree port angle on the bow.

By 1810 it was clear to surface and under four engine power TINOSA set course to a new attack position. At midnight the target was 13,000 yards away with zero angle on the bow. There were intermittent rain squalls transiting the area which interfered with visibility and radar operation.

When the target range had reached 4,900 yards radar detected a second target at 2,700 yards in a position on the starboard bow of the primary target. Heavy rain was falling as TINOSA maneuvered to take a position 5,500 yards on the tanker's

port bow. Suddenly visibility improved, and there, at 2,500 yards, was another destroyer. She saw TINOSA, too, and in less than two minutes opened up with her main battery, TINOSA went to 300 feet as expeditiously as possible. Between 0049 and 0225 eleven depth charges were dropped by two attacking destroyers. At 0327 TINOSA surfaced.

Post attack analysis determined that at least two torpedoes hit the target. A supposedly "easy" unescorted target should have been on the bottom but it was still afloat and the submarine had been placed in jeopardy. But exasperation is a way of life on the mighty T. Read on.

The TINOSA's next action has been written up extensively in submarine books and articles (including a recent issue of *Polaris*) dealing with the faulty torpedo. In no case that I know of has it been reported accurately. Assisted by the War Patrol Report and a steel trap memory, I will herewith produce an accurate account of that event.

On the night of 23 July, an intelligence report was received. It said that TONAN MARU NO. 2 was enroute from Borneo to Truk loaded with oil. It included the latitude / longitude coordinates of various points on her route and even the time and place that she was scheduled to meet her escort. TONAN MARU NO. 2 was one of two large whale factories that had been converted to oilers. It displaced 19,425 tons and was one of the biggest tankers the enemy had. TINOSA headed for a position to intercept the target two hours prior to her

escort rendezvous and by 0400 was on station. You might say, "Sitting in the catbird seat."

The morning of the 24th dawned bright and sunny. There was not a cloud in the sky nor a breath of wind and the sea was like glass. At 0555 the target was sighted on the high periscope, right on schedule. She was, however, about sixteen miles south of her projected track. TINOSA made haste to move to an attack position and at 0809 submerged. At 0923 four torpedoes were fired from the bow tubes at a range of 1,000 yards. Two torpedoes were seen to strike the target, one under the bridge and one midway between the masts. There were no explosions. The target dropped four depth charges and turned away.

"I saw them hit! I saw them hit," exclaimed the Captain!

"The set up is perfect, Captain. Let's fire the other two", said Lt. Bell on the TDC.

"All right," said the Captain, "Final bearing and shoot!"

At 0938 tubes five and six were fired. Both torpedoes were seen to hit the tanker and, miracles of miracles, one exploded on the port quarter. The target's engines stopped and she took a port list. She also dropped four depth charges.

Since the tanker showed no signs of sinking, TINOSA headed for a firing position on the starboard side to finish her off. During this transit some of the Japanese crew were seen manning their lifeboats while the others were firing at the periscope with machine guns and a four inch

deck gun.

At 1009, range 875 yards TINOSA fired one stern tube. Hit, no explosion. At 1011, range 1050 yards fired another. Hit, no explosion. Captain Daspit was not given to profanity, but he now indulged himself. At 1014 another stern shot hit the target, range 1300 yards. No explosion. A reload was conducted during which time there was discussion between the Captain, Lt. Bell and others as to what could be the problem with the torpedo and could it be TINOSA's fault. It was decided that the fault lay with the weapon. A decision was made to fire as many units as necessary to sink the target, save one, which would be returned to Pearl Harbor for inspection.

At 1039 the attack was resumed with the firing of a stern tube at a range of 900 yards. Hit, no explosion. At 1048 a bow tube was fired from 1,000 yards. The torpedo hit the target, veered off to the right and jumped clear of the water.

This gave the faint hearted Japanese great confidence for they then left the lifeboats, unlimbered the other deck gun and commenced firing at the periscope and torpedo wakes. At 1050 Daspit fired again from a range of 900 yards. Same results. At 1100 he fired from 1,000 yards. Hit, no explosion.

At this point sonar had a contact on high speed screws. Three minutes later a destroyer was sighted headed directly for TINOSA. At 1131 TINOSA fired another stern shot that was seen to hit but there was no explosion. At 1132 with the destroyer 1,000 yards away a stern tube was fired and

TINOSA headed for 300 feet. Sonar heard fish hit the target and stop running, No explosion. The destroyer had no explosion problem with her depth charges, however, when she dropped seven close ones.

At 1357, Daspit returned to periscope depth. The tanker was still afloat, down by the stern with a port list. The destroyer was alongside of her charge about three miles away. By 1800 twilight and a gathering haze closed visibility to where TONAN MARU NO. 2 could no longer be seen. At 1937 TINOSA surfaced, sent contact and attack reports. Three hours later she was directed to return to Pearl Harbor.

Thus ends the saga of TINOSA's second sortie into the enemy stronghold. It can be assumed that so far she had increased the enemy's morale and reduced his fear. It can be said that for TINOSA's crew it was just the opposite. Words like "jinx" and "unlucky" were often heard, but no one felt worse than the torpedomen who could not help but feel that their professional ability was in question. The crew could only take comfort in the fact that it was a short patrol and TINOSA was scheduled for a five week availability in Pearl Harbor Navy Yard.

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### **SECOND RUN TRIVIA**

Duration of patrol: 28 days  
Ship Contacts: 14  
Air Contacts: 2

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**PATROL RUN #2 SAILING LIST****OFFICERS**

DASPIT, CO

OAKLEY, XO

STRAUB

HUNNICUTT

BELL

BECK

ERICKSON

VAN GORDER

**CREW**

CHIEF OF THE BOAT: HAZUKA

BOATSWAINS MATE: HUNT

GUNNERS MATES: BLONDIN, KUYKENDALL

TORPEDOMEN: BEMBENEK, BONNER, CONNERY,

FISHER, KEANE, LEVY, NISONGER, SENEW,

SOBRENSKY

QUARTERMASTERS: DREHER, WATROUS, WENDLING

FIRECONTROLMAN: DACOSTA

MOTOR MACHINISTS MATES: BAYANS, BURCZYK,

DALE, GUTHRIE, HICKMAN, JOHNSON, KIRKMAN,

LORZING, ROBERTS, SCHMIDT, WILKE

ELECTRICIANS MATES: BERRY, BOSTICK, COOPER,

DRZYMALSKI, HARRIS, KELLAM, LESH, LINTH,

MAPLE, MITCHELL

RADIO TECHNICIAN: WILSON

RADIOMEN: FOLEY, GRIFFITH, HOIALMEN,

JACKSON, RUSTAD

SHIP'S COOKS: BIRCHMIER, GOODMAN, NICHOLS

YOEMAN: BRANTLEY

PHARMACISTS MATE: FORD

SEAMEN: ALEXANDER, BRADLEY, COOKSEY,

FONTANA, GORST, LOVETT, MCLAUGHLIN,


ANDERSON

FIREMEN: BASS, BURKE, CINFO, MAASCH, MANN,

RAY, REAL, REEL, STEVISON, STEIN, SUGHRUE

STEWARDS: DEVILLE, TURNER

**TOTAL 78**



**I'M SORRY, GANG,  
LOUSY PARTS!**



PATROL NUMBER 3  
HALF A LOAF

TINOSA arrived in Pearl Harbor from patrol number two on 4 August 1943. Nineteen of the crew were transferred to the relief crew and the remainder departed for their initial sojourn at the Royal Hawaiian Hotel. TINOSA entered Pearl Harbor Navy Yard.

On the previous patrols, submerged periscope inspection had detected air bubbles being emitted from the main ballast tank vents which indicated leaks in the high pressure air flask piping connections. All such connections were altered. The door in the after bulkhead of the conning tower was removed and a DRT was installed in the space gained. Number one periscope, which had only been usable from the control room, was modified to make it operable from the conning tower. The shaft bearings were replaced and a number of other alterations were made to improve hull and tank integrity.

Ready for sea, TINOSA took departure Pearl Harbor on 23 September for Johnston's Island for "topping off". Enroute, the Bendix Log failed and in addition to fueling at Johnston's Island, the machine shop there manufactured a new set of gears for that vital piece of equipment. By evening of 25 September, TINOSA was at sea again and headed for the war. There was high

hope for success this time, for among the weapon load were sixteen of the new MK XVIII electric torpedoes.

The assigned area for this patrol was north of the Carolines and south of the Marianas. Again TINOSA did not reach her area before engaging the enemy. At 0420 on 4 October, radar made contact with two ships at a range of 12,300 yards. Half an hour later TINOSA achieved attack position and submerged. At 0455, a four torpedo spread of MK XVIII's was fired from the bow tubes. Two torpedoes were heard to hit the target-one with a thud and one exploded. Then Murphy's law took over.

When the first torpedo was fired, the poppet stuck open. This extra water, supplemented by that from a recently discovered leak in the outboard supply ventilation piping, caused a loss of depth control. And sonar reported a set of high speed screws - - closing.

TINOSA reached 300 feet and rigged for depth charge just in time to accommodate the attacker who dropped five of them. Apparently the escort did not have a good position on TINOSA for they were not very close and the attack was broken off after that single barrage. The wakeless electric torpedoes can probably take credit for that happy condition.

By the time the counter attack was over TINOSA was at 350 feet running at standard speed to maintain depth control and conducting a reload. It was not until 0556 that proper trim was restored and she was able to return to periscope depth. The targets were gone.

TINOSA arrived in her area on 5 October at 0608. That night, a radio message reported that STEELHEAD had put three torpedoes into a large tanker which was now headed for TINOSA's area. TINOSA moved to intercept and (as proof of the excellence of the navigation team) the target was sighted at 0524 at a distance of 7-1/2 miles with a large angle on the bow. The sunrise sky was behind TINOSA so she submerged to avoid detection while she opened the range to where it would be safe to surface and make an end run. At 0622 TINOSA surfaced.

In spite of the fact that the target had been wounded, it was making sixteen knots through the water. The end run was a long one even with four engines on the line. By 1110 TINOSA was in an attack position and commenced a submerged approach. At 1155 the target suddenly slowed to 11.5 knots.

At 1201 a six torpedo spread of MK XVIII's was fired from the bow tubes at a range of 1540 yards. The periscope ducked and the target could not be seen at the time of torpedo impact. However, there were three loud explosions and the sound of a dud hit. At 1204 the target was seen to be taking a starboard list and was trimmed down by the bow. The injured tanker did not throw in the towel. Having sighted the periscope, she attempted to ram and dropped four depth charges, close aboard astern, as she passed. TINOSA was at 150 feet at this time. A fire was reported in the maneuvering room, in the port shaft revolution counter, and there was other minor damage.

During this attack, the chain on the outer door operating mechanism of tube #5 parted. The door was opened and the tube fired properly, but the door did not close completely, and the tube was declared out of commission. When the reload was attempted, it was ascertained that the outer door gasket of tube #2 was leaking badly.

At 1215 the target was tracked at nine knots, heading away. TINOSA opened range and at 1430 surfaced and commenced another end run. The tanker had now slowed to 6-1/2 knots and TINOSA was able to gain attack position by 1644.

At 1818, a four torpedo spread was fired from the stern tubes (MK XIV). Two explosions were observed, one in the stern and the other just abaft amidships. The target slowed to 4.5 knots and started to swing toward TINOSA as if to ram. She continued to swing on, however, indicating that the stern hit had impaired her ability to steer. The target was now dropping and throwing depth charges at random and firing both deck guns.

At 1825 TINOSA fired two MK XVIII's from the bow tubes. Sonar reported the fish running hot straight and normal but there were no explosions. Shortly after this attack, the target stopped.

1834 Fired one MK XIV stern shot. No explosion.

1859 Target was lowering boats. Fired one MK XIV stern shot. Hit observed, no explosion.

1910 Fired one MK XVIII bow shot. No explosion.

1913 Fired one MK XVIII bow shot. Hit

observed, no explosion.

1933 Target sank.

"On October 6, off the Carolines, TINOSA and STEELHEAD cornered the large tanker KAZAHAYA and sent her down in a gush of blazing oil." (Submarine Operations in World War II, page 280).

It is hard to understand why this ill-fated tanker, which was under long hours of attack, did not receive any anti-submarine support. She was less than 250 miles from Guam and Ulithi when she was sunk.

Now flushed with success TINOSA set a course for the Paluwat Island Group for the purpose of conducting a shore bombardment of the radio station on Alot Island. On 7 October at 1803, she surfaced and opened fire at a range of 3,000 yards. Forty-one rounds were expended which were seen to raise clouds of dust, proof positive, that the shells at least hit the island. Firing ceased when a shell became jammed in the bore and eventually had to be removed with clearing charges. This taken care of, TINOSA resumed patrol.

Note: At 2110, the bridge reported crossing three streaks in the water resembling torpedo wakes.

At 2202 on 9 October TINOSA received orders to terminate the patrol and return to base. On 12 and 13 October, TINOSA searched for downed aviators near Wake Island but none were found.

On 16 October TINOSA arrived at that tropical paradise, Midway, proudly displaying an array of bunting that included the ship's insignia flag, one Japanese merchant flag, and a busted cherry flag.



TINOSA had finally joined the ranks of the truly successful. Having expended 65 torpedoes, she had one sinking to her credit. Actually only half a sinking; STEEL-HEAD was credited with the other half. Well, half a loaf . . . . .

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### THIRD RUN TRIVIA

Duration of patrol: 24 days

Ship Contacts: 3

Air Contacts: 8

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A sailing vessel - apparently fishing - was a disinterested spectator to TINOSA's shore bombardment from a distance of two miles.

There were three contacts with U.S. Submarines on this patrol. One was identified only through radar interference, SKATE and TAUTOG were the others. It's getting crowded.

Of special note: Glen Hickmam CMoMM received special mention for volunteering to enter the superstructure to search out the leak in the ventilation supply system while the ship was in enemy controlled waters. He found and corrected the problem.

### Binnacle List:

John Gorst wrenched his back handling ammunition during the shore bombardment.

Steve Hovanec was hit in the face when the handle of an engine induction flapper snapped out of the catch. Doc Ford did some embroidery on him and he returned to duty.

**ENCOUNTER:**

**CHAPTER: 3**

**PATROL RUN #3 SAILING LIST**

**OFFICERS**

DASPIT, CO  
HUNNICUTT, XO  
STRAUB  
BELL

ROBB  
BECK  
ERICKSON  
VAN GORDER

**CREW**

CHIEF OF THE BOAT: HAZUKA

BOATSWAINS MATE: HUNT

GUNNERS MATE: BLONDIN

TORPEDOMEN: ANDERSON, BONNER, BROWN,  
CONNERY, FISHER, KEANE, LEVY, NISONGER,  
OSBORN, SOBRENSKY, WEEKS

QUARTERMASTERS: HULS, WATROUS, WENDLING

FIRECONTROLMEN: GORST, MONROE

MOTOR MACHINISTS MATES: BAYANS, DALE,  
GUTHRIE, HICKMAN, HOVANEC, JOHNSON,  
KIRKMAN, LORZING, O'MALLEY, REEL, ROBERTS,  
WILKE, ZARAZINSKI

ELECTRICIANS MATES: BERRY, BOSTICK,  
DRZYMALSKI, FONTANA, GALLARDY, HARRIS,  
LESH, LINTH, MAPLE, MOODY, YONUSCHOT

RADIO TECHNICIANS: FOLEY, WILSON

RADIOMEN: GRIFFITH, HOI ALMEN, MOEN, RUSTAD

SHIP'S COOKS: BERRY, BIRCHMIER, GARRISON

YEOMAN: BRANTLEY

PHARMICISTS MATE: FORD

SEAMEN: ALEXANDER, BRADLEY, BURNS, COOKSEY,  
GOODELL

FIREMEN: BASS, CINFO, CORBIN, MANN, RAY,  
REAL, STEVISON, STEIN, SUGHRUE

STEWARDS: KELLUM, TURNER

**TOTAL 78**



**PATROL NUMBER 4**  
**THE WORM TURNS**

At Midway, TINOSA was scheduled for a five day refit by SPERRY, two days for training and three days for reload. Because patrol run number three had been so brief, Daspit requested that the usual replacement of twenty five per cent of the ship's company be waived. He reasoned that the crew had had a long rest prior to the run and that there had been insufficient time to train the new men. The request was granted and only Jim Hunnicutt and two enlisted men were replaced.

Commander D.F. Weiss was assigned aboard for indoctrination as a prospective commanding officer. Naturally, there was considerable speculation as to whether or not he was to be Captain Daspit's replacement.

The previously grey TINOSA, now wearing a new coat of black paint, was ready for sea as scheduled and took departure Midway on the afternoon of October 27 (Navy Day). The weapon load consisted of Mk XIV torpedoes with a modified firing mechanism which was intended to eliminate the problem of dud torpedoes that had plagued TINOSA on her previous runs.

By 5 November, TINOSA was on station in the same area that she was in on the previous patrol and commenced scouting the Palau Is. - Truk Is. sea lanes. Two days

later she moved north to patrol an intercept position in the Empire - Truk Is. sea lanes. The move produced a target.

On 7 November, while on surface patrol, masts were sighted on the horizon to the west at an estimated range of 19 miles. The mast alignment indicated a small target angle, so Daspit, believing that he was close to the target track, submerged and set a course to close the range. It was 0741 before the target could be seen on the periscope. The range had closed to twelve miles, but the angle on the bow had increased to 45 degrees and there was danger that the target would pass out of firing range. This must not happen for the target was identified as a Mogami class cruiser.

TINOSA changed course to the left and increased speed to full. The next look was at 0804, and at that time it was seen that a DD of the Shiguri class was in company with the cruiser. All was in vain, however, for the target passed too far away for a shot. At 0922 TINOSA surfaced and headed for a new area.

The new area was on the west coast of the Palau Island group. Japan had acquired Palau from Germany after World War I and was using it as a principal shipping terminal in support of her war effort in the islands to the south. Considerable activity was anticipated here. TINOSA commenced a patrol in the northern part of the area at 0900 on November 9th.

The weather was stormy with low visibility for the next four days, and no targets were sighted. On the 14th, TINOSA set a course for the approaches to Toagel

Mlungui Passage which was the western entrance to the principal ports on Palau. At 0505 TINOSA submerged on station.

At 1316 a PC type patrol craft came near to TINOSA and remained in sight all afternoon. Nothing else was sighted.

On 16 November at 0500 TINOSA submerged south of the channel entrance with the intention of moving in close to the barrier reef and then proceed north past the channel entrance. There was, however, a strong ocean current that prevented enough headway to accomplish this. At 1215 a destroyer of the Asashio class was sighted and TINOSA went to battle stations. The target was making twenty two knots and turned into the harbor channel before TINOSA could get close enough to attack. At 1840 TINOSA surfaced.

The next morning TINOSA moved as close to shore as was considered safe in the bright moonlight and submerged at 0446. A patrol craft was sighted to the north at 0554. At 0613 a small tanker was sighted heading north inside the reef, so Daspit set a course to follow her in the expectation that sooner or later she would have to pass through the reef and he would be waiting. But the patrol craft was in the way and TINOSA had to go under her. By the time she had regained periscope depth, the target was headed south and going away.

At 0729 a five ship convoy was sighted headed for the channel entrance at a range of eight miles. TINOSA went to battle stations and increased speed. At six knots a loud rumbling sound was heard in the fairwater and then two depth charges, not

terribly close. The patrol craft turned toward the sub. Speed was again increased and at six knots the same rumbling was heard followed by two depth charges. TINOSA slowed for a look. The patrol craft was searching close by. Speed was increased as much as possible without creating the rumble in the hope that there would be a shot at the tail end of the convoy. It was not to be, for the convoy slipped into the harbor unscathed. That the little tanker was a decoy to entice submarines from the harbor entrance was considered a possibility.

It appeared that TINOSA had been detected. Five patrol craft arrived on the scene and commenced a search. At 1120 an Asashio class DD joined the search and TINOSA went to battle stations. Five minutes later a convoy cleared the harbor and headed north (through the area where TINOSA had been patrolling earlier). Das-pit secured general quarters and started to trail the convoy, which consisted of two tankers and two freighters, with the intent of establishing the course and speed for an after dark pursuit. At 1338 a depth charge exploded in the distance. The convoy was still in sight and there were six patrol craft between it and the sub.

At 1435 another convoy appeared, consisting of a submarine tender and a freighter escorted by a Chidori class torpedo boat. TINOSA went to battle stations and attempted to attain an attack position. At 1446 four depth charges were heard in the distance. At 1448 the targets made a radical course change to the east. Two

more depth charges exploded. TINOSA was unable to get closer than three miles to the convoy and at 1513 broke off the attack. At that time more depth charges were heard.

At 1630 a lone freighter was sighted five miles away. By 1651 the convoy to the north had disappeared, but the single ship was visible and it was decided to make that one the target after dark.

At 1816 TINOSA surfaced and the chase was on. At 1935 the OD reported seeing a red light on the target. At 2200 the red light was identified as a red cross on the stack with a flood light on it. Hospital ship!

It had been an exhausting two days of almost constant enemy contact. From one to seven patrol craft were in sight most of the time, and aircraft made frequent searches and provided coverage for all convoys entering or leaving the harbor. As testimony to the effectiveness of the Japanese antisubmarine capability in this area, no enemy ships were sunk by submarines within fifty miles of Toagel Mlungui Passage during the war. Daspit decided to quit fencing with this efficient system and headed for a new station.

TINOSA spent the 19th and 20th patrolling the Molukka Passage-Palau sea lanes and the 21st the Yap-Palau route without incident. At midnight she set a course for Malakal Passage, which was the eastern counterpart to Taogel Mlungui, and submerged on station at 0507.

Smoke was sighted at 0741 and TINOSA went to battle stations. The target was a



two ship convoy steaming in column with an escort ahead and another behind. Daspit maneuvered to get between the two freighters for a bow and a stern shot. The leading escort passed close aboard oblivious to the submarine presence. At 0838 TINOSA fired three stern tubes at a range of 700 yards. There were three hits and then a strange thing happened -- they exploded! The target rolled over on its port side and was seen to be rapidly sinking. At 0842 TINOSA fired three bow tubes at the other merchantman at a range of 1100 yards. There were two hits and the target began to settle by the stern.

The converging torpedo wakes gave the escorts a good fix on TINOSA'S firing position and they hastened to take advantage of that. TINOSA went deep and opened at high speed. At 0848 the first escort on the scene launched a thirteen depth charge barrage which was not close enough to do any damage. At 0850 there was a fourteen depth charge pattern which was not very close either. At 0852 there were two more ineffective depth charges. It seemed that TINOSA had successfully evaded the escorts but at 0911 without warning four depth charges exploded very close knocking out power to the planes, steering, gyros and other IC equipment.

TINOSA lost depth control and started up with a 15 degree angle. At 250 feet she took a 29 degree down angle and reached 380 feet (test depth was 312 feet) before she regained depth control. During this evolution six more depth charges were dropped, all of them close. The proximity of

the escorts kept TINOSA down until 1237. The escorts were still searching and both targets had disappeared from the scene. Daspit continued to open to the east and surfaced at 1850.

The next day TINOSA spent on submerged patrol and surfaced after dark. At 2328 an aircraft flew over and dropped a flare and Daspit submerged. There was no further incident. The 24th was spent on surface patrol without contact.

At 0115 on the 25th there was an aircraft contact on the SD radar at eight miles and TINOSA submerged. Immediately sonar reported hearing echo ranging. At 0147 TINOSA surfaced and set out in pursuit of the sound signal. By 0332 she had made contact on a three ship convoy with two escorts apparently headed for Malakel Passage.

When contact was made the convoy was five miles ahead of TINOSA so a chase was necessary. At 0445 it was clear that there was no chance of making an attack before daylight, so TINOSA opened out for an end run. Because of aircraft contacts on the SD radar, it was not possible to surface until 0805. It was 1405 when TINOSA arrived in an attack position and submerged.

At 1532 TINOSA fired three stern tubes at a range of 900 yards, but a control error caused all three to miss. The escorts commenced an ineffective attack, and Daspit was able to evade at periscope depth. Four depth charges were dropped but not very close.

At 1830 TINOSA surfaced and started a search for the convoy. It was 0711 the

next morning when contact was finally made. Because she was getting close to land, TINOSA had had to submerge earlier and now found herself too far off the target track to make an attack. It took fifteen minutes of high speed running to get into position. At 0931 she fired three bow tubes at a range of 1150 yards. One hit aft with a tremendous explosion and the other hit amidships, but there was no apparent damage from that one.

Daspit selected another target at the same time that the target picked up the periscope and started firing at it with two deck guns. At 0935 three bow tubes were fired at a range of 750 yards. There were two explosions heard at the timed end of the torpedo run, but Daspit was busy with the third ship and the escorts and did not observe the hits. At 0938 there was an explosion close aboard which must have been a depth charge dropped from an aircraft. Although the escorts were heading for TINOSA, they were not very close.

Thirty four depth charges were dropped by the attacking escort in the next three hours, but in spite of the fact that the aircraft bomb had marked the submarine's position, they were of no consequence. At 1243 TINOSA was able to return to periscope depth and survey the scene. One ship could be seen burning until 1527 when there was a tremendous billow of smoke and then nothing.

At 1852 TINOSA surfaced to confront another problem. During the attack on the second ship sonar had reported hearing only two torpedoes run. That, coupled with the

fact that the torpedo room was unable to close the outer door on tube number five gave rise to the suspicion that the torpedo had not completely left the tube.

Lt. Bell went over the side to investigate and found the fish projecting three feet out of the tube. It was over nine hours since the war head had been exposed and there was justifiable concern that it had become armed. In case that it hadn't. Ens. Van Gorder went over the side and installed a wedge in the impeller so the arming process could not continue.

It was a nervous time as Daspit backed the ship at eight knots and fired the tube with 400 pounds of impulse pressure. The torpedo very obligingly left the tube and sank with no fuss whatever. Tube number five was designated out of commission.

TINOSA was now getting low on fuel and conservation measures were in order. She spent the next six days putt - putting in an area southeast of Peleliu Island without contact.

3 December found TINOSA on surface patrol near the southern islands of the Palau group. There were rain squalls all about. It was another uneventful day until 1730 when a freighter and a Chidori class torpedo boat popped out of a rain squall eight miles to the west with a large angle on the bow. Daspit turned away to open the range and draw ahead. The plan was to make a surface radar attack after dark. By 1820 it was dark and TINOSA began to close range at maximum speed.

As luck would have it a bright half moon appeared and illuminated the attack

zone to the extent that it was too light for a surface attack and hardly light enough for a periscope approach. At 1928 TINOSA submerged to radar depth and at 1938 went to periscope depth.

The convoy zigged at this time and spoiled the opportunity of firing at two ships. The freighter passed close and Daspit swung TINOSA about for an "up the rump" shot. At 1947 three bow tubes were fired at a range of 520 yards. One torpedo hit the stern and the target burst into flames as did the surrounding water. There was no opportunity to make another attack for the depth charging commenced and TINOSA was compelled to take evasive action for the next twenty minutes. At 2016 a periscope inspection confirmed that the target was still afloat albeit burning and down by the stern. TINOSA surfaced at 2031.

The target was still making eight knots but her steering was impaired for she was making a circle to starboard. The plan was to finish her off with one torpedo and then give chase to the rest of the convoy. At 2100 TINOSA fired one bow tube at a range of 2100 yards. It missed and the target promptly opened fire with two deck guns and a machine gun. At 2105 TINOSA submerged -- with a new plan.

At 2120 TINOSA fired three bow tubes at a range of 1450 yards. Two of them hit and the target disappeared.

TINOSA'S fuel shortage made it unwise to attempt to catch the convoy which was now over twenty miles away and making 14 knots. With only two torpedoes left and little fuel, she was limited in her ability

as an offensive weapon and on 4 December was ordered to Darwin, Australia to top off and proceed to Freemantle for upkeep. Christmas in Perth? TINOSA'S luck had indeed changed.

TINOSA reached Darwin on 10 December with 5800 gallons of fuel left. She took on 39,000 gallons and headed for Fremantle that afternoon. She arrived there on 16 December at 1800, displaying a respectable array of Japanese flags. The patrol was over.

The Squadron and Force Commanders commended the officers and crew of the TINOSA for a highly successful patrol and made special mention of the high percentage of torpedo hits. TINOSA was credited with sinking four freighters totaling 18,544 tons and damaging one freighter of 7,210 tons.

When, on November 22nd, TINOSA fired three torpedoes, got three hits and -- wonder of wonders -- three explosions the morale of all hands got a lift that could only be surpassed by Betty Grable making a patrol run on board. As the torpedoes continued to explode in subsequent attacks, a new confidence was born in the ship's company. One can only speculate on how the submarine force would have impacted the war if they had been supplied with a satisfactory torpedo.

Patrol run number 4 was to be Captain Daspit's last war patrol. He was of slight physique, prematurely bald, and wore metal rimmed spectacles. If you were to meet him in mufti you might think he was a bookkeeper or perhaps a professor, but never would you

guess that he was in the business of leading men into battle. One could not help but be impressed with his knowledge of his craft and of his ship, his calm demeanor in battle conditions, and his composure in the face of adversity. That he attained flag rank is a testament to the respect in which he was held, Good bye. Dangerous Dan.

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#### **FOURTH RUN TRIVIA**

Duration of patrol: 51 days  
Ship Contacts: 43  
Air Contacts: 16

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#### **OF SPECIAL NOTE:**

Lt. Bell and Ensign Van Gorder received special mention for going over the side in connection with the stuck torpedo as did Fisher, Levy, Nisonger and Johnson who assisted on deck.

#### **BINNACLE LIST**

Sughrue suffered an ear infection. No loss of duty.

Corbin had an infection of the big toe and was back to duty in three days.

Reel was in much pain from an erupting wisdom tooth. Doc Ford had him cured in two days.

Berry fell through the storeroom hatch and cut his shin. He was stiched up and returned to duty.

Garrison suffered second and third degree burns from spilling hot pudding on his arm while lowering it into the chill box. He was nine days off duty.

**PATROL RUN #4 SAILING LIST****OFFICERS**

DASPIT, CO  
BELL, XO  
STRAUB  
VAN GORDER  
ROBB

BECK  
ERICKSON  
SALISBURY  
WEISS, PCO

**CREW**

**CHIEF OF THE BOAT:** HAZUKA

**BOATSWAINS MATE:** HUNT

**GUNNERS MATES:** BLONDIN, BRADLEY

**TORPEDOMEN:** ANDERSON, BONNER, BROWN,

CONNERY, COOKSEY, FISHER, KEANE, LEVY,

NISONGER, OSBORN, SOBRENSKY, WEEKS

**QUARTERMASTERS:** HULS, WATROUS, WENDLING

**FIRECONTROLMEN:** GORST, MONROE

**MOTOR MACHINISTS MATES:** BASS, BAYANS,

CINFO, DALE, GUTHRIE, HICKMAN, HOVANEC,

JOHNSON, KIRKMAN, LORZING, MANN, O'MALLEY,

REEL, ROBERTS, STEIN, STEVISON, SUGHRUE,

WILKE, ZARAZINSKI

**ELECTRICIANS MATES:** BERRY, BOSTICK,

DRZYMALSKI, FONTANA, GALLARDY, HARRIS,

LESH, LINTH, MAPLE, MOODY, YONUSCHOT

**RADIO TECHNICIANS:** FOLEY, WILSON

**RADIOMEN:** GRIFFITH, HOIALMEN, MOEN, RUSTAD

**SHIP'S COOKS:** BERRY, BIRCHMIER, GARRISON

**YEOMAN:** BRANTLEY

**PHARMACISTS MATE:** FORD

**SEAMEN:** ALEXANDER, BURNS, GOODELL,

**FIREMEN:** CORBIN, RAY, REAL

**STEWARDS:** COLLINS, TURNER

**TOTAL 79**





**4TH PATROL FOR CORBIN,  
GREAT TORPEDOS, BAD TEETH**

PATROL NUMBER 5  
RETURN FROM PARADISE

TINOSA spent the summer Christmas season in Fremantle / Perth and the crew was able to enjoy the best liberty they had had since leaving stateside. Compared to the island stops made between previous patrols, Australia was indeed a paradise. Enough sea stories were accumulated there to entertain shipmates for at least the next patrol run.

During the upkeep, the problems with the Bendix log and the torpedo tube outer doors were given some attention, and the ship was decked out in a new coat of camouflage. On January 10, 1944, she was ready for sea, and at 1310 took departure Fremantle for Exmouth Gulf under the command of new skipper, Donald F. Weiss. The weapon load consisted entirely of Mk XIV torpedoes. (A happy innovation in the conduct of war was a load of Swan Lager in the chill box.)

In addition to the ships company, TINOSA carried a detail a six Australian Intelligence Force men under the command of Major W.J. Jenkins. The first order of business on this patrol was to land these men at Labian Point on northeast Borneo. There they were to engage in the perilous occupation of coast watchers. They would operate under the nose of the enemy, observing enemy ship movements, and radioing the

information to their headquarters.

TINOSA arrived at Exmouth Gulf at 0830 on 13 January, took on fuel, and set about conducting a training exercise for landing the Aussies. The exercise consisted of bringing three life rafts topside through the after torpedo room hatch, inflating them, and loading them with 5000 pounds of equipment and supplies. Then, with two men in each raft, the plan was to flood down and float the party off. When all was ready, the forward and after group vents were cycled and TINOSA settled in the water. The vents were recycled with no apparent result. The vents were cycled again and suddenly TINOSA went down fast -- by the stern. Bow bouyancy tank vent had not been opened! Water was pouring through the conning tower hatch before an emergency blow could get the boat back to the surface. The rafts floated off just fine though. They were recovered and piped below, and, in spite of the limited success of the exercise, TINOSA confidently sailed off for Borneo.

Progress was slowed by many contacts with patrolling aircraft which compelled TINOSA to submerge frequently. During the night of the 16th, she transitted Lombok Strait and entered the Flores Sea.

On the 17th at 1648, an object was sighted about three miles dead ahead. TINOSA started to develop an attack but the target suddenly disappeared. It was thought to have been an enemy submarine which had submerged. The next day there were sailing craft in sight all day. At 1628 TINOSA pulled up alongside a prau

which contained a crew of three who were interrogated in Malayan by one of the Aussies. No useful information was forthcoming, and, inasmuch as there were no Japanese on board, TINOSA proceeded on her way.

At 1730 a ship was sighted on the port bow at a range of ten miles. By 1808 this was identified as a destroyer, which, ten minutes later, spotted TINOSA and turned towards her. Weiss bent on two more main engines and was able to evade her in the gathering darkness.

TINOSA continued her transit of Makassar Strait toward the rendezvous point for landing the passengers. She arrived there on 20 January, submerged at 0542, and began a cautious approach to the beach. The shore party was to display a white sheet spread between two trees to indicate that it was all clear and to fix the exact site to land. The signal was sighted early in the afternoon and TINOSA headed for it. Shortly afterward it was determined that the sub was grounded and Weiss decided to sit there until dark. At 1820 she surfaced and closed the shore.

Unexpectedly, a prau came to meet TINOSA and moored alongside to take the landing party off. The occupants came aboard where they were fed and given some of the necessities of life, of which they had obviously been deprived for a long time. The makeup of this group consisted of a U.S. Army Captain, a Cavite Navy Yard worker, and two Philippine Scouts, all of whom had escaped from Bataan, and an Englishman who was living on Borneo when the war broke

to send spray to the bridge. The other unit missed.

At 2037 TINOSA maneuvered to regain an attack position and at the same time started a reload forward. At 2108 there was gunfire from the target's vicinity. The escort had rejoined the convoy and had spotted TINOSA. Projectiles could be heard as they passed by and one landed close enough to spray the bridge.

Weiss decided to stay on the surface and turned away at increased speed. By 2115 the gunfire had ceased, so TINOSA set a course to get astern of the target. The escort could not be seen, but the two freighters were visible at one and a half miles. At 2157 TINOSA fired three bow shots from a range of 3000 yards.

One hit was observed and the target lost headway and sent up a dense cloud of smoke. The escort opened fire again but was shooting at shadows for no hardware was delivered in TINOSA'S vicinity. At 2211 a reload was started as TINOSA made preparations to attack the remaining ship.

At 2253 she commenced an approach. At 2303 the target, apparently aware of TINOSA'S presence, lighted a searchlight and swung it back and forth past the sub. Weiss continued to bore in, and at 2317 the shelling began again. At that time TINOSA fired three bow tubes at a range of 2000 yards. All torpedoes missed ahead.

Both the escort and the target were now firing at TINOSA with machine guns and four or five inch deck armament. Weiss bent on four main engines in an attempt to open the range. At 2350 the destroyer was able to

get her searchlight on the sub, but the range was now 9500 yards and the shells were falling short. At 2355 TINOSA lost contact with the targets. By now, the crew had been at battle stations for nine hours and had had no evening meal, so it was decided to break off the attack and to try to reestablish contact the next morning.

TINOSA spent the rest of the night moving to a likely intercept position. At 0646 she submerged on what was believed to be the target track. Meanwhile the torpedomen were busy rendering the magnetic exploder mechanisms inoperable, for that was thought to be the cause of the premature explosions. The targets did not put in an appearance.

Surface patrols were conducted until 4 February. During this two week period no enemy ships were sighted, but there was constant harassment by aircraft, two of which dropped bombs. The SD radar was not working properly and all contacts had been visual. Since there was not likely to be any shipping coming through while the aircraft were reporting his position, Weiss decided to patrol submerged during daylight hours. No targets were forthcoming, however, so on the night of the 12th, TINOSA cleared Balabac Strait into the Mindanao Sea heading east toward Surigao Strait.

On 14 February, the day was overcast and a steady rain was falling. At 0710 three small fishing vessels were sighted, and TINOSA pulled up alongside two of them to investigate and to obtain information. The boat crews were Filipino, friendly and anxious to come aboard the submarine.

Weiss allowed one of them who spoke pretty good English to come aboard for interrogation. He then submerged and went sailing off with one new, and somewhat reluctant, crew member. At 1800 TINOSA surfaced and made a transit of the Surigao Strait into the Pacific Ocean.

The morning of the 15th was spent patrolling on the surface, when at 1110 smoke was sighted on the horizon to the northwest about twenty miles away. TINOSA commenced tracking the target and at 1122 submerged.

It was 1210 before the targets could be seen by periscope. They were identified as two freighters, one transport and one tanker type. The convoy had changed base course, however, and would pass too far away for an effective attack. Weiss set a course to open the range so that he could safely surface and conduct an end around. At 1537 TINOSA surfaced.

By 1957 TINOSA was in position for a surface radar attack. The sky was overcast and visibility was poor. The convoy was arranged in two columns of two ships each with the two largest in the van. Weiss would try to get both of the latter.

At 1958 TINOSA fired three bow tubes at the near ship at a range of 2100 yards and then three bow tubes at the far ship. The torpedoes fired at the near ship were seen to miss astern, but two of the three that were fired at the far ship hit, one of which failed to explode.

At 2001 one of the trailing ships fired a star shell which lit up the area, and now, with TINOSA in sight, both of the trailing ships opened fire with their deck

guns. By this time TINOSA was speeding away and the shells fell short.

At 2018 the gunfire ceased. Radar still had contact on the ship that had been missed, and Weiss set out to intercept her. At 2023 a loud explosion was heard from the ship that had been hit, but that ship was out of radar range, and there was no assurance that it sunk.

The moon had risen by the time TINOSA was in position for an approach, so it was decided to make a submerged attack, and at 2335 she dove to radar depth. By 2342 the target was in sight on the periscope at a range of 6700 yards. TINOSA went to periscope depth and started the approach.

At 0000 the target made a radical change of course and now was heading directly for the attacking submarine. Weiss increased depth to ninety feet. At 0002 the target passed overhead and TINOSA returned to periscope depth.

At 0007 three stern tubes were fired at a range of 2000 yards "up the rump." There was a loud explosion and a column of smoke arose from the target.

The hit in the stern had stopped the target, so Weiss maneuvered toward a position to finish it off. There were several explosions that sounded like depth charges. By 0012 the target could be seen clearly and was not only stopped, but her bow was high in the air and she was sinking stern first.

TINOSA now had only one torpedo forward and two aft -- and the Swan Lager was all gone -- so she was ordered to proceed to Midway Island. At 0018 she surfaced and



headed for the barn. The patrol run was not yet over however.

On 19 February at 1047, three columns of smoke were sighted and once more TINOSA made preparations to attack. The convoy consisted of four freighters, one tanker and three escorts. At 1437 TINOSA entered a large rain squall and lost contact with the targets. At 1605 Weiss, believing that he was on the target track and not wanting to be caught on the surface if the rain should stop suddenly, submerged. At 1650 the convoy was sighted but the base course was twenty degrees to the right of that previously estimated and TINOSA would not be able to close to an effective firing range. At 1811 TINOSA surfaced and commenced pursuit of the targets.

Radar contact was reestablished at 1900 at a distance of 7-1/2 miles. Since no escort could be seen patrolling the starboard column, Weiss set up for an attack on that side. As TINOSA moved across the front of the convoy, so did the destroyer who maintained a position directly between the near ship and the submarine. Weiss dropped back to attack the starboard quarter of the convoy, but the escort dropped back, too, and positioned itself about 3000 yards from the nearest target directly between the submarine and the intended victim.

Weiss then hooked up four main engines and headed around the stern of the convoy to have a go at the port side. At 2230 TINOSA was abeam of a target and the escort was interposed between the adversaries as before. Weiss then took his submarine

ahead of the convoy, and at 2325 found himself well ahead and on the target track.

At 0003 TINOSA fired two stern tubes at a range of 3900 yards. There were no hits. At 0007 a destroyer was detected passing astern of the targets and heading for the attacking submarine at high speed. TINOSA ran away at top speed and was able to avoid a confrontation.

TINOSA took station about seven miles astern of the convoy and commenced trailing and transmitting contact reports. Visibility was variable because of haze and intermittent rain, and at 0537 she lost contact but continued to follow. At 0830 contact was regained.

At 1034 the rain suddenly stopped and the haze lifted and there was TINOSA in clear view of the convoy. One of the ships could be seen frantically signalling the near escort so Weiss turned away. The destroyer did not give chase, however, so at 1045 TINOSA went back to her trailing station. Not for long though, for, at 1054, two destroyers came over the horizon hell bent for election. Weiss tried once again to run away but the Japs were having none of it.

One destroyer opened fire at a range of eight miles. A projectile fell about 50 feet off the port quarter.

At 1136 the destroyer opened fire again at a range of six and a half miles. At 1140 a pattern of four rounds landed within twenty yards of the port side and one round passed so close overhead that the bridge personnel thought it was going to take off the periscope shears. With the approval of

all hands and the ship's cook, Weiss decided that discretion was the better part of valor and "pulled the cork." TINOSA went deep and rigged for depth charge. At 1155 the destroyer was overhead alternately echo ranging and listening, but was unable to make contact. By 1300 the destroyer was gone and TINOSA returned to periscope depth. It was raining again. Weiss decided to give it up and head for home, and at 1330 surfaced and set out for Midway.

TINOSA arrived Midway at 1600 on 28 February, topped off fuel, and at 1330 the next day departed for Pearl Harbor where she arrived at 1130 on 4 March.

In his remarks concerning the conduct of the patrol, Weiss made the following entry: "Gunfire was encountered from each convoy during the patrol, and though mostly erratic in range, excepting the attack of 20 February, the wisdom of the decision to remain on the surface could have been embarrassingly wrong. No suggestion is made here because of the speed, range, visibility, and luck factors involved and to which the known vulnerability of a sub to gunfire should be added and considered in any decision made."

On this subject Comsubpac made the following comment: "The cool daring of the Commanding Officer in electing to remain on the surface during several attacks under heavy, accurate gunfire so as to retain the initiative is noted with admiration and alarm. It must be borne in mind that the Japanese are continually improving their gunnery against submarines, and the risks involved in remaining on the surface in the

face of enemy gunfire must be very carefully weighed with the value of the target being attacked."

TINOSA was credited with sinking three freighters totaling 16,071 tons and damaging two freighters totaling 9,097 tons on this patrol.

Post war examination of Japanese records indicate that the ship that was hit in the attack of 15 February and for which damage credit was given, did indeed sink and TINOSA was eventually given credit for sinking four ships on this patrol.

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### **5th RUN TRIVIA**

Duration of patrol: 55 days

Ship Contacts: 24

Air Contacts: 36

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### **Binnacle List:**

Al Watrous sprained a finger when it was stepped on by a man descending from the bridge. No lost time.

Larry Dryzmalski developed abscesses in two teeth. The teeth were extracted by Doc Ford and the patient returned to duty the next day.

**PATROL RUN #5 SAILING LIST****OFFICERS**

WEISS, CO  
BELL, XO  
ROBB  
VAN GORDER  
SCHROEDER

BECK  
ERICKSON  
SALISBURY  
HINCHEY

**CREW**

CHIEF OF THE BOAT: PERRY & YONUSCHOT  
Jack Perry was commissioned Ensign while on patrol. He was relieved by Yonuschot.

BOATSWAINS MATE: HUNT

GUNNERS MATES: BLONDIN, BRADLEY

TORPEDOMEN: ANDERSON, BENTHAM, BROWN,  
CONNERY, FISHER, GIUFFRIDA, KEANE, LEVY,  
OTIS, SOBRENSKY, WEEKS

QUARTERMASTERS: HULS, WATROUS, WENDLING  
FIRECONTROLMEN; GORST, MONROE

MOTOR MACHINISTS MATES: BAYANS, CINFO,  
CROSS, HOVANEC, JOHNSON, KIRKMAN, LORZING,  
NORRIS, O'MALLEY, PIERSON, REEL, STANFORD,  
STEIN, STEVISON, SUGHRUE, WILLS, WITTMER,  
ZARAZINSKI

ELECTRICIANS MATES: BOND, BOSTICK,  
DRZYMALSKI, FONTANA, GALLARDY, HARRIS,  
LESH, LINTH, MOODY

RADIO TECHNICIANS: FOLEY, WILSON

RADIOMEN: GRIFFITH, MOEN, RUSTAD

SHIP'S COOKS: BERRY, GARRISON, HILLHOUSE  
YEOMAN: WILSON

PHARMACISTS MATE: FORD

SEAMEN: ALEXANDER, BEEDY, BURNS, DEYOUNG,  
GOODELL, SALMON, WATKINS, WICKER

FIREMEN: BROOKS, BURNS, RAY

STEWARDS: COLLINS, SETTLE

TOTAL 80



**YOU YANKS EAT WELL, BUT  
HOW'S YOUR SEX LIFE ?**



PATROL NUMBER 6  
A GANG FIGHT

TINOSA had arrived in Pearl Harbor from patrol number five on March 4 where she was scheduled for a twenty five day availability to be conducted by Bushnell. Number four MBT was to be converted to an FBT, the bridge was to be cut down to minimize the silhouette, and a four inch deck gun was to be installed to replace the three inch one that had been put aboard after run number one. Twenty-three men were transferred off and they were replaced by twenty-five new hands.

Notable among the new arrivals was one who was not so new. Jim Hunnicutt, who had commissioned the boat and made the first three runs in the engineering department, returned to the boat as executive officer and navigator.

Fifty new submarines were commissioned in 1943 and these, plus the boats that had been on patrol in the Atlantic Ocean, were now engaged in the war in the Pacific. It was no longer necessary to spread the submarine attack force so thin, so in October of 1943, Subpac commenced to use the tactic that the Germans had utilized so successfully. The Wolf Pack.

For patrol number six, TINOSA would be a component of a wolf pack that included PARCHE (L.P. Ramage) and BANG (A. Gallaher). The Officer in Tactical Command



(O.T.C.) was Captain G.E. Peterson in PARCHE. The assigned operating area was the Luzon Strait between Taiwan and Luzon Island, P.I.

At 1600 on March 29, the wolf pack departed Pearl Harbor for Midway Island where they spent April 2nd topping off with fuel. At noon the next day, they took departure Midway for enemy territory.

April 5 and 6 were occupied with battle surface drills in which all deck armament was fired. Up to now TINOSA had fired her deck gun in anger only once, when, on patrol run number three, she bombarded one of the Paluwat Islands. But the war was changing for TINOSA and these exercises were a harbinger of things to come. And soon.

At 1808 on April 12, the mast of a small boat was sighted at a range of seven miles. OTC ordered that it be sunk with gunfire. PARCHE made an attack at a range of 1,000 yards and TINOSA followed suit. As it turned out, the Sampan had been abandoned and was simply a derelict. TINOSA made two more attacks in an attempt to sink the wooden craft but she would not go under. When the siege was ended, the bow and masts were still visible. (The patrol report makes no mention of BANG in this affair nor makes no mention of rounds expended, number of hits or sea conditions.) At 1910, the submarines resumed course to the assigned operating area, where they arrived on April 16 at 1625.

BANG was ordered to patrol the southern third of the area off the coast of Luzon Island, TINOSA, the northern third off

Taiwan, and PARCHE, in between. For thirteen days, there was no enemy contact save for an occasional sampan transitting the area.

At 1604 on April 29, TINOSA received a contact report from BANG. There was an eleven ship convoy off the northwest coast of Luzon headed toward Manila at ten knots. PARCHE and TINOSA set out to join her. TINOSA was almost ninety miles away and would not make contact until 0512 the next day, when smoke was sighted. Weiss started an end run.

BANG had already made an attack and sunk one ship from this convoy by the time that the other subs arrived. PARCHE was to make an attack on the port flank before TINOSA, during which time Weiss maneuvered to follow up.

At 0828, TINOSA went to battle stations and commenced an approach. The primary target was to be a large tanker in the starboard column, and the freighter leading this column was to be the secondary target.

Luck was with TINOSA as the convoy made a zig to the left which put her in excellent position for the attack. Two explosions were heard and then a barrage of forty-two depth charges were heard in the direction of PARCHE. The convoy immediately started to disperse and turned away from TINOSA spoiling the set-up. Then luck returned. The target group unexpectedly turned back to the right in a formation that presented TINOSA with the spectacle of five ships overlapping each other.

Weiss decided to treat the five ships as a single target and at 1919 fired a six

torpedo spread from the bow tubes at a range of 3,000 yards. One torpedo hit the leading freighter, two torpedoes hit a second freighter (which sank according to the patrol report, but TINOSA received no credit for it in the postwar analysis) and one torpedo hit the tanker. TINOSA lost depth control and by the time she was able to return to periscope depth, the three escorts that had been attacking PARCHE were bearing down. Weiss attempted to swing around into position for a stern shot but again lost depth control.

Before she could regain periscope depth, two depth charges exploded close aboard, probably dropped by the aircraft that was covering the convoy. TINOSA went deep and in the next fourteen minutes received twenty one depth charges but only two or three were close.

At 1046, Weiss got back to periscope depth - in time to see a freighter sink. BANG was credited with this one. The convoy was sighted to the north, so TINOSA was still between it and the apparent port of call. At 1407 TINOSA surfaced with the expectation of moving into attack position but was promptly chased down by an aircraft.

It was 1823 before she could safely surface and give chase. The wolf pack had lost contact with the convoy and had not regained it by early the next morning when OTC ordered it back to patrol stations.

Back on station, TINOSA attempted to conduct surface patrol, but before noon was chased under three times by aircraft. It was decided to stay submerged.

At 0552 on May 3, the masts of a convoy were sighted. There were twelve ships, which included one tanker, one troop transport, six freighters, one destroyer, and three smaller escorts. TINOSA trailed the convoy and sent hourly contact reports to PARCHE and BANG. At 0957, Weiss surfaced and started an end around, but at 1335 was chased under by an aircraft sighting.

A patrol craft was sighted at 1800 headed for TINOSA. Weiss thought the aircraft might have spotted him so he took steps to evade. The patrol craft was on some other business apparently, for it went on by. At 1900, a series of five distant explosions were heard. Darkness had set in by 1922, so TINOSA surfaced and headed for the convoy.

At 1950, there was a radar contact four miles away. There was radar interference accompanying the interference so it was assumed to be BANG or PARCHE and Weiss took steps to get clear. At 2023 PARCHE sent a contact report and asked for positions of all submarines. TINOSA'S radio transmitter was out of commission and she was unable to comply.

Radar contact on the convoy was made at 2052 at a range of seven miles to the east, and TINOSA forged ahead to get to an attack position. By 2155 she was well placed ahead of the target group. BANG had been ordered to make the initial attack and Weiss moved away out of torpedo range. It was a bright moonlight night which dictated a submerged periscope attack and at 2213 TINOSA dove and commenced her approach.

A tanker that was leading the starboard

column was chosen as the first target, and at 2309 at a range of 1600 yards three bow tubes were fired. Thirty seconds later three more bow tubes were fired at the freighter that was following the tanker. The tanker was hit under the bridge and in the bow and sank. One hit was heard on the freighter but was not observed as Weiss was watching the tanker. There was another hit on the freighter and a hit on a freighter in the far column which had apparently got in the way of a torpedo that missed. The latter burst into flames. TINOSA came about in order to get a stern tube shot, but before she could get set up two of the escorts came charging in on her. Weiss attempted to evade at periscope depth.

At 2314, a loud explosion was heard in the direction of the burning freighter. Nothing could be seen, however, as that ship was enveloped in a dense cloud of smoke. At 2320, TINOSA went deep and rigged for depth charge. In the next two hours she received fifty-five of these, and made note of the fact that they appeared to be a new type that was much louder and more potent than any previously encountered.

By 0134, the escorts had broken off their attack and TINOSA surfaced. There was a radar contact seven miles to the west and Weiss headed for it. The night had darkened making a surface approach possible and at 0244 TINOSA was in position to attack.

At 0249 she fired four stern tubes at a range of 3250 yards. The target had detected TINOSA and was firing at her with four rapid fire weapons. The first torpedo

hit just abaft the bridge, another hit right under the bridge and a third hit the bow. The unfortunate victim simply disappeared.

OTC again requested position reports but TINOSA was still unable to transmit. A series of explosions were heard at 0345 but these could not be identified. There were four targets on radar, three of which were assumed to be escorts. Weiss bore in on the single merchantman. During the approach, the usually reliable torpedo data computer developed a malfunction and the old Mark 8 angle solver had to be brought into play.

At 0409 TINOSA fired four bow tubes from a range of 3,000 yards. The torpedoes missed ahead. TINOSA was between the escorts and the dawn sky and to prevent being detected Weiss cleared the area at full speed. At 0455 radar contact was lost.

The radio transmitter was now repaired and at 0457 a position report was sent to OTC. At 0503 TINOSA submerged and commenced a submerged patrol. A mast was sighted to the west at a distance of eight miles and Weiss set a course to intercept. After an hour, the target was still in sight but the range had not closed. Between 0712 and 0733 forty-eight explosions were heard. Somebody was getting it! Suddenly the target group turned south and the range began to shorten. By 0847 Weiss was in position for a stern shot.

At 0850 four stern tubes were fired at a range of 3,000 yards. The target sighted the torpedo wakes and started to turn away. The two escorts turned towards TINOSA. Two

explosions were heard at 0855 but the target was out of sight and it is not known if they were torpedo hits. The escorts were now at hand, and TINOSA underwent a long depth charge attack, during which, thirty depth charges were dropped.

It was 1500 before Weiss could get back to periscope depth, and there was still one escort in sight. It was 1855 before TINOSA could surface. All torpedoes were expended and the crew was exhausted from thirty hours of constant enemy contact. OTC was informed of this and permission was given to proceed to Majuro Atoll. The action on this patrol, however, was not over.

On May 9, while in the area of the Mariana Islands, a small trawler was sighted at 0810. A larger one was sighted about five miles to the northeast. "Decided to knock this one off."

At 1211 TINOSA submerged and began an approach. When the range had closed to 6,000 yards, she battle surfaced in a medium sea and opened fire. The first shot missed but the second round hit the target's bridge. Forty-one rounds later, at a range of 3000 yards, the gunners got their second hit. As the range closed, the target was hit more frequently and fragments of the wooden vessel could be seen flying about. The patrol report states: "at 1400 yards, we were hitting consistently. A waterline hit started a fuel fire. Two or three more hits left her settling at the stern and burning like a bonfire."

TINOSA closed to pick up survivors. The first one was reluctant to come aboard, but a tommy gun persuaded him to do so.

The others exhibited the same reluctance and kept swimming away when TINOSA got close. Since the fire was making a lot of smoke, Weiss decided that it would be appropriate to get the hell out of there before an aircraft spotted it. He secured topside and headed away. There were ten survivors clinging to the wreckage as he left. TINOSA set course for Majuro Atoll in the Marshall Islands where she was to undergo upkeep by Bushnell. She arrived alongside on May 15.

Comsubpac gave TINOSA credit for sinking one freighter in the April 30 attack, one tanker and one freighter in the May 3 attack, and a fishing trawler for a total of 25,650 tons and 25,000 tons damaged. It is interesting to note that the post war analysis credits no ships sunk by PARCHE or TINOSA in the April 30 action while BANG is credited with sinking two freighters. For the May 3 action, BANG is credited with one freighter, PARCHE two freighters, and TINOSA two freighters (12,876 tons).

TINOSA was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation for the 4th, 5th and 6th war patrols.

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### **6th RUN TRIVIA:**

Duration of patrol: 47 days

Ship Contacts: 34

Air Contacts: 11

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## Binnacle List:

Lt. Robb developed cellulitis in his right leg and was removed from duty for eight days.

George Alexander suddenly started to hemorrhage in the area of his shoulder, No injury was apparent. One day off duty.

Hisao Kajisaki (Prisoner of War) was suffering from a gunshot wound and multiple lacerations and contusions and a rib fracture. Doc Loveless (a mortician in civilian life) sewed him up and had him in good health when the ship reached Majuro.

The Doc also treated the following:

Acute gasritis

Acute urethritis, nonvenereal

Vincent's Angina

Cellulitis

Acute conjunctivitis

Fungus infection, right ear

Hemorrhoids

Special mention was directed to CSS Hugh Paschal for the improvement in the food "whose planning and supervision was of the high order demanded by the Submarine Service."

**PATROL RUN #6 SAILING LIST****OFFICERS**

WEISS, CO	BECK
HUNNICUTT, XO	ROBB
SCHROEDER	SALISBURY
SIEGFRIED	McGRATH
ERICKSON	

**CREW****CHIEF OF THE BOAT: CONNERY****GUNNERS MATE: BRADLEY****TORPEDOMEN: BENTHAM, BROWN, CLEMENT,****GIUFFRIDA, KEANE, OTIS, PETROWSKI,****SOBRENSKY, WAGNER, WEEKS****QUARTERMasters: BOYD, HULS, WATROUS****FIRECONTROLMAN: MONROE****MOTOR MACHINISTS Mates: BAYANS, BROOKS,****CROSS, DAUGHTRY, HALL, HOVANEC, JOHNSON,****LORZING, NORRIS, O'MALLEY, PIERSON, REEL,****SALACINSKI, STANFORD, STEVISON, SUGHRUE,****WILLS, WITKOWSKI, WITTMER****ELECTRICIANS Mates: BOND, BOSTICK,****DRZYMALSKI, GALLARDY, HARRIS, LESH, LINTH,****MINOR, MOODY, POLIS, ROMAN, STOKES****RADIO TECHNICIANS: FOLEY, TYLER****RADIOMEN: CITRIN, FLANTZER, GRIFFITH, MOEN****SHIP'S COOKS: BOLINDER, GARRISON,****HILLHOUSE, PASCHAL****YEOMAN: REEVES****PHARMACISTS MATE: LOVELESS****SEAMEN: ALEXANDER, BEEDY, BURNS, CARPENTER,****DEYOUNG, GOODELL, MCLAUGHLIN, SALMON,****SOUTIERE, WATKINS, WICKER****FIREMEN: BURNS, CROWDER****STEWARDS: COLLINS, SETTLE****TOTAL 83**



**CHEF HUGH PASCHAL**  
**6TH PATROL HERO**

PATROL NUMBER 7  
PRELUDE TO STATESIDE

TINOSA spent just over three weeks alongside Bushnell at Majuro Atoll for upkeep, loading, and training. Thirteen men and officers were transferred and the rest of the crew spent ten days frolicking among the palms, getting as much R & R as two bottles of Iron City beer and some horrible raisin wine could provide. Meanwhile, the relief crew made some minor repairs, gave the boat a new camouflage and loaded twenty-four Mark 23 torpedoes. At 1312 on June 7, TINOSA left Majuro to resume the business of war.

She was headed for the East China Sea this time, where, you will remember she had made a four day sortie during patrol run #1 to conduct an unsuccessful attack on a twelve ship convoy. The area guarded the ports of Nagasaki and Sasebo in Japan, and the port of Pusan in Korea, and the principal sea lanes of western Japan to China and the south. It was to be another wolf pack run, the other boats being TANG and SEALION II. Captain Weiss in command. This wolf pack varied from the one on patrol run #6 in that instead of three boats operating in a single area, each would have an area of its own adjacent to each other and pass targets on to each other. There was to be a limited amount of coordinated patrol activity. TANG was to operate in

the Yellow Sea and SEALION II in the area to the west of TINOSA in the East China Sea.

Enemy aircraft harrassment started on June 13. At 0942 a flying boat was sighted and at 1122 another. TINOSA was compelled to dive to avoid the second one.

At 1030 on June 14, an unidentified ship was sighted at a range of five miles. It was believed to be a submarine. Weiss dove and commenced an approach but was unable to make further contact. He surfaced at 1210 and commenced a search, without success.

At 0130 the next morning explosions were heard and gunfire could be seen all the way from dead ahead to abaft the starboard beam. (SWORDFISH sank a ship on this date and at this latitude and longitude. It is possible that this was the cause of all the fuss.) The firing continued for two-and-a-half hours. TINOSA made radar contact at 0340 on a target that was five-and-one-half miles away. Weiss started an end around on what was believed to be a destroyer. At 0509 he dove for an attack, but the target turned away and TINOSA was out of shooting range.

Upon surfacing at 0615, three ships were sighted. The SJ radar was out of commission and it was quite foggy. The range was estimated to be six miles. Shortly thereafter the entire convoy was in sight. There were two small tankers, a freighter, and two destroyers. At 0626 TINOSA submerged and commenced an approach. At 0703 the escorts, for some unknown reason, lay down a barrage of seven depth

charges. At 0711 six bow tubes were fired at the two tankers from a range of 3200 yards. Two torpedoes were seen to pass under the near destroyer, and all six missed ahead of the targets.

Weiss then attempted to bring the stern tubes to bear, but the escorts were charging in on him. TINOSA started to go deep. Five depth charges exploded very close aboard. Eighteen more fell during the next half hour, some of which were close enough to cause a loss of depth control and drive TINOSA down to 360 feet. The depth charging ceased, but the destroyers continued to search. At 0829 Weiss returned to periscope depth. The destroyers were three miles to the east.

TINOSA was clear of the enemy by 1105 at which time she surfaced with the intention of searching out the convoy for another attack. A bad storm was brewing, however, and after an hour-and-a-half of high seas, heavy rain and strong winds made further search impractical she broke off the search and continued on her way to her area.

By morning, the storm was over and the sky had cleared and this became a day of unwanted contacts. Four aircraft were sighted, three of which came close enough to force TINOSA under. Then at 1554 a periscope was sighted at a range of 1500 yards. Weiss bent on four engines and sped away.

The next morning, at 1110 another periscope was sighted at a range of 800 yards. Weiss went to four engines and turned toward the sighting in an attempt to drive

her down. At 1121 TINOSA continued on her way. The weather was worsening and visibility decreasing so that TINOSA was able to transit the Ryukyu Islands on the surface. At 1427 on June 17, TINOSA entered the East China Sea and her assigned area. Once there she headed for a zone in which some B-29 crews were thought to have ditched.

The next day she spent searching for the downed airmen. At 1325 she was forced to dive because of a near aircraft. She again surfaced at 1420 and continued the search. A three masted sailing vessel was sighted at 1820, and at 1840 a sampan put in an appearance. Weiss decided to make a night gun attack on the schooner.

The night was very dark and TINOSA was able to close to 750 yards before being detected. At that time the target challenged with a small blinker light. The gunners who were having trouble seeing the target now took a bead on the signal light. The four inch deck gun, both 20 mm and two 50 caliber machine guns opened fire and continued to rake the hapless victim until the range got down to 100 yards. Then TINOSA came alongside of the badly damaged ship, tossed half a dozen buckets of fuel oil aboard which were ignited with oil soaked rags. As TINOSA moved away, the target was a mass of flames which could be seen for the next five hours.

June 19 was spent on surface patrol. There were two aircraft contacts that morning but neither came close enough to be a problem. June 20 was spent submerged. There were occasional aircraft sightings,

without incident.

At 0820 the next morning, TINOSA got caught with her skivvies askew when an airplane got in to three miles heading right for her. Weiss dove immediately and headed for 120 feet, fully expecting momentary explosions. None came, so at 0845 he took a peek and there was the aircraft headed directly for the periscope. He went deep again, but as before no bombs or depth charges were dropped. At 0940 and again at 1042 Weiss took a look and each time the plane was sighted circling the area. The next time he looked the aircraft was gone. At 1505 TINOSA surfaced but at 1610 was again compelled to dive to avoid air detection. It was 2005 and dark when TINOSA surfaced again.

At 0449 June 22, TINOSA dove to conduct submerged patrol. Dullsville! At 1835 a sampan was sighted at a distance of five miles and Weiss, itching for a target, decided to attack it with gunfire. At 1950 TINOSA battle surfaced at a range of 900 yards and opened fire with the deck gun. The first three shots were hits and the sampan settled by the stern. It was decided to burn it, so three "TINOSA COCK-TAILS" were tossed aboard and the victim was soon engulfed in flames. A short while later the fuel tanks exploded and she disappeared. TINOSA headed east.

At 2345 the bridge sighted a patrol craft which was picked up by radar at a range of three miles and closing fast. Weiss bent of four engines and turned away. While turning, a second patrol craft was sighted about one mile away. TINOSA showed



them her stern and was able to get away.

At 0200 June 23, TINOSA abandoned the search for B-29 crews. It was time to head south to a rendezvous with TANG and SEALION II who were now on station. At 1930 the bridge sighted a periscope at 2000 yards and turned away at full speed.

At 0100 on June 24 TINOSA was lying to alongside TANG. SEALION II arrived at 0245. A conference was held aboard TINOSA setting forth the procedures for a coordinated patrol. At 0355 the liaison officers returned to their respective ships, and the wolf pack proceeded to the designated positions.

All was quiet until at 2200 TANG sent a contact report stating that she had attacked a convoy that was headed for Nagasaki. Since TINOSA and SEALION II were too far away to intercept the surviving ships before they reached port, it was rather academic. TANG sank four ships of this six ship convoy.

June 26 and 27 were uneventful except for occasional aircraft and sampan sightings. At 2002 June 27, the wolf pack departed the Nagasaki area and headed west to take position in the sea lanes to Shanghai. They were on station by 0100 June 29. Enroute, SEALION II encountered and sank a ship.

The next day while patrolling on the surface, a floating mine was sighted. An attempt was made to sink or explode it with rifle fire, but the sea was rough and the try was unsuccessful. TANG and SEALION II were notified of the mine's position, and the submarines were released to return to

their areas to operate independently. On this day and the next, TANG sank three ships.

The morning of July 2 found TINOSA poking around the islands off Sasebo. At 0456 a large freighter was sighted steaming through the islands at a range of eight miles. It was, at that time, in water too shallow for an attack, but it was headed for deeper. TINOSA headed for the deep water too, but to get there in time to achieve position, it was necessary to pass within four miles off Haku To on which there was a lighthouse. There was little doubt that she was seen and reported; for at 0620, two aircraft were sighted headed right for her. She dove.

When she was passing 100 feet, the first bomb exploded, driving the sub up to eighty feet. Three more bombs exploded immediately after the first, but were not as close. By noon thirteen more bombs exploded, one of which caused number ten torpedo tube to flood. All the explosions were close enough to make Weiss believe that he was leaving a trail of bubbles or fuel oil. All air and circulating water systems were shut down where possible. He decided to stay down until dark.

At 1604 depth charges began to rain down and twenty nine exploded by 1753, some close. No screws could be heard on the sound gear so it was assumed that they were aircraft launched. At 1910 sound picked up screws and more depth charges began to explode. The first ones were close and then progressively further away. At 1927 Weiss returned to periscope depth and took

a look around. There was a small patrol craft about four miles away. Again at 2016 he took a look. Nothing was to be seen, but depth charges could be heard exploding in the distance. Thirty-six charges were counted since the arrival of the PC.

At 2025 TINOSA was able to surface. It was a bright moonlight night. At 2130 the bridge sighted a periscope on the port beam about a mile away. She turned away at full speed.

July 3 was spent submerged until 2003. At that time TINOSA surfaced, again in the bright moonlight. At 2111 radar reported a contact nine miles southeast of TINOSA. There were several blips and it looked like a convoy. Weiss closed to investigate, and at six miles several ships could be seen from the bridge. By 2133 five ships could be seen deployed in three columns.

At 2216 TINOSA went to radar depth and bore in for an attack. When the range reached 7200 yards the complete convoy could be identified. The port column was led by a large troop transport followed by a small tanker, the center column was led by a destroyer followed by a large freighter, and the starboard column was led by a large tug followed by a freighter. There were three escorts on the starboard side of the convoy and one about three miles ahead. There were none on the port side.

Weiss went to periscope depth and moved in on the troop transport. The target made an unexpected zig toward TINOSA and it was necessary to hurriedly open the range. At 2301 two stern tubes were fired at a range of 500 yards. The first hit under the

bridge and eight seconds later the other hit just aft of her superstructure. She sank. Weiss was now swinging for a shot at the large freighter in the center column.

At 2302 four bow tubes were fired. Weiss found it necessary to shoot sooner than he would have wished because a destroyer was coming fast. One hit was seen just forward of the bridge and the target was seen to break in two. There was no time to watch any longer for the destroyer was 150 yards away. TINOSA headed deep. Two more hits were heard on the target as she was going down.

The first of the depth charges went off as TINOSA was passing 100 feet and in the next hour a total of forty three exploded in the vicinity. Some were close but did no particular damage.

By 0045 TINOSA was able to surface. The remainder of the convoy would reach port before she could mount an attack so battle stations were secured and TINOSA headed south. On this day TANG, which was operating in the Yellow Sea, sank two more ships.

July 6 through 9 were uneventful except for the usual aircraft harrassment. On July 6 TANG sank a ship at the northern end of the Yellow Sea, and SEALION II sank a ship off the China coast.

At 0621 on July 10 the bridge reported smoke on the horizon at a range of fifteen miles. TINOSA closed to investigate and submerged when the range had decreased to seven miles. As she got closer it became apparent that the target was too small for a torpedo attack, so it was decided once

again to exercise the gun crew.

When the range reached 1700 yards TINOSA surfaced and opened fire with the deck gun. The first round was short, but ricocheted into the base of the mainmast which collapsed. The next hit was the ninth round, which at a range of 500 yards, hit amidships just above the waterline, and the target exploded. Weiss wanted to take a prisoner but no survivors could be found. TINOSA headed west.

At 0220 the next morning the bridge observed a torpedo wake pass fifty feet astern and TINOSA ran away at full speed. At 0420 the bridge sighted a periscope 2000 yards away and turned away to avoid. July 12, 13 and 14 were spent on submerged patrol off Ryukyu Islands, but made no ship contact.

On July 15 Weiss decided to go back to the Nagasaki area which seemed to provide the most targets. At 1650 he was once again chased under by aircraft.

At 1910 TINOSA surfaced and continued on her way. At 1948 the bridge sighted smoke to the eastward at a range of eight miles. The high periscope identified the contact as a Japanese submarine of the I class. A quick set up was plugged into the TDC as TINOSA moved into position for attack. It was getting dark. Then the radar ceased to function and it wasn't until 2047 until it was again operational, but it was unable to regain contact. At 2109 radar made contact at 850 yards. The blip indicated a small object which suddenly disappeared from the scope. It had all the characteristics of a submarine periscope,

and, if that were the case, then TINOSA was now the target. Weiss departed the vicinity.

July 16 was spent submerged and at 0510 July 17 she dove for more of the same. At this point the patrol report narrative is missing until 0145 on July 22. Other elements of the report indicate that TINOSA left her operating area on July 19 in accordance with the operation order and headed for Midway Island, and then to Pearl Harbor where she arrived in time for breakfast on July 30.

The Type Commander's endorsement to the patrol report made mention of and indicated concern as to the extensive air coverage and the high incidence of submarine sightings on this patrol. TINOSA was credited with 18,400 tons sunk by torpedo and 600 tons sunk by gunfire.

(SEALION II sank 3 ships, 5,373 tons and TANG sank a whopping 10 ships, 47,060 tons on this patrol).

TINOSA would now leave the combat arena for stateside and a Navy Yard overhaul at Hunters Point Navy Yard. Tojo-and TINOSA's crew-could breathe easy for a few months.

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### 7th RUN TRIVIA

Duration of patrol: 54 days

Ship Contacts: 19

Air Contacts: 31

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Binnacle list:

None

Torpedo troubles persist. Three of the fish received from Bushnell had gyro defects. One was delivered without a gyro, the gyro in another was frozen and had to be cleared. During the depth charge attack on July 2 when #10 tube was flooded the afterbody of the torpedo in that tube was flooded and had to be made operational by ships company.

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**PATROL RUN #7 SAILING LIST****OFFICERS**

WEISS, CO  
HUNNICUTT, XO  
SCHROEDER  
SMITH

SIEGFRIED  
ERICKSON  
SALISBURY

**CREW**

CHIEF OF THE BOAT: SCALIA

GUNNERS MATE: BRADLEY

TORPEDO MEN: BENTHAM, BROWN, CLEMENT,  
GIUFFRIDA, KEANE, OTIS, PETROWSKI, WAGNER,  
WEEKS, WESNER

QUARTERMASTERS: BOYD, WATROUS, WICKER

FIRECONTROL MEN: GOODELL, MONROE

MOTOR MACHINISTS MATES: BAYANS, CROSS,  
DAUGHTRY, HALL, HOVANEC, JOHNSON, LORZING,  
O'MALLEY, PARE, PIERSON, ROBBINS,  
SALACINSKI, STANFORD, STEVISON, WILLS,  
WITKOWSKI, WITTMER

ELECTRICIANS MATES: BOND, BOSTICK,  
DRZYMALSKI, FREEBURN, GALLARDY, HARRIS,  
KLAG, LESH, MINOR, MOODY, OWENS, POLIS,  
ROMAN, STOKES

RADIO TECHNICIANS: SAWYER, TYLER

RADIOMEN: CITRIN, FLANTZER, GRIFFITH, MOEN

SHIP'S COOKS: BOLINDER, GARRISON,  
HILLHOUSE, PASCHAL

YEOMAN: SCRANTON

PHARMACISTS MATE: LOVELESS


SEAMEN: BEEDY, BRUMFIELD, BURNS, CARPENTER,  
DEYOUNG, ETEROVICH, MCLAUGHLIN, SALMON,  
SOUTIERE, WATKINS

FIREMEN: AULT, BURNS, CROWDER

STEWARDS: COLLINS, SETTLE

TOTAL 82





## **THE 'T'S SOLUTION FOR ENEMY PERISCOPES**

**PATROL NUMBER 8,  
THE MINE DETECTING DEVICE**

TINOSA arrived at Hunters Point Navy Yard on 7 August, 1944, for a major overhaul. During the two-and-one-half months she was there, all her machinery and armament were refurbished or replaced. The four inch deck gun was replaced with a five inch twenty-five caliber one, the twenty millimeter heretofore mounted on the after end of the bridge deck was replaced with a forty millimeter unit. The SJ radar mast was extended six feet, boiler type manhole covers were installed at the lower end of access hatch trunks, and a centrifugal trim pump replaced the old one. There was one item of new equipment installed that would make a significant change in the manner of conducting patrols - - - a mine detecting device.

By October 23 the overhaul was done, the ship was loaded, the crew had been herded aboard, and TINOSA headed for San Diego. She conducted ten days of exercises there, and then headed for Pearl Harbor where she arrived November 18.

Thirty-one men who had been aboard when TINOSA reached the states were now gone, and had been replaced by thirty-seven others. Lt. Comdr. R.C. Latham who had relieved Comdr. Weiss as CO in September spent a week exercising the crew and the ship's machinery followed by three days of

"special tests."

These special tests were very special, indeed. In fact, so special that Admiral Lockwood spent a day aboard during the tests, and he was a most interested observer of - - - the mine detecting device.

All tests and training were completed by December 1, and the next two days were spent loading ship. The weapon load for this run was twenty-two MK eighteen torpedoes. For some unexplained reason only six units were loaded aft. At 1330 on December 4, TINOSA was underway for Midway Island where she topped off fuel and lube oil, and at 0800 December 9 she was underway to her assigned patrol area.

The area included the Ryukyu Islands south of Okinawa Jima and the east coast of Formosa. Some twenty-five enemy ships had been sunk by submarines in this area so some torpedo action could be expected.

It was the time of heavy weather, and as TINOSA approached the Bonin's, the seas began to get exceedingly rough and the wind blew up a gale. There was not much chance of being detected by the enemy in this weather, but it did compel her to slow to eight knots, and it was hard on the crew, especially the bridge watch. On December 12 at 1600 the new watch was doused as "two green ones" came aboard and poured down the conning tower hatch. There was a foot of water in the conning tower when it was over. The port lookout was knocked unconscious for a short time. On December 17, a "big green one" lifted Chuck Wagner out of the starboard lookout station and deposited him on the main deck aft. He made his way

back to the bridge ladder, but was again washed away. He alertly grabbed a lifeline and held on until he was able to regain the bridge ladder and was hauled to safety by the eager hands of the bridge watch.

On December 17, the gunners sank a floating mine with small arms, 20 mm and 50 caliber fire.

On the 20th, TINOSA transitted the Daito Islands, 150 miles east of her area. There was an abundance of interference from shore based radar installations, indicating that the Japanese had been upgrading their detection equipment since TINOSA went stateside. This proved to be the case on each island of any size in this patrol area.

TINOSA pressed onward and entered her assigned area on December 21 at 0005. She spent the day on surface patrol about fifty miles southeast of Okinawa Jima. As soon as it was dark, Latham commenced to close the island and at 0627, the next morning, submerged eight miles off the entrance to Naha harbor. For six hours he inched closer to the shore, and at 1237 commenced a test of - - - the mine detecting device.

Okinawa was known to be surrounded by mine fields, for the Japanese realized that this strategically placed island was a candidate for invasion. Intelligence had provided precise information on the location of some of these mines and TINOSA was headed for these. During the course of the afternoon some mines were detected, which is a good thing, for it is easy to imagine what might happen in a known mine field when no mines are found by - - - the mine

detecting device.

TINOSA cleared the mine field and surfaced at 1849. She would now proceed to the southwest through the remaining Ryukyu Islands to the east coast of Formosa where she arrived on Christmas morning. For a week she conducted submerged patrol up and down the coast sighting only sampans and patrol aircraft. December 30 she received orders to break off this patrol and return to the vicinity of Okinawa Jima to conduct a special mission involving - - - the mine detecting device.

The United States invasion of Okinawa Jima was scheduled for April 1. Reconnaissance was needed to support that exercise and to that end SWORDFISH had been fitted out with special photographic equipment and personnel. She had left Pearl Harbor on December 22, and had been assigned the area immediately north of Okinawa. TINOSA'S mission was to circle the island at a suitable distance from shore to support the photographic reconnaissance, plot a safe track clear of mines, and supply this information to SWORDFISH.

At 0213 January 7, TINOSA submerged about four miles off the coast and commenced the mission. At 1915 January 9, the encirclement was completed - and not a single mine was detected! Not even in the area where she had found mines on December 21!

January 10, Latham left the Okinawa area to patrol in the Daito Islands. After seven uneventful days there TINOSA received orders to terminate the patrol January 18. TINOSA returned to Pearl Harbor where she

arrived at 1030 January 30.

Comsubpac awarded TINOSA a successful patrol run designation for run number eight. It was successful from the standpoint that TINOSA was not wiped out. Upon examination in Pearl Harbor, it was determined that it was working at only twenty percent efficiency. You know - - - the mine detecting device!

Apparently SWORDFISH never was able to use the information provided by TINOSA. The last that Comsubpac heard from that unfortunate boat was on January 3.

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### 8th RUN TRIVIA

Duration of patrol: 57 days

Ship Contacts: 9

Air Contacts: 22

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While in Hunters Point, the Steelhead, which was in the next drydock to TINOSA suffered a severe fire which did so much damage that she had to be decommissioned.

Nickel and dime one-armed bandits on TINOSA'S barge at Hunters Point produced a most lavish and memorable ship's party at the Claremont Hotel in Richmond.

On this patrol, met and exchanged recognition signals with four U.S. subs, TRE-PANG, PIRANHA, PUFFER, QUEENFISH.

It's getting more crowded.

**PATROL RUN #8 SAILING LIST****OFFICERS**

LATHAM, CO

SMITH

WEAVER

PAINE, XO

SIEGFRIED

OLSEN

SANDERS

SALISBURY

**CREW**

CHIEF OF THE BOAT: WELCH

GUNNERS MATES: RICHESON, WATKINS

TORPEDOMEN: BENTHAM, BROWN, BURNS, CLEMENT,  
KEANE, OTIS, STONE, WAGNER, WEEKS, WESNER,  
WILSONQUARTERMASTERS: BOYD, RODMAN, WATROUS,  
WICKER

FIRECONTROLMEN: GOODELL, MONROE

MOTOR MACHINISTS MATES: BAIRD, BAYANS,  
CROSS, DAUGHTRY, HALL, HOVANEC, MCLAUGHLIN,  
NORMAN, O'MALLEY, PARE, PIERSON, REYNOLDS,  
ROBBINS, SALACINSKI, STANFORD, STEVENS,  
THOMPSON, WITTMERELECTRICIANS MATES: BOND, DRZYMALSKI,  
FREEBURN, GALLARDY, HARRIS, KLAG, LEONARD,  
MINOR, MOODY, OWENS, POLIS, SOUTIERE, STOKES

RADIO TECHNICIANS: BRADY, TYLER

RADIOMEN: CITRIN, GRIFFITH, HINDS,  
VAN NATTERSHIP'S COOKS: BOLINDER, HUFFMAN, IRVIN,  
MURPHY

YEOMAN: HARRIS

PHARMACISTS MATE: GARNER

SEAMEN: ARMSTRONG, BEEDY, BRUMFIELD,  
CAMPBELL, C. CARPENTER, R. CARPENTER,  
ETEROVICH, GOULD, SANDERS, SHELDEN,  
ST. AMANT

FIREMEN: AULT

STEWARDS: JACKSON, SETTLE

TOTAL 85



**CAPTAIN, IS THAT BIG  
ROUND BALL WITH SPIKES,  
DANGEROUS ?**





## PATROL NUMBER 9 --- JUST PLANE TROUBLE

On her arrival in Pearl Harbor on January 30, 1945, the Submarine Base and Subdiv 45 commenced a routine refit on TINOSA. The radar mast extension that had been installed in Hunter's Point was removed and, most notably, a ship alteration that was designed to allow the bow planes to be rigged out with a fifteen degree down angle, thereby decreasing the time to dive, was implemented. Eighteen men were transferred and replaced by a like number. The weapon load was identical to that of the previous run. On March 1 at 1426, TINOSA took departure Pearl Harbor en-route Saipan.

The trip to Saipan was uneventful except that she was forced to dive three times because of aircraft contacts. They were probably friendly aircraft, but even so, they might not act friendly toward a submarine. At 1046 on March 11, she moored alongside the tender FULTON in Tanapag Harbor, Mariana Islands. There she spent four days conducting special tests, and at 1334 on March 17, she departed for her patrol area in company with SPADEFISH.

Captain Latham was to command a wolf pack that consisted of TINOSA, SPADEFISH and TIRANTE. TIRANTE would join the pack later.

At 0605 on March 23, TINOSA dove to make a submerged transit of the Ryukyu Islands. The bow planes failed to rig out

fully and would not tilt. A heavy sea was running and without bow planes it was impossible to maintain depth control at periscope depth, so Latham took the boat to 150 feet. A shear pin in the rigging gear had failed and this was replaced, but the planes would not rig out. The planes were rigged in with the intention of making repairs when the ship surfaced. Depth control was extremely difficult under these circumstances, and TINOSA frequently broached to thirty feet and was compelled to use negative tank to regain depth. The water here was not very deep and she hit bottom a couple of times.

At 1931 TINOSA surfaced. The bow planes were not fully rigged in although the indicator showed them to be. The limit switches were reset to agree with the indicator in the hope that this would make the planes operable.

(While all this was going on, SPADEFISH sank a freighter fifty miles NNW of TINOSA).

At 0604 TINOSA conducted a trim dive from which she surfaced at 0631. The bow planes seemed to be working. At 0702 there was a visual aircraft contact, and she submerged and the noise in the bow planes made it obvious that there was a major defect in the gear train. The planes would tilt, but upon surfacing they would not rig in. The heavy seas were giving the rigged out planes a fierce pounding, so at 1147 Latham submerged. The bow plane tilting gear box was then disassembled and it was found that an indicator shaft had sheared. The main problem was not with the tilting

mechanism but with the rigging gear. It appeared that some teeth on the gears had broken off. From now on the bow planes would have to be rigged in and out by hand after diving and before surfacing. TINOSA surfaced at 1904.

TINOSA was now in the East China Sea, west of the Ryukyu Islands, and on March 25th at 0641, she commenced a special mission - plotting mine fields. The invasion of Okinawa was less than a week off and this area was heavily mined. TINOSA was to supply important information on the location of these mines to the invasion fleet.

The day was spent in this exercise. While on the surface at 1620, a floating mine was sighted and an attempt was made to destroy it with gunfire but was not successful. At 2220 TINOSA tried to anchor so as to maintain her position but the anchor chain parted and she lost her anchor.

The next morning, another floating mine was sighted and it was destroyed with gunfire, and the following day another one was sunk in the same manner.

At 0628 on March 28, TINOSA sailed into a large oil slick in which were floating many bodies of Japanese soldiers and other debris. At 1232 a mast was sighted and Latham took his crew to battle stations. As TINOSA came closer, it was discovered that the target was a lifeboat under sail. There were seventeen Japanese in the boat and Latham drew alongside to take prisoners. At first they were reluctant to come aboard but Lieutenant Siegfried accidentally fired two rounds from his forty-

five and then they all wanted to cooperate. The two with the most impressive uniform insignia were taken and the rest sent on their way. They were army aviators whose ship had been sunk by a U.S. Navy torpedo plane.

TINOSA then resumed the special mission in which she had been engaged. The mission was finished at 1843 that day and TINOSA then set a course for her assigned patrol area which was the same one in which patrol run seven had been conducted - the west coast of Kyushu and the south coast of Korea. At 0400 March 29, she was on station. At 1156 a uniformed body with an attached parachute was sighted, but there was no time to identify it because there was an aircraft in the area.

TINOSA made contact with SPADEFISH at 0109 on March 30, and the two boats exchanged information. At 0600 she submerged to conduct a patrol of the approaches to Nagasaki. Later that morning two distant depth charge explosions were heard but the day was otherwise without incident. At 1927 she surfaced only to discover that the bow planes were not fully rigged in and they promptly dropped to a rigged out position. It was necessary to dive again to rig them in.

The next day Latham attempted to stay on the surface, but was forced to submerge three times to avoid enemy aircraft. At 1710 a small craft was sighted containing about forty Japanese in civilian clothes. The boat was similar to a landing craft and was apparently being used as a lifeboat from a sunken ship. Two prisoners were en-

ough to handle and Latham allowed this boat load to go on its way.

On April 1 at 1134, TINOSA dove to avoid an enemy aircraft. While she was down, the sound operator heard pinging to the east. Latham changed course to close the range. By 1230 the top hamper of six ships could be seen. They did not appear to be large enough for a torpedo attack, and it was thought that they were mine-sweepers or fishing trawlers. Since the invasion of Okinawa had started, it was thought that this group of six might be making an anti-submarine sweep or clearing mines for larger combat ships that would be following to reinforce the Japanese fleet that was opposing the invasion. TINOSA surfaced to send a contact report, but was promptly chased under by two enemy aircraft. As soon as it was clear she surfaced, sent the contact report and commenced trailing the contacts to see what would develop.

At 1928 there came an aircraft contact report describing this group as landing craft escorted by two destroyers and a light cruiser. In an attempt to regain contact and in the hope of getting in an attack, Latham went ahead on four main engines, but was unable to find the targets.

April 2 was spent submerged and at 1931 she surfaced, and in accordance with a dispatch received earlier, set a course for Guam. At 1100 she received orders to take station for lifeguard duty where she remained until 0211 April 4. TINOSA then headed for Guam, and at 1400 on April 7,

she moored alongside PROTEUS in Apra Harbor.

This was TINOSA'S shortest patrol run to date. It was terminated because of mechanical difficulties, particularly with the bow planes. Unfortunately, there was no opportunity for torpedo attack or wolf pack operations because she was unable to roam due to her commitment to a special mission. Comsubpac designated the run successful, however, because of the data gathered on that special mission.


SPADEFISH and TIRANTE remained on station where the former sank two ships (4127 tons) and the later six ships (13,071 tons). It was on this run that TIRANTE made her famous sortie into the harbor on Cheju for which her skipper was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor.

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### **9th RUN TRIVIA**

Duration of patrol: 27 days  
Ship Contacts: 15  
Air Contacts: 21

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**THROW IN THE TOWEL,  
CAPTAIN, SUMPIN'S WRONG!**



PATROL NUMBER 10  
EVERYTHING IS JAKE

PROTEUS and Subdiv 202 conducted a short refit for TINOSA. By April 18 the bevel gears in the bow plane rigging mechanism were replaced, and the mine detection apparatus had been overhauled. After a week of tests and training, she was ready for sea on April 26. One day was spent loading ship and on April 28, with fourteen new hands, an observer from the Royal Navy and a seaman photographer, TINOSA took departure Apra Harbor.

She set a course to the southeast for her assigned area which was in the vicinity of Truk Island. This heavily fortified island was now the subject of extensive bombing by the Army Air Force and TINOSA was to stand by to rescue crews of aircraft that were forced to abandon their planes into the sea. Lifeguard duty.

She entered the area at 1721 on April 29 and was submerged on lifeguard station at 0520 the next morning. By midday the liberators were over their target, and eighteen of them were observed bombing the island. Latham surfaced and established communications with them. In an hour the planes had completed their mission without any losses and headed for Guam. At 1430 a U.S. Navy patrol plane appeared which TINOSA attempted to contact without success.

May 1 produced no bombing activity and

TINOSA took the opportunity to scout installations on some islands adjacent to Truk, and to take reconnaissance photographs in the North Pass. The next evening the bombing resumed and TINOSA cruised her lifeguard station, but no planes were lost.

The next day was spent on the surface. The bombers were back and completed their runs without mishap. Suddenly at 1626, an enemy patrol aircraft appeared, flew low over TINOSA, and dropped a bomb which exploded one hundred yards ahead. TINOSA submerged in great haste all the time expecting the other bomb that had been seen attached to the wing of the attacker, to fall. It didn't! There was minor damage. Some cork flew off the bulkheads, number one sanitary flooded when the outboard vent valves jarred open, and the fuse blew in the bow plane rigging circuit. One hour later Latham returned to periscope depth where he could see two aircraft searching the area. The plane that had attacked TINOSA had the code name of Jake and for the remainder of this patrol this Jake or one of his ilk would harass TINOSA. It was 1916 before it was safe to surface.

May 4 and 5 were uneventful except for several dives to avoid aircraft. Latham decided to utilize the lull in the bombing by taking TINOSA to reconnoiter the South Pass. May 5 and 7 were spent in that exercise and on May 8 she returned to her lifeguard station for the bombing was to start anew. For two days the liberators were over Truk but TINOSA was not needed.

There was no bombing the next day so Latham decided to scout Nomwin Island where

there was reported to be a seaplane base. Perhaps the Jake that had been plaguing TINOSA could be caught on the water and disposed of with deck armament! There she submerged on May 10 and took a good look but the island appeared to be deserted. TINOSA went back to South pass until May 12 when she returned to lifeguard station.

Early that evening a flight of liberators appeared and conducted bombing runs. One aircraft reported that her rudder control had been shot out but thought she could fix it. TINOSA followed along the planes departure route, but there was no call for assistance.

The next day twelve liberators were in the area, but again TINOSA was not needed. TINOSA was submerged on station on May 14 when she received orders to return to Guam. At 1303 she surfaced and headed home. At 1934 that evening Ulil (Ulul) Island was sighted and TINOSA made preparations to conduct a shore bombardment of radio and meteorological installations there.

At 2129 she was 500 yards from shore and 1700 yards from the selected targets. She then opened fire and discharged thirty rounds of five inch shells and many rounds of smaller caliber stuff into the target area. An aircraft contact on SD radar caused TINOSA to break off the attack at 2155. The only visible damage was a column of dense smoke. At 0048 she conducted her trek to Guam where she moored alongside PROTEUS at 0707 May 16.

This run set a new TINOSA record for short runs and she was to have only a five day availability to prepare for her next

sojourn into enemy waters.

Comsubpac declined to award TINOSA a successful run designation for run number ten in spite of the fact that she had conducted an apparently successful shore bombardment. This ended her string of nine successful patrol runs.

### **10th RUN TRIVIA**

Duration of patrol: 19 days

Ship Contacts: 0

Air Contacts: 26

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**PATROL RUN #10 SAILING LIST****OFFICERS**

LATHAM, CO	CLUTTERHAM	GROSE
SMITH, XO	BROOKS	SALISBURY
SANDERS	SIEGFRIED	WEAVER
BAKIN, (Royal Navy observer)	OLSEN	

**CREW**

CHIEF OF THE BOAT: WELCH

GUNNERS MATES: RICHESON, SEARLES

TORPEDOMEN: BENNETT, BENTHAM, DIXON, GOEN,  
HUSON, OTIS, WAGNER, WILSON

QUARTERMASTERS: BOYD, DOWLER, RODMAN,  
WICKER

FIRECONTROLMAN: YOUNG

MOTOR MACHINISTS MATES: AULT, BARR, BURKE,  
BURLEW, DAUGHTRY, GILTNER, HALL, PIERSON,  
ROBERTSON, STANFORD, STEVENS, THOMPSON,  
WILSON, WITTMER

ELECTRICIANS MATES: ANDERSON, GALLARDY,  
GIBSON, GRIGG, KLAG, LEONARD, MCDANIEL,  
MINOR, OWENS, POLIS, SOUTIERE, STOKES,  
VOEGTLIN, SMITH

RADIO TECHNICIANS: BRADY, TYLER, WHIPPS

RADIOMEN: GROVES, HINDS, MACPHERSON,  
VAN NATTER

SHIP'S COOKS: BOLINDER, IRVIN, MURPHY

YEOMAN: C. CARPENTER, HARRIS

PHARMACISTS MATE: GARNER

SEAMEN: ARMSTRONG, ATNIP, BRUMFIELD,  
CARLIN, R. CARPENTER, COSTIBILE, DISMUKES,  
GOULD, KEEPERS, NYLANDER, SANDERS, SHELDEN,  
ST. AMANT,

FIREMEN: ETEROVICH, LARSON, PAQUETTE

STEWARDS: JACKSON, SETTLE

PASSENGER PHOTOGRAPHER: WEIL

TOTAL 87



**WE'RE NOT READY TO  
GO YET, PILOT !**

**PATROL NUMBER 11  
IN HIROHITO'S HOT TUB**

Upon TINOSA'S arrival in Guam on May 17, 1945, a five day upkeep was conducted by Subdiv 202 and Proteus. Five men were transferred to the squadron and six new hands reported aboard. Major alterations accomplished during this period included the installation of a new fathometer, and mine clearing cables were mounted on the diving planes. Five more days were spent in training exercises, and at 1500 on May 29, she took departure Apra Harbor on patrol.

She sailed in company with FLYING FISH and BOWFIN. The three were to be an element of a group of nine submarines commanded by E.C. Hydeman in SEA DOG whose task was to enter the Sea of Japan and conduct coordinated attacks on enemy shipping. The other three boat elements of the group, known as Hydeman's Hellcats, were SEA DOG, CREVALLE, SPADEFISH and TUNNY, SKATE, BONEFISH. The Sea of Japan was a perilous place to operate. Japanese anti-submarine forces and mines had already destroyed six U.S. submarines in the area. TINOSA headed northwest toward Yaku Shima where she would transit the Ryukyu Islands.

On June 1 at 1230, TINOSA received a report of a downed fighter pilot ninety miles dead ahead, and she increased speed. FLYING FISH advised TINOSA that BOWFIN was

closer and would investigate. At 1315 there was a report of a B-29 ditching 250 miles to the north. The three submarines headed for that position with the expectation of arriving there at 0200 the next morning.

Visibility was poor in a dense fog. TINOSA started a search in the area at 0200, and because of the fog fired Very's flares and sounded her whistle at frequent intervals. She then stopped her engines to listen for any noise the survivors might provide.

Comsubpac had ordered aircraft to search for the survivors as they could be seen from the air better than they could be seen on the surface in the low lying fog. A search plane arrived on the scene at 0447.

She searched in vain for four hours, when suddenly at 0845, radio picked up an SOS from a liferaft transmitter, and a few seconds later the search plane reported that they had sighted the survivors in a liferaft. Latham searched until noon without finding the raft. At that time he asked the aircraft to circle low over the survivors so that he could get a bearing. They agreed to comply when the next SOS was transmitted.

The SOS came at 1230. TINOSA obtained a bearing and at 1244 she came alongside the liferaft. Soon ten of the eleven Army airmen who had parachuted from the stricken plane were safely aboard. The parachute of the other airman had failed to open. TINOSA and her consorts resumed their trek for the Ryukyus.



At 2200 TINOSA received information of a downed fighter pilot and altered course to make a search. At 0030 on June 4, she reached the bailout position and conducted a three hour search without finding any survivors. She broke off the search and headed for a rendezvous where she had been directed to transfer the rescued airmen to SCABBARD FISH. By 2300 the airmen were gone from TINOSA and on their way home.

At 2350 there was a radar contact 16 miles to the east and Latham prepared to attack. The contact was going away from TINOSA and by 0150 it was apparent that to continue the chase would put her too far behind her scheduled arrival on station, so Latham broke off the attack.

June 6 operations were the subject of a special report, presumably mine detection in the Sasebo area.

On June 7 and 8 TINOSA was buffeted by heavy seas. On the morning of the 8th, it was discovered that the port mine clearing cable on the bow planes had become fouled on a deck cleat which would prevent rigging out the bow planes. Lt. Grose and Rodman volunteered to go forward and undertake the dangerous mission of clearing the cable. This was safely accomplished and the ship's force set about making anti fouling devices which were installed that night.

TINOSA was now on her assigned station off the east coast of Korea, and on the 9th, she dove early in the morning to conduct a submerged patrol. By 1330 she had moved to the entrance of Bokuko Ko harbor in search of sitting ducks. The harbor was empty.

At 1422 smoke was sighted to the southwest. Soon the target appeared and was identified as a small freighter, fully loaded and headed northwest along the coast at six knots. The range was four miles.

TINOSA went to battle stations, and at 1503, when the range had closed to 1800 yards, fired three bow shots. The first two missed, but the third hit amidships and the target broke in half and sank.

At 1524 the next day TINOSA was patrolling on the surface some forty five miles north of her previous sinking when she made radar contact on a target thirty-one miles to the north. Latham fired up all four engines and headed for a position to attack. It was 1930 before TINOSA was ready to commence the approach on the target which was a 4,000 ton freighter. At 2040 she fired three stern tubes from 1500 yards.

The first unit was heard to hit but did not explode. The second torpedo made a circular run and came back at TINOSA, passing close aboard. Latham flooded negative tank and went deep to avoid subsequent passes of the errant torpedo, at the same time firing another stern tube hoping to get a hit and an explosion. It missed. The target dropped three depth charges which were not close.

At 2148 Latham surfaced to continue the attack but was unable to make contact. Since TINOSA had already encroached on BOWFIN'S area it was decided not to pursue further. She returned to her area.

June 11 was spent on surface patrol and was uneventful except for two dives to

avoid aircraft. The next morning Latham decided to have another look into the harbor at Bokuko Ko, so at 0534 TINOSA submerged and headed in. At 0920 smoke and the tops of masts were sighted, and at 0948 Latham started an approach. However, at 1012 it was determined that the target was too small for an attack. At 1055 a large sea truck was sighted three and a half miles to the southwest, and the tracking party went to work. Visibility was 3,000 yards in patchy fog, and the target went out of sight so TINOSA surfaced and commenced an end around. By 1311 visual contact was re-established at a range of three miles. Visibility had decreased to 1,000 yards. It was now decided to sink her with deck armament.

At 1335 the guns were manned and ready, and TINOSA bore in on four engines through the lifting fog. At 1339 she opened fire at a range of 4,000 yards. By the time she had closed to 700 yards the unfortunate victim had suffered thirty-six hits from the five inch deck gun and was sinking. There was one lifeboat load of survivors. A small fishing boat was witness to this action from 1500 yards.

On June 13 TINOSA was in the southern part of her area, and at 0445 dove to conduct a submerged patrol. At 1750 she sighted another sea truck and attempted to close but was unable to do so. The next day was more of the same.

June 15 was spent submerged near the Korean coast in a flat calm sea and 6,000 yards visibility. Fishing boats were all around. At 1339 a loud metallic noise was

heard from the pump room area. Apparently negative flood valve operating linkage had parted within the tank. The tank would be out of commission for the rest of the patrol.

At 2043 TINOSA surfaced and headed northeast for deeper water. The next day was spent on the surface except for a single dive to avoid aircraft. At 2145 she made contact with FLYING FISH which came alongside for a short rendezvous. At 2245 TINOSA returned to her own area, and the next day was spent on the surface without incident.

The early morning hours of June 18 were spent steaming toward Bokuko Ko at seventeen knots and trying not to collide with the myriad of fishing boats that were working the area. At 0404 radar made contact with a potential target at a range of five miles, and TINOSA went to battle stations. A dense fog set in which limited visibility to 75 yards.

TINOSA was now three miles off the coast. Latham maneuvered his ship to a point six miles ahead of the target and commenced an approach. At 0602 three bow tubes were fired at a range of 600 yards. All missed. They were heard to explode after they had run 3,500 yards. At 0635 TINOSA was in position for another attack and fired two bow tubes at a range of 700 yards. These did not hit either, and it was decided that although the target looked large in the morning fog, it was actually of too shallow a draft for torpedoes. The set-up had been excellent and the fish had been set at six and four feet respectively

and appeared to pass under the target. TINOSA broke off the attack and submerged at 0833 until 2008.

TINOSA headed south. Latham, disappointed at the small targets encountered, the saturation of fishing craft, and the poor visibility on the Korean coast, decided to patrol in the northern Korean Strait near Tsushima. While enroute, at 0305 radar made contact with a target at a range of six miles to the northeast. By 0423 the target was identified as a small freighter. Latham started an end around.

At 0539 TINOSA submerged twelve miles ahead of the contact and went to battle stations. By 0712 she was in position and fired three bow tubes from 750 yards. All three units hit the target, which sank in thirty-five seconds. About twenty survivors were seen clinging to wreckage. TINOSA surfaced and took steps to clear the area. At 0928 she submerged.

All was quiet until 1729 when smoke was sighted to the southwest at an estimated range of ten miles. TINOSA took off at full speed in an attempt to attain an attack position. It was late in the day and there was a limited amount of "juice in the can." However, at 1924 she was where she wanted to be, and from a range of 1200 yards, fired four bow tubes. Two of them were hits and the hapless freighter sank in fifty seconds. At 1928 a loud, close explosion was heard which was believed to be an aerial bomb, although no aircraft had been sighted. Latham took her deep and rigged for depth charge, but no further countermeasures were taken. At 2054 she

surfaced.

It was now time to leave this area and head north to rendezvous with the rest of the Hellcats and conduct special missions in La Perouse Strait at the northern end of Hokkaido Shima.

Early in the morning of June 26, TINOSA transitted Kita Uruppu Suido into the Pacific and headed for Midway Island. There she arrived at 0834 on June 30, and at 1334 on the same day, was underway for Pearl Harbor where she arrived at 1120 on July 4.

This was an outstanding patrol for TINOSA, which was so noted by Comsubpac and she was given credit for sinking four ships (12,100 tons) and damaging one (4,000 tons).

Hydeman's Hellcats took a heavy toll of Japanese shipping in this one month foray into the Emperor's back yard. Twenty-eight ships were sunk for a total tonnage of 57,052. There was a heavy price to pay however, for BONEFISH, after sinking two ships (12,380 tons) was detected by the enemy and was subjected to a severe attack. She was lost with all hands.

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### 11th RUN TRIVIA

Duration of patrol: 36 days

Ship Contacts: 24

Air Contacts: 10

## PATROL RUN #11 SAILING LIST

## OFFICERS

LATHAM, CO	CLUTTERHAM	GROSE
SMITH, XO	BROOKS	SALISBURY
SANDERS	SIEGFRIED	WEAVER
		OLSEN

## CREW

CHIEF OF THE BOAT: WELCH

GUNNERS MATES: RICHESON, SEARLES

TORPEDOMEN: BENNETT, BENTHAM, DIXON, GOEN,  
HUSON, OTIS, WAGNER, WILSONQUARTERMASTERS: BOYD, DOWLER, RODMAN,  
WICKER

FIRECONTROLMAN: YOUNG

MOTOR MACHINISTS MATES: AULT, BAIRD, BARR,  
BURKE, BURLEW, DAUGHTRY, GILTNER, GRIGG,  
HALL, REIF, ROBERTSON, STANFORD, STEVENS,  
STRIPLING, THOMPSON, WILSONELECTRICIANS MATES: ANDERSON, FREEBURN,  
GIBSON, KLAG, LEONARD, MCDANIEL, MINOR,  
OWENS, POLIS, SMITH, SOUTIERE, STOKES,  
VOEGTLIN

RADIO TECHNICIANS: BRADY, TYLER, WHIPPS

RADIOMEN: GROVES, HINDS, MACPHERSON,  
VAN NATTER

SHIP'S COOKS: BOLINDER, IRVIN, SCRUGGS

YEOMAN: C. CARPENTER, HARRIS

PHARMACISTS MATE: GARNER

SEAMEN: ATNIP, BRUMFIELD, CARLIN, R.  
CARPENTER, COSTIBILE, DISMUKES, GOULD,  
KEEPERS, NYLANDER, SANDERS, SCOTT, SHELDEN,  
ST. AMANT

FIREMEN: ETEROVICH, LARSON, PAQUETTE

STEWARDS: JACKSON, SETTLE

PHOTOGRAPHER: DARANOWICH

TOTAL 87



**THANKS, MIGHTY 'T;  
WE LOVE YOU!**



PATROL NUMBER 12  
THE END

At Pearl Harbor the Submarine Base and Subdiv 103 conducted a twenty day refit. Repairs were made to negative tank flood valve, mine clearing cables were added, and a 40 mm gun replaced the forward 20 mm. Fourteen men left the ship and were replaced. On August 11 at 1330, TINOSA departed Pearl Harbor, ostensibly for a war patrol, but it was not to be. On August 6 and 9 atomic bombs had fallen on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and Japan was finished. On August 22 at 0045, TINOSA was ordered to Midway Island. Emperor Hirohito had ordered the cessation of hostilities. It was over.

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**PATROL RUN #12 SAILING LIST****OFFICERS**

LATHAM, CO

SMITH, XO

SANDERS

SETTERSTROM

CLUTTERHAM

BROOKS

SIEGFRIED

GROSE

OLSEN

SHELLER

**CREW**

CHIEF OF THE BOAT: SETON

GUNNERS MATES: RICHESON, SEARLES, ST AMANT

TORPEDOMEN: BENNETT, R. CARPENTER, DIXON,  
GOEN, HUSON, MANUILOW, SHELDEN, WAGNER,  
WILSONQUARTERMASTERS: BOYD, BRUMFIELD, ORMSBY,  
RODMAN

FIRECONTROLMAN: YOUNG

MOTOR MACHINISTS MATES: AULT, BARNETT,  
BARR, BURKE, BURLEW, DAUGHTRY, GILTNER,  
GRIGG, HALL, PAQUETTE, REIF, STEVENS,  
STRIPLING, WILSONELECTRICIANS MATES: ANDERSON, DAVENPORT,  
FREEBURN, GIBSON, KLINE, MCDANIEL, MINOR,  
OWENS, POLIS, SHULTZ, SMITH, STOKES,  
VOEGTLIN

RADIO TECHNICIANS: BRADY, TYLER, WHIPPS

RADIOMEN: BROOKS, HINDS, KEEPERS,  
MACPHERSON, VAN NATTER

SHIP'S COOKS: BOLINDER, IRVIN, SCRUGGS

YEOMAN: C. CARPENTER

PHARMACISTS MATE: GARNER

SEAMEN: ATNIP, CARLIN, COSTIBILE, DISMUKES,  
NYLANDER, SANDERS, SCOTTFIREMEN: DEPALO, ETEROVICH, FRANK, HAYES,  
LARSON

STEWARDS: JACKSON, SETTLE

TOTAL 82



**RETIREMENT'S O.K.,  
BUT I SURE MISS YOU GUYS!**



## ENCOUNTER:

## AFTERWORD

TINOSA was a war boat. She had been built for that purpose and had been in commission for just over two-and-one-half years. For twenty-three months of this time she was directly involved in the war. Her career after the war was short and undistinguished. She went off to take on Tojo with a green crew and a poor torpedo. The crew rose to the occasion and quickly achieved veteran status, and her input to the torpedo problem had much to do with the improved weapon. She sank ships with torpedoes and deck armament, she bombarded shore installations, she landed coast watchers, she took prisoners, she conducted a burial at sea, she destroyed floating mines and mapped minefields, and she rescued aviators. She dodged depth charges and gunfire, and she did not lose a man!

Comsubdiv 142 made the following comment in his endorsement to the patrol report of run number twelve:

"The Division Commander takes this opportunity to congratulate the Commanding Officer, officers and crew of the TINOSA on their outstanding record of achievement during this war. Except for a short period spent life guarding off Truk, every patrol of this submarine has been a successful one, and all have been characterized by intelligent planning and outstanding aggressiveness. To all who contributed directly or indirectly to the fighting TINOSA'S outstanding record, is extended a sincere and thoroughly deserved "well done."

## ENCOUNTER:

## THE WAR ROSTER

## APPENDIX I

NAME:	DATE ON	DATE OFF	GRADE ON	GRADE OFF	RUN NO.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	TOTAL
ADAMS, George B.	08/01/44	11/19/44	BM1c	BM1c		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ALEXANDER, George Jr.	06/30/43	05/30/44	S1c	S1c		0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5
ANDERSON, Richard A.	01/15/43	03/20/44	S1c	TM2c		1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5
ANDERSON, Jack H.	02/17/45	08/16/45	EM3c	EM2c		0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	4
ARMSTRONG, Arthur W.	11/19/44	05/16/45	S2c	S2c		0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	3
ATKINS, Victor K.	01/15/43	06/01/43	Lt.-Jg.	Lt.-Jg.		1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
ATNIP, Tolbert B.	04/18/45	08/16/45	S1c	S1c		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	3
AULT, Earl E.	05/30/44	08/16/45	F2c	MoM3c		0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	6
BAIRD, Floyd C.	12/04/44	07/04/45	MoM1c	MoM1c		0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	4
BARNETT, James R.	07/04/45	08/22/45	MoM1c	MoM1c		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
BARR, George	04/27/45	08/16/45	MoM3c	MoM3c		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	3
BASS, Paul S.	01/15/43	01/01/44	F1c	MoM2c		1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
BAYANS, Ray E.	01/27/43	02/17/45	MoM1c	MoM1c		1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	8
BECK, Lawrence A.	04/10/43	05/29/44	Lt.-Jg.	Lt.-Jg.		1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	6
BEDDY, Lyle D.	01/01/44	04/08/45	S1c	S1c		0	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	5
BELL, C. Edwin	01/15/43	04/04/44	Lt.	Lt.-Cdr.		1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5
BENBENEK, David J.	01/15/43	08/27/43	TM3c	TM3c		1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
BENNET, Millard M.	02/17/45	08/16/45	TM3c	TM2c		0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	4
BENTHAM, Robert E.	01/01/44	07/14/45	TM3c	TM2c		0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	7
BERRY, Ivan J.	08/30/43	03/20/44	SC3c	SC3c		0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
BERRY, James M.	01/15/43	01/01/44	EM3c	EM2c		1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
BIRCHMIEER, Lowell P.	05/02/43	01/01/44	BKR2c	BKR1c		1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
BLONDIN, Wayne B.	01/15/43	03/20/44	S2c	GM2c		1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5
BOLINDER, Ralph H.	03/20/44	08/16/45	F1c	GM2c		0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	7
BOND, John H.	01/01/44	02/17/45	EM3c	BKR3c		0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
BONNER, Leo	04/27/43	01/01/44	TM2c	TM2c		1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
BOSTICK, Henry W.	01/15/43	11/17/44	EM3c	EM1c		1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7
BOYD, Edgar	03/22/44	08/16/45	SM1c	SM1c		0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	6
BRADLEY, John W.	07/02/43	10/23/44	S1c	GM3c		0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7
BRADY, Ferris G.	11/06/44	08/16/45	RT3c	RT2c		0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	5
BRANTLEY, James J.	01/15/43	01/01/44	Y3c	Y1c		1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
BROOKS, Edward R.	08/05/45	08/16/45	RM3c	RM3c		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
BROOKS, Kenneth L.	01/01/44	05/30/44	F2c	MoM3c		0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
BROOKS, Frank C.	04/01/45	08/16/45	Lt.	Lt.		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	3
BROWN, Milton J.	08/17/43	02/17/45	TM3c	TM2c		0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	6
BRUMFIELD, Floyd E.	05/30/44	08/16/45	S1c	QM3c		1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	6
BURCZYK, Alex F.	01/15/43	08/27/43	F3c	CMN		1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
BURKE, Edward W.	01/15/43	08/27/43	F3c	F2c		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
BURKE, Charles M.	02/17/45	08/16/45	MoM3c	MoM3c		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	4
BURLEW, Harry A.	04/18/45	08/16/45	MoM3c	MoM3c		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	3
BURNS, William F.	08/13/43	02/17/45	S2c	TM3c		0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	6
BURNS, Corwyn S.	01/01/44	11/17/44	F2c	F1c		0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	3

## ENCOUNTER:

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## APPENDIX I

NAME:	DATE ON	DATE OFF	GRADE ON	GRADE OFF	RUN NO.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	TOTAL
CAMPBELL, James W.	10/20/44	02/21/45	S2c	S2c	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
CARLIN, Robert C.	04/18/45	08/16/45	S1c	S1c	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
CARPENTER, Clarence A.	03/22/44	08/16/45	S1c	S1c	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
CARPENTER, Rex N.	10/20/44	08/16/45	S1c	S1c	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
CINFO, Stephen	06/30/43	03/20/44	F1c	TM33c	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5
CITRIN, Herbert	03/28/44	04/08/45	RM3c	RM2c	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
CLEMENT, William R.	03/20/44	04/19/45	TM2c	TM2c	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
CLUTTERHAM, David	12/04/44	08/16/45	Ens.	Ens.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
COLLINS, Isaac	10/22/43	09/04/44	STM1c	STM1c	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
CONNERY, Harold E.	01/15/43	05/30/44	TM2c	TM1c	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6
COOPER, Hugh C.	01/15/43	01/01/44	S2c	TM33c	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
COOPER, Byron E.	01/15/43	08/27/43	CEM	CEM	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
CORBIN, Joseph V.	08/13/43	01/01/44	F1c	F1c	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
COSTABILE, Joseph F.	02/17/45	08/16/45	S1c	S1c	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
CRAIG, William H.	01/15/43	06/30/43	F3c	F2c	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
CROSS, Warner C.	01/01/44	04/08/45	MoMM1c	MoMM1c	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5
CROWDER, John B.	03/20/44	10/25/44	F1c	F1c	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
DaCOSTA, Frederick W.	01/15/43	08/27/43	FC2c	FC1c	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
DALE, Robert W.	01/15/43	01/01/44	MoMM2c	MoMM2c	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
DARANOWICH, (DARAN) Walter H.	05/28/85	07/27/45	PhoM3c	PhoM3c	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
DASBIT, Lawrence R.	01/15/43	01/10/44	LT.Cdr.	Cmdr.	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
DAUGHTRY, Herbert	03/20/44	08/16/45	MoMM2c	MoMM1c	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7
DAVENPORT, Cecil L.	07/27/45	08/16/45	EM1c	EM1c	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Davile, E.	01/15/43	04/20/43	EM2c	EM2c	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
DePALO, Thomas P.	08/04/45	08/16/45	F1c	F1c	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
DevILLE, Joseph M.	01/15/43	08/27/43	Matt2c	StM1c	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
DeVOUNG, Herbert	01/01/44	10/23/44	S2c	S2c	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
DISMUNES, Alvin C.	02/17/45	08/16/45	S2c	S2c	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
DIXON, Richard L.	04/18/45	08/16/45	TM1c	TM1c	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
DOWLER, Melvin L.	02/20/45	08/02/45	QM2c	QM2c	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
DREHER, William H.	01/15/43	08/27/43	QM2c	QM2c	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
DRZYMAJSKI, Lawrence F.	06/30/43	02/17/45	EM3c	EM2c	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7
ERICKSON, Eldridge A.	01/15/43	08/31/44	Ens.	lt.-jg.	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6
ETEROVICH, Matthew	05/30/44	08/16/45	S1c	F1c	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
FISHER, Clark W.	01/15/43	03/20/44	TM2c	TM1c	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5
FITZPATRICK, Micheal W.	01/15/43	04/20/43	TM2c	TM2c	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
FLANTZER, Lou	03/28/44	11/17/44	RM3c	RM3c	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
FOLEY, Walter J., Jr.	01/15/43	05/30/44	RM3c	RM1c	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6
FontANA, Andrea	01/15/43	03/20/44	S2c	RM3c	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5
FORD, William M.	01/15/43	03/20/44	PhM1c	CPHM	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5
FRANK, Lewis R.	07/27/45	08/16/45	F1c	F1c	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
FREEBURN, Harry D. (Tour 1)	05/30/44	04/27/45	EM2c	EM1c	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3

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FREEBURN, Harry D. (Tour 2)	05/22/45	08/16/45	EM2c	EM1c		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	2
GALLARDY, Clyde V.	08/13/43	05/16/45	EM3c	EM3c		0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	8
GARNER, Frank E.	11/06/44	08/16/45	PHM1c	PHM1c		0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	5
GARRISON, Charles J.	09/12/43	11/17/44	SC3c	SC3c		0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	5
GIBSON, Jack R.	03/15/45	08/16/45	EM3c	EM3c		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	4
GLITNER, Thomas W.	04/18/45	08/16/45	MoMM1c	MoMM1c		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	3
GUERRIDA, Giuseppe O.	01/10/44	11/18/44	TM2c	TM1c		0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	3
GOEN, Louis E.	02/19/45	08/16/45	TM3c	TM3c		0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	4
GOODELL, George E.	08/17/43	04/08/45	S1c	FC3c		0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	7
GOODMAN, William H.	01/15/43	09/15/43	SC1c	SC3c		1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
GORST, John H.	03/05/43	03/20/44	S1c	FC3c		1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5
GOULD, Harold R.	11/29/44	07/20/45	S1c	TM3c		0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	4
GRIFFITH, Robert L.	06/30/43	02/17/45	EM3c	EM3c		0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	7
GRIGG, John R.	02/17/45	08/16/45	MoMM3c	MoMM3c		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	4
GROSE, Herschel G.	02/01/45	08/16/45	Lt.Jg.	Lt.Jg.		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	4
GROVE, Russell C.	02/17/45	07/04/45	EM1c	EM1c		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	3
GUNN, Douglas A.	01/15/43	06/30/43	SC1c	SC1c		1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
GUTHRIE, Donald A.	01/15/43	01/01/44	MoMM2c	MoMM2c		1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
HALL, Melvin E.	01/15/43	06/30/43	CTM	CTM		1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
HALL, William F.	03/20/44	08/16/45	MoMM3c	MoMM3c		0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	7
HARRIS, Fred B.	11/17/44	08/11/45	Y1c	Y1c		0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	4
HARRIS, Roy D.	04/26/43	02/17/45	EM3c	EM1c		1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	8
HAYES, Donald R.	07/27/45	08/16/45	F1c	F1c		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
HAZUCHA, Paul E.	01/15/43	01/01/44	CMoMM	CMoMM		1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
HICKMAN, Glen K.	01/15/43	01/01/44	CMoMM	CMoMM		1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
HILLHOUSE, Hollis B.	01/01/44	10/15/44	SC3c	SC3c		0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
HINCHEY, John F.	01/10/44	03/04/44	Ens.	Ens.		0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
HINDS, Lawrence P.	11/18/44	08/16/45	RM2c	RM2c		0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	5
HOLMSEN, Sidney A.	01/15/43	01/01/44	S2c	RM2c		1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
HOVANEK, Stephen J.	08/13/43	04/08/45	MoMM2c	MoMM1c		0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	7
HOWARD, George D.	01/15/43	06/30/43	CMoMM	CMoMM		1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
HUFFMAN, Richard W.	11/17/44	04/08/45	BKR2c	BKR2c		0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	2
HULLS, Ernest W.	08/13/43	05/30/44	QM3c	QM3c		0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
HUNNICUTT, James L. (Tour 1)	01/15/43	10/27/43	Lt.	Lt.Cdr.		1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
HUNNICUTT, James L. (Tour 2)	03/10/44	09/10/44	Lt.	Lt.Cdr.		0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
HUNT, Charles F.	01/15/43	03/20/44	BM2c	BM1c		1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5
HUSON, Loyal A.	02/17/45	08/16/45	TM3c	TM3c		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	4
IRVIN, Frederick L.	10/16/44	08/16/45	SC3c	SC3c		0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	5
JACKSON, Nathaniel	10/16/44	08/16/45	StM2c	StM2c		0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	5
JACKSON, Wilfred E.	07/02/43	08/27/43	RM3c	RM3c		0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
JOHNSON, Harold M.	01/15/43	11/17/44	MM2c	CMoMM		1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7
KEANE, John J.	06/30/43	02/17/45	TM3c	TM2c		0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	7



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KEEPERS, Harold J.	02/17/45	08/16/45	S1c	RM2c		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	4
KELLAM, James H.	01/15/43	08/27/43	EM3c	EM2c		1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
KELLUM, William	08/13/43	10/23/43	STM1c	STM1c		1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
KIRKPAN, Earl R.	01/15/43	03/03/44	MoMM2c	MoMM2c		1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5
KLAG, Donald J.	05/30/44	07/04/45	EM3c	EM3c		0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	5
KLNE, Donald M.	07/27/45	08/16/45	EM3c	EM3c		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
KUYKENDALL, Clifford W.	06/20/43	07/31/43	GM3c	GM3c		0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
LANDRY, Clyde E.	01/15/43	04/25/43	EM1c	EM1c		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
LARSON, Allen G.	04/27/45	08/16/45	F1c	F1c		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	3
LAPHAM, Richard C.	08/31/44	08/16/45	Cmdr.	Cmdr.		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	5
LEONARD, Carthel F.	11/16/44	07/04/45	EM2c	EM1c		0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	7
LESH, Clyde R.	04/26/43	10/23/44	EM2c	EM1c		1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
LEVY, Jules F.	01/15/43	03/20/44	TM3c	TM1c		1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5
LINTH, Vernon E.	01/15/43	05/30/44	EM2c	CEN		1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6
LORZING, Julius J.	01/15/43	05/30/44	MoMM2c	MoMM1c		1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	7
LOVELESS, Ray H.	01/15/43	11/17/44	PhM1c	PhM1c		0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
LOVETT, Carl M.	06/30/43	11/17/44	S1c	S1c		0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
LYSAGHT, James R.	03/15/43	08/27/43	EM1c	EM1c		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MAASCH, Marvin F.	04/01/43	08/16/45	F1c	EM1c		0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
MACPHERSON, Malcolm	01/15/43	01/01/44	F3c	RM2c		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	3
MANN, David	07/27/45	08/16/45	TM2c	MoMM2c		1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	4
MANULLOW, John	01/15/43	01/01/44	S2c	TM2c		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
MAPLE, Howard R.	01/15/43	01/01/44	S2c	EM2c		1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
MARLEY, Kenneth L.	01/15/43	06/30/43	F2c	F1c		1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
MC DANIEL, Jesse J.	04/18/45	08/16/45	EM3c	EM3c		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	3
MCGRATH, Edward G.T.	04/18/45	05/01/44	Lt-jg.	Lt-jg.		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MC LAUGHLIN, Edward J.	11/17/44	04/27/45	MoMM1c	MoMM1c		0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	2
MC LAUGHLIN, Robert A.	04/06/43	08/27/43	S2c	S2c		1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	2
MC LAUGHLIN, Robert A.	03/27/44	10/13/44	S2c	S1c		0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	7
MINOR, James P.	03/20/44	08/16/45	EM3c	EM3c		0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	5
MITCHELL, Peter	01/15/43	09/22/43	EM1c	CEN		1	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6
MOEN, Orville R.	08/13/43	10/23/44	RM3c	FC3c		0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	7
MONROE, Jack A.	08/13/43	02/17/45	EM2c	EM1c		0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
MOODY, Ezra B.	08/13/43	04/08/45	EM2c	EM1c		1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	3
MORRIS, Jack C.	11/19/44	06/30/43	SC1c	SC1c		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	2
MURPHY, Edward J.	11/19/44	05/27/45	TM2c	TM2c		1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
MURPHY, Kenneth W.	01/15/43	08/27/43	TM3c	TM2c		1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
NICHOLS, Bliss E.	01/15/43	01/01/44	CSN	CSN		1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
NISONGER, Russel C.	01/15/43	06/30/43	MoMM2c	MoMM2c		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	2
NOBLE, John O.	11/18/44	04/25/45	ChMNM	ChMNM		0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	2
NORMAN, Garvin D.	01/01/44	05/30/44	S1c	S1c		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
NYLANDER, Raymond E.	04/18/45	08/16/45	S1c	S1c		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1

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O'NALLEY, Thomas C.	08/13/43	02/17/45	MoMM2c	MoMM1c		0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	6
OAKLEY, Thomas B.	01/15/43	09/01/43	Lt. Cdr.	Cmdr.		1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
OLSEN, John	12/04/44	08/16/45	Ens.	Lt. Jg.		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	5
OSBORN, Ralph F.	07/27/45	08/16/45	SM2c	SM2c		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
OSBORN, Lester L.	08/13/43	01/10/44	TM3c	TM3c		0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Ottis, Donald J.	01/01/44	07/04/45	TM3c	TM2c		0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	7	
OWENS, Robert L.	05/30/44	08/16/45	EN3c	EM2c		0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	6	
PAINE, Roger W.	08/31/44	04/30/45	Lt. Cdr.	Lt. Cdr.		0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	2
PAQUETTE, Clifford N.	02/17/45	08/16/45	F1c	MoMM3c		0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	4
PARE, Alfred L.	05/30/44	02/17/45	MoMM3c	MoMM2c		0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
PASCHAL, Hugh H.	03/20/44	11/19/44	CCS	Ens.		0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
PERRY, John L.	01/01/44	02/29/44	CNO MM	TM3c		0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
FERROWSKI, Felix A.	03/20/44	11/17/44	F1c	TM3c		0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
PHARRIS, Paul L.	01/15/43	06/30/43	F1c	F1c		1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
PIERSON, Donald F.	03/20/44	05/16/45	EN3c	MoMM2c		0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	6	
POLIS, Jack S.	06/30/43	03/20/44	F3c	RT3c		0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	7	
RAY, James H.	06/30/43	01/10/44	F3c	F3c		0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	
REAL, William	03/05/43	05/30/44	F1c	MoMM1c		1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	
REEL, Robert N.	03/20/44	05/30/44	CY	CY		0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6
REEVES, Paul A.	05/22/45	08/16/45	MoMM2c	MoMM1c		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
REYNOLDS, Franklin B.	11/16/44	02/17/45	MoMM2c	MoMM2c		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
RICHESON, Edward M.	10/23/44	08/16/45	GM1c	GM1c		0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	5
ROBB, William B.	09/25/43	05/25/44	Lt.	Lt.		0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
ROBBINS, Kermit E.	04/01/45	MoMM2c	MoMM2c	MoMM2c		0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	3
ROBERTS, Stacy	06/30/43	08/27/43	CNO MM	CNO MM		0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
ROBERTS, William H.	08/13/43	01/01/44	MoMM2c	MoMM2c		0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
ROBERTSON, James C.	02/17/45	08/05/45	MoMM3c	MoMM3c		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	3	
RODMAN, George W.	10/16/44	08/16/45	QM3c	QM3c		0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	5	
ROMAN, Peter	03/20/44	11/03/44	EM3c	EN3c		0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	
RUSTAD, Albert O.	01/15/43	03/20/44	EM2c	RM1c		1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5
SALACINSKI (SALANI), Robert E.	03/20/44	02/17/45	MoMM2c	MoMM2c		0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
SALISURY, Guy F.	10/27/43	07/31/45	Ens.	Lt. Jg.		0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
SALMAN, Jack B.	01/10/44	S2c	S2c	S2c		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SALMON, Harold E.	01/10/44	10/23/44	S2c	S2c		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SANDERS, Aubrey R.	11/19/44	08/16/45	S1c	S1c		0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
SANDERS, Charles R.	12/04/44	08/16/45	Lt.	Lt.		0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	5
SAWYER, Albert J.	05/30/44	11/17/44	RT2c	RT2c		0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	5
SCALIA, Raffaeli	05/30/44	11/28/44	MoMM2c	MoMM2c		0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
SCHMIDT, Herman R.	06/30/43	08/27/43	CNO MM	CNO MM		0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
SCHROEDER, Moritz J.	01/10/44	07/25/44	Lt. Jg.	Lt. Jg.		0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
SCOTT, Dale V.	05/22/45	08/16/45	S1c	S1c		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2

## ENCOUNTER:

## THE WAR ROSTER

## APPENDIX I

NAME:	DATE ON	DATE OFF	GRADE ON	GRADE OFF	RUN NO.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	TOTAL
SCRANTON, Stuart J.	05/30/44	11/18/44	Y1c	CY	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
SCRUGGS, Robert C.	05/23/45	08/16/45	SC1c	SC1c	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
SEARLES, Dayton	02/17/45	08/16/45	GN3c	GN2c	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
SENEW, John M.	01/15/43	08/27/43	TM1c	TM1c	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
SETON, Robert L.	07/27/45	08/16/45	CTM	CTM	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
SETERSTROM, Robert V.	08/11/45	08/16/45	Ens.	Ens.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
SEWIE, Spaulding B.	01/03/44	08/16/45	StM1c	StM2c	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
SHEETS, Lloyd C.	01/15/43	06/30/43	CNoMM	CNoMM	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
SHELDON, James F.	11/19/44	08/16/45	S1c	TM3c	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
SHELDON, Willard W.	08/11/45	08/16/45	Ens.	Ens.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
SHULTZ, Gerald F.	07/27/45	08/16/45	EN2c	EN1c	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
SIEGFRIED, Clyde W.	03/29/44	08/16/45	Ens.	LT-3g.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
SMITH, Norman D.	01/15/43	06/30/43	S2c	S2c	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
SMITH, Harvey J.	06/07/44	08/16/45	LT.	LT.Cdr.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
SMITH, Richard P.	04/18/45	08/16/45	MoMM3c	MoMM2c	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
SOBRESKY (LINK), Richard W.	06/30/43	05/30/44	S1c	TM3c	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
SOUTIERE, Clement	03/20/44	07/04/45	S1c	EN3c	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
STANFORD, Samuel E.	01/01/44	07/04/45	F1c	EN3c	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
STEIN, Israel	01/15/43	03/20/44	F2c	MoMM2c	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
STEVENS, Charles R.	11/16/44	08/16/45	MoMM3c	MoMM2c	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5
STEVENSON, Elmer G.	01/15/43	11/17/44	F3c	MoMM2c	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
STOKES, Victor L.	03/22/44	08/16/45	CEM	CEM	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7
STONE, Charles E.	11/18/44	04/18/45	TM1c	TM1c	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
STRAUB, John E.	01/15/43	06/30/43	GM1c	GM1c	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
STRIPING, Ernest R.	05/22/45	08/16/45	MoMM2c	LT.Cdr.	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
ST. AMANT, Wilfred J.	11/16/44	08/16/45	S1c	MoMM1c	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
SUGHRUE, William T.	01/15/43	05/30/44	F3c	GN3c	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6
THOMPSON, Robert M.	11/19/44	07/04/45	MoMM2c	MoMM1c	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
TURNER, John C.	01/15/43	01/01/44	Matt2c	SLM1c	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
TYLER, John P.	03/20/44	08/16/45	RT2c	CTT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
VAN DUSEN, William R.	01/15/43	06/30/43	TM2c	TM3c	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
VAN GORDER, Keith R.	06/01/43	02/29/44	Ens.	LT-3g.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
VAN NATTER, Charles H.	10/21/44	08/16/45	RM3c	RM2c	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
VOEGLIN, Eustace P.	02/17/45	08/16/45	EM1c	EN1c	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
WAGNER, Charles H.	03/20/44	08/16/45	TM3c	TM2c	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
WATKINS, Francis O.	01/09/44	02/17/45	S1c	GN3c	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
WATROUS, Allen E.	01/15/43	02/17/45	SM2c	CQM	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	8
WEAVER, Bruce S.	09/06/43	02/17/45	Ens.	LT-3g.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
WEEKS, Clyde E.	04/28/45	05/16/45	TM3c	TM2c	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
WEIL, Robert L.	10/27/43	09/13/44	Cmndr.	Cmndr.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
WEISS, Donald F.					0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4

## ENCOUNTER:

## THE WAR ROSTER

## APPENDIX I

NAME:	DATE ON	DATE OFF	GRADE ON	GRADE OFF	RUN NO.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	TOTAL
WELCH, Freeman	11/19/44	08/04/45	CTM	CTM		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	4
WENDLING, Gilbert F.	01/15/43	03/20/44	S1c	SM2c		1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5
WESNER, George D.	05/30/44	04/15/45	TM1c	TM1c		0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	3
WHIPPS, Jack C.	04/18/45	08/16/45	RT3c	RT3c		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	3
WICKER, William A.	01/01/44	07/07/45	S2c	QM2c		0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	7
WILKE, Elroy F.	01/15/43	01/01/44	MoMM1c	MoMM1c		1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
WILLS, Frank E.	01/01/44	11/17/44	MoMM1c	MoMM1c		0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
WILSON, Alton W.	01/01/44	03/20/44	Y1c	Y2c		0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
WILSON, William A.	01/23/43	03/20/44	RT2c	RT1c		1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5
WILSON, Eldon R.	11/16/44	08/16/45	TM3c	TM2c		0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	4
WITKOWSKI, Norval D.	02/19/45	08/16/45	MoMM	MoMM		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	5
WITKOWSKI, Frank R.	03/20/44	11/17/44	MoMM2c	MoMM2c		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	4
WITMER, Paul W.	01/01/44	05/16/45	MoMM2c	MoMM2c		0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
WOOSLEY, James T.	01/15/43	06/30/43	RM1c	CRM		1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
YONUSCHOT, Raymond A.	09/22/43	03/20/44	CEM	CEM		0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
YOUNG, Buck R.	04/18/45	08/16/45	FC2c	FC2c		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	3
ZARAZINSKI, Walter J.	08/13/43	03/20/44	MoMM1c	MoMM1c		0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3

R. C. Latham's account of his command.

THE FOLLOWING SECTION APPEARED IN THE SEPTEMBER, 1980 ISSUE OF THE TINOSA BLATT ON PAGES 4 AND 5.

This incident happened on 8 January, 1945, when TINOSA was in shallow water, close in to the harbor of Naha, Okinawa. The log says only; "Numerous sampans sighted during day ranging from 50 to 200 tons. The leader of one column of three had a bridge amidships, similar to a freighter and made flag hoists on entering channel to NAHA. Sampan traffic entered and left NAHA on approximately the following true bearings originating at NAHA: 005, 315, 255, and 242". I do not now remember the depth of water, but I'll make a guess at 150 feet. I do know that the bottom was covered with cackling shrimp which made a continuous loud background noise which completely blocked out the sonar. It was impossible to hear the propeller beats of the sampans.

TINOSA was running at periscope depth which allowed a couple of feet of periscope exposure in the fully raised position and also provided some twelve feet or so clear from the surface with the periscope lowered. This was enough so the shallow draft sampans would not touch us, even if they passed directly overhead.

I'd raise the scope and take a look-see every ten minutes or so. Imagine my surprise when the scope broke the surface and I found myself looking in high power

(six times magnification) directly into the placid, yellow face of a man, about 25 feet away. All I could see of him was his head and the upper part of his torso, and he seemed to be looking directly into my eyes. When I put the scope in low power, I could see that he was sitting cross legged upon a big pile of bananas on the stern of a sampan which was passing. "Geez, nothing but teeth", I thought. We couldn't make our presence known because we were looking for mines and the survey was not yet complete, so the sampan went on its way.

The sampan incident occurred in the eighth patrol, which was a rough water patrol. The log for 12 December, 1944, two days west of Midway, reads: "0800 Barometer dropped to 29.72. Sea picking up. Wind about 40 knots, N.W. 1355 Forced to slow to about 8 knots. 1600 Took two green ones over the bridge, received about one foot of water in the conning tower. Port lookout knocked out temporarily. 240 volt ground on the drain pump. Slightly damp, but no other troubles. 2000 Made good 7.25 knots since 1200. Drain pump in commission". On 17 december, TINOSA'S log says: 0335 Wagner, C.H. Jr. TM3C, USNR, washed off starboard high lookout station and landed on main deck. All stop. Wagner made his way back to the conning tower ladder when again swept away, this time hanging up on a life line. Made his way again to the conning tower and was hauled to safety by eager hands. Examined by pharmacist's mate and discovered to have suffered no injuries or bruises of any nature. Resumed laborious progress at full on one main engine". How

Going by memory, because the log for 6 June, 1945, says only, "See special report", we dove that morning at 0400 with BOWFIN, TINOSA and FLYING FISH positioned along a line of bearing at equal distances from each other. We were somewhat south but mostly to the west of the island of Tsushima in the middle of the Tsushima Straits or Korea Strait. The general plan was to navigate by dead reckoning, passing from south to north in the deep part of the channel to the west of the Island of Tsushima. I remember that after submerging our course was to be north for several hours and then northeast for the remainder of the passage.

We would be able to roughly verify position by the depth to the bottom, having decided to chance one solitary ping on the depth finder at intervals for that purpose.

There is a rather narrow, deep trench roughly in the middle of the strait. I think the depth of the trench was roughly 300 feet with much shallower water on each side. I think we went through at a keel depth 130 feet, which hopefully would place the top of our periscope shears just below the deepest depth at which any mine was reported to be planted, unless, of course, the current caused the mine to dip to a deeper depth.

There is a current setting to the north through Tsushima Strait at velocities reported to be as high as three knots. The current is always in the same direction with a minimum of one and a half knots.

With our slow speed of three knots through the water, we would make between

four and a half and six knots over the ground, or somewhere between 54 and 72 miles in twelve hours. As I recall, we needed about 60 miles to clear Tsushima and possible mine fields.

The Exec, Snuffy Smith, and I were to stand watch and watch, four on and four off, at the conn in the conning tower, with me having the first watch or the 0400 to 0800.

My watch was uneventful and Snuffy relieved me before 0800, so I went to my cabin for a much needed snooze. About 1115, the messenger reported to me, "Hey, captain, if you want to see some mines, get up in the conning tower."

By the time I got there, the mine cable had dragged down the starboard side. Snuffy told me that he saw a mine nearly dead ahead, so he ordered right full rudder. About the time we started to swing to the right, he picked up another mine on the starboard bow, so he ordered left full rudder. By the time the ship was swinging left again, we had sort of fishtailed into the mine cable which made contact about midship and scraped its way along the hull until it fell clear. Snuffy had, of course, stopped the screws so we wouldn't possibly wind the mine cable around the blades and pull the mine down on top of us.

Thank God our clearing lines worked as designed and the mine cable did not hang up on any projections.

After that, we went through two more distinct lines of mines, which we plotted, but, fortunately, we hit gaps between the mines and did not rub any more cables.



By evening twilight we were pretty sure we had passed any possible minefields, so we came to periscope depth to take a look around and hopefully fix our position. We were past the north end of Tsushima and about to pass the port of Pusan, Korea. There ahead and to the left was a convoy or group of many ships, of all sizes, apparently about to go across to Japan. We were prohibited from making our presence known by sinking anything until sundown of the ninth, and here it was only the sixth. So TINOSA went back down to 120 feet and cruised silently along into the Sea of Japan.

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THE FOLLOWING APPEARED IN THE APRIL 1981 ISSUE OF THE TINOSA BLATT ON PAGE 4.

In my last contribution, I had taken us through Tsushima Strait. We had rubbed one mine cable and safely navigated through two more distinct lines of moored mines. About evening twilight, we surfaced for a fix and found that we were clear to the north of Tsushima Island and about to pass the port of Pusan, Korea.

There, ahead and to the left was a convoy or group of many ships, of all sizes, about to go across to Japan. We were prohibited from making our presence known by sinking anything until sundown of 9 June, and here it was only the sixth. So TINOSA went back down to 120 feet and cruised silently along into the Sea of Japan.

About 2200 we were clear of the assem-

## ENCOUNTER:

## APPENDIX II

bly of ships off Pusan, so TINOSA surfaced and put two main engines on propulsion and two on battery charge.

A short while later, upon achieving a full can and having crossed the hundred fathom curve on our northbound course, the great mental strain of the minefield penetration into the Sea of Japan was behind us. Once again we felt free and unfettered, ready and eager to find the enemy.

From the log: 0138 Ship Contact #7. Avoided a small southbound radar contact. Seas picking up, now condition 6. Slowed to one engine. Brought lookouts down to bridge level. 0145 Green water over the bridge frequently. 0457 Submerged when finally crossed the 100 fathom curve. 7 June 1200 Position Lat 35-54N, Long. 130-01E. 1548 Came to 80 feet at which time began to broach. Depth control poor. Obtained look through periscope. Seas from north, condition 7-8. Went back down to 120 feet where depth control is possible. 2040 Surfaced. 8 June, 1945. Noticed port bow plane mine clearing wire fouled on cleat. Heavy angle-iron, anti-fouling device across bow cleats has carried away and cable has looped over cleat. Cannot rig out bow planes. Seas still condition 7-8 from the north. Sent two volunteers forward and cleared the wire. Lieut. (JG) H.G.Gross, USNR and Rodman, G.W. QM3C (SS) USN are deserving of special credit for volunteering for this simple, but hazardous job. 1200 Position Lat 37-22N, Long. 129-58E.

The seas began to subside on the afternoon of the eighth of June, so that at

## ENCOUNTER:

## APPENDIX II

2023, we were able to surface and obtain the first fix since leaving Tsushima. At 2034 a submarine surfaced 4,000 yards ahead of us and then dove again. We think that this was USS BOWFIN which must have been having difficulty working to the north in these seas. At 0427 on 9 June, 1945, TIN-OSA dove again.

Dawn comes early here. This was to be our shooting day at sunset, if we could find a target. At 1330 we inspected the harbor of Bokuko Ko, Korea. We had planned a devastating mele here at sunset, but much to our disappointment, the harbor was empty.

At 1422 we sighted smoke and later a ship bearing 160 degrees true. The water was shallow and we could not close this target closer than about 3,000 yards and still stay submerged. I was thinking:

(1) It is not sunset yet, by six hours or so, and that is the deadline for commence firing.

(2) The reason for the firing deadline was so all ships could reach station without the Japs being alerted to the fact that we are here.

(3) All ships are on station by now.

(4) The harbor at Bokuko Ko, supposedly a busy port is empty, and we haven't seen many ships.

(5) I must not let this guy get away.

BATTLE STATIONS! 1503:

FIRE ONE! (I wouldn't be a gunner, if I wasn't here.)

FIRE TWO! (I wouldn't be a gunner, if I wasn't here.)

FIRE THREE! #1 was aimed to miss just

ahead, #2 was aimed at MOT (middle of target), #3 was aimed to miss just astern. With this spread, a slight error in target speed, either fast or slow, would give two hits, one forward and one aft. A big error in target speed should produce at least one hit. OH, the longest wait in the world, waiting for the torpedoes to reach the target when the range is about a mile and a half! He must have slowed down upon approaching port! #1 must have missed ahead, it should have reached him by this time! #2 must have missed ahead! WHAMO! #3 hit MOT! There is a big puff of black smoke and a shower of spray amidships. We hear the roar of the exploding warhead as the sound travels through the water to the submarine. In a matter of seconds the bow is rising up at an angle out of the water while the stern is doing the same thing. Here, Snuffy (Snuffy Smith, X.O.), take a look through the scope! In less than two minutes that ship is completely gone, not a trace left! Oh, joy!

They didn't have time to send out any messages or alert anybody. It will be long after the sunset deadline before anyone realizes what happened to that ship. Right full rudder. Let's get out of here and reverse course to deeper water. So we took a single ping sounding frequently and kept about ten feet between us and the bottom as we were slowly able to go deeper as the bottom sloped away to deeper water.

Our keel depth was first 70 feet, then 80, then 90, then 110, 120 and 125. Inexplicably, our keel depth then began to decrease, 120 then 115, then 110. Accord-

tons, on 9 June, 1945. On June 10th, while surfaced, a contact was made on the SJ radar at a range of 21,750 yards. We manned battle stations at 1230, but secured at 1255 when contact was determined to be a false echo. The peculiar atmospheric conditions that day and the effect on the radar are demonstrated by the next event.

At 1524 with TINOSA still on the surface, the SJ radar had a contact at 62,000 yards. This distance of approximately 31 miles was twice the straight line or eyeball range of the SJ radar from the raised periscope position of the fully surfaced submarine. We were receiving an echo which had bounced off the water once at 31 miles!

TINOSA commenced tracking and closing the target. At 1659 we sighted smoke and the top of a ship through the periscope at a range of 32,000 yards. The target tracked on a course of 285 degrees true, at a speed of eight knots and we were on his port beam. Thus began the long end-around run in order to get into position to fire torpedoes. TINOSA went to full power on four engines on course 285 degrees true and stayed on the surface, keeping the target in sight at 32,000 yards.

As the range increases slowly, TINOSA turns to the right a little in order to bring the range back down to 32,000. In this manner we can see the target, but he cannot see us, and we are gradually drawing ahead of him and closing in on his track. At 1934 we are on the target's track and ahead of him at a distance of 32,000 yards. He has been on course 285, speed eight, since we have had him in sight, about four

hours.

1936 - DIVE! DIVE! Since we have this guy so dead to rights, we'll amble along ahead of him, but towards him. If he doesn't change course, we'll turn 90 degrees to the right at the proper time and give him three fish on a 90 port track at 1,000 yards firing range.

1940 - Man battle stations! 2032. Turn right and pull off the track. Our target is a medium sized and medium loaded AK. 2040. FIRE ONE! FIRE TWO! FIRE THREE! 2041. See water splash amidships and hear muffled thud of a dud hit.

Sound reports torpedo making circular run!

Can hear screws plainly as torpedo, set at six feet in depth, passes close overhead with screaming whine. FLOOD NEGATIVE! TAKE HER DEEP, CHARLIE! (Charlie Sanders, Diving Officer at GQ.)

We've got to get out of the way for the second pass of that wild torpedo!

Several sources report hearing muffled thud of number three torpedo.

Final set up and shoot! As scope goes under we fire our fourth torpedo, with no effect. Level her off at 300 feet!

Sound reports target turning and approaching. 2050, First depth charge. 2053, Second depth charge. 2100, Started back up, determined to sink this target. 2106, Third depth charge. All were not close, seemed small and appeared to be set shallow.

2125. Depth 56 feet. Sound conditions are terrible. JP and QB hear nothing. JK could only hear target at 1500

yards and can hear nothing now. 2148 Surface! SJ radar all clear.

We are 35 miles into BOWFIN'S area. The way our luck is running just now, let's not make a blind search into BOWFIN'S area on the surface, let's get out of here. 2200. SJ interference on the radar. Attempted to exchange recognition, but the signals were too weak to read. Believe this to be BOWFIN. The bearing of the interference drew north towards our last contact. We hope BOWFIN can shed some light onto what happened to the ship which we attacked. Attempted to call him on the SCR610 voice with no success. We learned after the war that BOWFIN sank our target early in the morning on 11 June, the SHINYO MARU NO. 3, passenger-cargo 1,898 tons.

These entries from the TINOSA log may bring memories to some who were there. 11 June 1945. 0038 Entered own area again. 0435 Submerged. 0538 Surfaced. Patrolling shipping lanes. 1100 APR signal on 147 mgc. 1115 A/C #6. Sighted large unidentified plane, range 11 miles. Submerged. Just as we submerged, SCR-610 picked up voices in English, loud and clear, "Hello, Smitty. This is flight number seven. I have a message for you." The reply was unreadable, but was English. We have no information of our planes using 31.7 mgc voice. (Some routine entries are omitted.) 12 June, 1945. 0300 Completed converting #4 F.B.T. (Fuel Ballast Tank.) Excessive trouble, as usual, encountered with blank flanges in 10 pound blow. 0330 Submerged to flush out #4 F.B.T. 0343 Surfaced. 9514 Sighted small fishing boat. 0534

Submerged 15 miles off Bokuko Ko, headed in to investigate port. 0920 S/C #11. (Ship Contact.) Smoke and masts sighted bearing 194 degrees true. 0948 Manned battle stations. Commenced submerged approach. 1012 Broke off approach. Secured from battle stations when target determined to be small fishing boat. Continued in toward Bokuko Ko. 1055 S/C #12. Sighted large sea truck on course 340 true, range 7,000 yards. Angle on the bow 90 S. Cannot close submerged. Came to parallel course. 1240 Visibility 3,000 yards. Lost sight of sea truck. Surfaced for end around. 1311 Sighted sea truck again. Range 6,000 yards. 1325 Visibility 1,000 yards.

Decided we could sink him with deck gun by being all ready and suddenly appearing out of the fog. Submerged approach is impractical in this visibility. 1330 While manning battle stations surface, fog suddenly began to lift. Small wooden sailing trawler on starboard beam 1500 yards. Sea truck visible at 4,000 yards. Men are on deck. We are committed now. Don't believe sea truck has seen us, so ducked into a patch of fog until all guns are ready, but he is visible all the time.

1335 Ready. Closing on four engines. Fog lifting rapidly. We feel awfully naked. Shore is visible in places at range nine miles. Trawler has a box seat. 1339 Gun Attack #1. Sank loaded sea truck, type E2 modified. Loaded displacement 1583 tons. Full movie coverage. Ranges from 4,000 yards to 750 yards. 1400 Leaving scene of action. 1404 One lifeboat sighted to south. Must have departed unnoticed



from disengaged side of target.

That's what the log says. Now I'll tell you how I remember the action.

While we are submerged and after losing the target in the fog, Mr. Siegfried, the gunnery officer, says to me, "Captain, come on! For God's sake, lets get him with the gun in a surface action and save the fish for something big later!"

"O.K. Clyde, we'll try it." So we surface. Man battle stations surface!! "Daranowich, get your camera ready and get yourself up top of the periscope shears. No matter what happens, take pictures continuously. I'll call you down before we submerge again."

While people are scurrying around readying guns and ammo, TINOSA runs out of fog and there we are, naked as a jaybird, in broad daylight and there is the target, but we are not ready! Right full rudder! Back into the fog! Ready! Left full rudder, steady on the sea truck! There she is.

Range 4,500. She has a deck gun visible on the raised bow. Figures are running towards it. Range 4,000. COMMENCE FIRING!

We can see the shells from our forward mounted five inch, 25 caliber deck gun as the orange tracers speed toward the enemy ship. WHAMMO! Our first shot lands squarely on the deck gun and pieces go flying. They can't shoot at us with that gun anyway. We bore on in. A few of our shots go into the pilot house, but as we get closer we concentrate on the engine room. We are lying nearly stopped on her

port quarter, range 750 yards. She has a raised section aft, and we can see the hole which our shells have made just above the waterline. One after another our shells land in the same hole and we can clearly hear the shells explode inside the engine room.

The diving officer can hear, too, and Charlie Sanders told me later that he would hear our gun go off and then hear an explosion which he thought was them shooting back at us. This made it more scary in the control room than it was on the bridge. Slowly she sank, stern first, and nothing was left.

TINOSA cleared the area to seaward receiving friendly waves, we thought, from fishing vessels we passed. Afterwards we found out that the bright sun and fog had caused over exposure of the movie film and our pictorial record consisted of a black screen frequently showing a blaze of orange light!

The final tally gives us credit for sinking the KEITO MARU, a cargo vessel, 880 tons.

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THE FOLLOWING SECTION APPEARED IN THE DECEMBER, 1981 ISSUE OF THE TINOSA BLATT ON PAGES 4 AND 5.

Writing articles for this column consists of checking my last article, to see where and when I left off, and then going to the log at the date of the last action and reading on further. It is sort of an on-going serial and I'm glad that I know

how it eventually comes out. Reading the cold, dry report of the log sets me to dreaming and remembering. Those were exciting days!

The last column told the tale of sinking the KEITO MARU in a surface gun action on 12 June, 1945. We go on from there.

The action is not as frequent or as productive as we would like. There just doesn't seem to be any shipping. We have searched diligently, but the total amount of traffic along the coast of South Korea has been the ship we sank on the 9th, the one on the 10th where our circular run torpedo nearly got us and the one on the 12th which we sank with the deck gun. Other than those, none of which were very big, we have seen only small sampans and fishings vessels. But, remember all those ships off Fusan the night we made the passage through Tsushima Straits? I'll bet they are running between Fusan and Shimonoseki.

If we go down to the north end of Tsushima Island, any traffic between Fusan and Shimonoseki will have to pass near to us. The only problem is that Tsushima lies well to the south and we have an obligation to rendezvous with our wolf pack, the BOB CATS, on the night of the 16th and that rendezvous position is well to the north.

Well there isn't enough action here to suit us, there may be some down by Tsushima. We've been having a lot of fog. If it is foggy enough, we can stay on the surface while running south and thus get on station quick enough to give us some time there and make it worth while. If it is

not foggy and we have to run submerged, we can go only part way. In that case we will cover the port of Hoko in Geijitsu Wan.

At 1750 on the 13th TINOSA sighted a small wooden sea truck, about 800 tons. We went to battle stations submerged at 1800, but could not reach a firing position. The best we could do was reach a position at 4,000 yards range and a 120 degree port angle on the bow. We did not surface to make an end around, nor consider a surface gun action, because we did not wish to advertise our presence in the vicinity of Fusan. By midnight of the 13th, we were patrolling on the surface, east and west along a line eleven miles to the north of the end of Tsushima Island.

Nothing doing here, either. We went to battle stations at 0238 when a white light was sighted, but secured at 0336 when the craft we sighted was determined to be very small. We could track it by radar only out to a range of 5600 yards. The contact course was 320 degrees true, speed 7 knots. Fog prevented visual identification. At 0445 on 14 June, 1945, we submerged while closing the coast north of Fusan.

Visibility was poor all day. There was no ship traffic. At any time during the day there were about eleven fishing vessels in sight. Unfortunately we have to work north along the coast, away from Fusan, but toward our rendezvous for the night of the 16th. We surfaced at 2048. These are long days submerged, sixteen hours in round figures.

We submerged at 0435 on 15 June when increasing light and variable visibility

revealed fishing craft at 3,000 yards. Our radar does not pick up these small wooden ships. The sea is like glass. We are continually foiled in attempting to steer any course by the great number of fishing vessels milling around. At 0910 a small sampan, range 1500 yards, keeps giving us a zero angle on the bow. We notice a net marker twenty degrees on the port bow, range 350 yards, and another 60 degrees on the starboard bow, range 600 yards. It looks like we have blundered directly into a fishing net. We'll go into it in no uncertain fashion and maybe break right on through. Flood negative! Take her to 300 feet! All ahead full! 0931.

At periscope depth again. Cannot see any net markers and we appear to be all clear. 1300. Fishing sampans all around. The sea is like glass. Changes in water temperature, with corresponding changes in density, make depth control difficult at slow speed. At 1339 all hands heard a loud metallic snap or bang which seemed to come from the pump room. Shortly afterward attempted to flood negative when inadvertently came up to 56 feet. Negative tank flood valve won't open and cannot flood negative, although the operating shaft opens and closes hydraulically by visual inspection in the pump room bilge, and the indicator lights are working. We suspect that the flood valve operating linkage carried away inside negative tank. Negative tank is out of commission. Flooded same and compensated for it. 2043 Surfaced. 2108 received a dot dash challenge by flashing white light bearing 085 true,

estimated range 4,000 yards, no SJ radar contact. This is probably another wooden sampan type fishing or patrol vessel which has heard our Diesels or screws. Avoided. 16 June, 1945. 0437 Submerged for trim. 0532 Surfaced. 1300 Submerged upon SD radar contact at six-and-a-half miles. Visibility about 600 yards, contact not sighted. 1403 Surfaced. 2030 Commenced getting friendly SJ radar interference. 2145 Made contact with USS FLYING FISH on SJ radar. 2249 Alongside USS FLYING FISH. She is the leader of the three BOBCATS: FLYING FISH, BOWFIN and TINOSA. Enjoyed a chat with Bob Risser, exchanged movies and gave FLYING FISH 15 pounds of salt. 2255 Enroute own area.

The 17th of June was an unproductive day spent entirely on the surface, except for hiding from one aircraft contact. Looking for surface shipping without result. On the 18th at 0220 TINOSA spotted a dim white light followed by an SJ contact at 1400 yards. We commenced running through a darkened fishing fleet, some seen and some not. The SJ picks these small craft up at ranges from 2500 to 350 yards. We were closing the coast north of Bokuko Ko at 17 knots. Until 0400 we ran through this fleet using right and left full rudder almost continuously to avoid collisions. We ran through at least one net and had an estimated 50 contacts. This was exhilarating business! At 0404 SJ radar had a contact bearing 329 degrees true, range 9500 yards. This must be a coastal freighter like a sea truck or something, at least it was much more substantial than the little

sampan type fishing vessels which we have been dodging for so long. At 0405 manned battle stations submerged, although we were still on the surface, intending to make a surface approach after gaining a favorable position. 0417 Sighted target in growing light, range 11,000 yards. Target is indistinct, but has good length and a large superstructure. 0420 Ran into fog bank, visibility 75 yards, making end around. Fog apparently reduced radar sensitivity, radar contact lost. 0515 We are on target's track. 12,000 yards ahead, three miles off shore. Commenced closing target. 0530 Regained contact, range 7700 yards. 0602 Torpedo attack number three. Fired three torpedoes, depth set six feet, torpedo run 600 yards, 60 degree starboard track. No hits. Range to land 5900 yards. Left full rudder. Passed 350 yards from target without sighting. Target continues on course 330 degrees at six-and-a-half knots. Hear three explosions corresponding to torpedo runs of 3500 yards. JK heard target screws for the first time, reported as "light and fast". Torpedo attack number four. Fired two torpedoes, depth set four feet, 100 starboard track, torpedo run 700 yards. No hits. Desisted from further useless expenditure of torpedoes. Considered gun attack, but decided against it. In this fog, with visibility of 75 yards, we would practically have to ram him before we could see what we are attacking. Broke off attack. This was a low point in our morale for this patrol, everything we had done to date was right, except this. Determined to improve our score somehow.

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0822 June 18, 1945. Fog is getting spotty. Fishing sampan suddenly clearly in sight on the port beam, range 1400 yards. The occupants waved gaily to us before we ducked into another fog bank. 0845 Four sampans in sight on the starboard bow, range 2,000 yards. Submerged near coast for rest of the day, with no ship contacts. 2008 Surfaced. Avoiding many small contacts. Decided to head down to Tsushima again. If we can run on the surface enough, we may be able to get down there with enough time left to scout Fusan itself. (This did not occur.)

2312 June 19, 1945. SJ radar contact bearing 160 degrees true, 6700 yards. 0005 June 24 Original contact joined two more. We have strong radar interference on 3,000 mgc. Decided this was a patrol. Because of patrols, good visibility and lack of time decided not to try to get all the way to Fusan. 0305 SJ radar contact bearing 035 degrees true, range 11,500 yards. Commenced tracking. 0407 Getting light. Target tracks on 120 degrees true, speed 7 knots, angle on the bow 150 starboard. 0423 Sighted target which is a medium sized AK. Making end around at full power in good visibility. We'll be lucky, in this position north of the north end of Tsushima Island, if we can stay on the surface long enough to get ahead of him. 0539 Submerged, angle on the bow 12 degrees starboard, range 24,000 yards. 0556 Manned battle stations. 0712 Fired three torpedoes on a 90 degree starboard track, torpedo run 500 yards. Three hits! This AK started a dive immediately. In twenty seconds she was



decks awash with about a 20 degree dive bubble and still looking like she was making seven knots. At 35 seconds she was completely gone leaving about twenty survivors clinging to miscellaneous pieces of wreckage. She had a deck cargo of lumber. At time about 40 seconds after firing, Charlie Sanders, the diving officer, says, "Captain, if you don't change course we're apt to get at the same place at the same time as that ship."

"Geez, you're right Charlie! Right full rudder!" I felt more at ease when TINOSA had turned through 90 degrees in heading and we had not collided with the sinking ship. There was no mistaking her breakup sounds as she went deeper and so the KAISEI MARU, 884 tons, joined the others in Davy Jones locker, on the morning of 20 June, 1945.

We will probably finish the eleventh patrol next time and then I will be wondering what to say. If any of you have questions that you have wondered about ever since TINOSA'S WW II patrols and you think that I might be able to enlighten you, if I would, give it a try. Ask me. It will give me something to write about next time.

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THE FOLLOWING SECTION APPEARED IN THE APRIL 1982 ISSUE OF THE TINOSA BLATT ON PAGES 6 AND 7.

In the last issue, the KASEI MARU had just completed a 35 second dive on the morning of 20 June, 1945. That was at 0715 in the morning. At 0832, after a good

breakfast, we surfaced and commenced patrolling on a northerly course.

How lucky we were to have been able to make that end around on the surface in order to gain a firing position on the KASEI MARU! With us being this close to the island of Tsushima we could expect some air activity, and it came along soon.

We were able to patrol on the surface for less than an hour before being driven down by an APR contact and radar interference on 3,000 megacycles. We continued submerged, coming up frequently to shallower keel depth in order to raise the height of eye search through the high scope.

At 1720 we logged ship contact #20, smoke on the horizon, bearing 247 degrees true, bearing drawing south. The target's course was estimated to be 120 degrees true. TINOSA came to the optimum approach course at standard speed. With the angle on the bow about 35 degrees port and the range estimated at 20,000 yards, we manned battle stations submerged. At the same time we took her down to 100 feet in order to hide her wake and went ahead full speed, keeping a wary eye on total battery voltage. Every fifteen minutes or so we would slow and come to periscope depth for a check on the target, and then would go deeper and speed up again. At 1924, TINOSA made torpedo attack #6 by firing four bow tubes at a torpedo run of 1200 yards with a 100-109 degree port track angle.

There were two torpedo hits. The first hit was aft and was followed immediately by a broiling, orange flame that

shot up at least 800 feet above the ship. This ship disappeared in about fifty seconds, and the total for two ships must be eligible for the Guinness Book of Records.

About three minutes after the first torpedo hit, there was a loud explosion which seemed close and which might have been an aircraft bomb. Since we had been too busy to look for aircraft during the attack, and since number two poppet valve didn't work and a large impulse bubble had been noted, it was possible that we were under aircraft attack.

So at 1928, we rigged for depth charge and went to 250 feet and secured from battle stations. Nothing further developed and at 1951, we came to periscope depth and found all clear. At 2054 TINOSA surfaced. Our latest victim was the TAITO MARU, a cargo vessel of 2,726 tons sunk at Lat. 36-04N, Long. 130-26E.

The night of 20-21 June was spent cruising north on the surface toward our rendezvous with the other Hellcats, which was set for the evening of 23 June. At 0203 we sighted a steady white light on the island of Utsuryo To, bearing 350 degrees T, distance 30 miles. The day of 21 June was spent on the surface with our noon position being Lat. 38-28N, Long. 132-57E. When these positions are given you might find it fun to look at the location in your atlas. At 1820 we heard very plain and loud a Japanese female voice on SCR 610, 31.7 mc, otherwise the day of 21 June was uneventful. 22 June was also spent on the surface with the noon position being 42-14N, 135-15E. At 2244 we made ship contact

#21 and commenced closing a white light. This was determined to be a properly illuminated Russian tanker. She was loaded and headed westerly and was estimated at 10,000 tons. We all wished that some of our sinkings could have been as big as this fellow.

Some of the continuous tension, alertness and readiness permeating TINOSA can be imagined from the log entry at 0253 23 June. Submerged when lookout thought he saw and heard a plane flying overhead. 0306 Surfaced. Visibility was variable, 2-5 miles all day. Noon position 45-54N, 138-57E. 1650 At rendezvous. Submerged. 2013 Surfaced.

From here I have to describe our exit from the Japan Sea from memory, since the log entry says only, "See Special Report."

As I recall, shortly after surfacing in the evening of 23 June we had plenty of interference on our radar as the other boats of Hydeman's Hellcats surfaced nearby, calls were exchanged, and we sorted ourselves out into three groups of Hyde-man's Hepcats, Pierce's Polecats and Riser's Bobcats. Only the BONEFISH of Pierce's Polecats failed to appear and we all hoped that Larry Edge and crew were only temporarily delayed. The decision was made that we would exit through La Perouse Strait on the surface the next night, 24 June. The formation would consist of two columns of four ships each, the columns to be separated by 1,000 yards and each ship to be 500 yards astern of its leader. Speed was to be full on four engines, about 18 knots. During the day of the 24th, we all submerged at dawn, and proceeded slowly

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along parallel courses at speed three knots, resting and preparing for the big event.

About 2100 on 24 June we were all on the surface and forming up in our two columns. About 2200 we started for the approximate center of the strait and increased our speed to full on four. It was a black night with haze and fog reducing the surface visibility to about one mile. SEADOG almost immediately reported her surface search radar out of commission and her lead ship duties were taken over by CREVALLE. About 2300 we were all alerted to a surface ship contact ahead and the columns changed course slightly to leave the stranger about a mile to port. He was tracked on a course opposite to ours and was soon determined to be a properly illuminated Russian ship. We were glad to see a big surface ship making transit of the Strait through the same water we were traversing because it indicated that the water might not be mined. However, we cursed the Russian when at about 2330 he turned on a big searchlight and illuminated the line of hurrying submarines. I think we had some other radar contacts of possible patrol ships in the strait, but none came after us and we did not pass close to any. By about 0300 we were safely through La Perouse Strait and into water that was undoubtedly not mined because of its depth. At this point each sub was released to proceed independently with George Pierce in TUNNY being given permission to wait in order to provide possible assistance to the missing BONEFISH. As we know now, BONEFISH was at that

time on eternal patrol.

The day before the exit from the Sea of Japan, COMSUBPAC had sent a message to all subs in the vicinity asking them to create whatever diversions they could on the night of the 24th in order to attract the attention of the Japanese and thus divert attention from La Perouse Strait. Perhaps the scheme worked. At any rate, Hydeman's Hellcats were not hindered in their passage. When TINOSA and the others were told to proceed independently after clearing La Perouse, it was left to our discretion to chose a passage through the island chain which stretches from Japan's northern island of Hokkaido to the Kamchatka Peninsula, the Kuril Island Chain. TINOSA chose the third passage north from Hokkaido, the Kita Uruppu Suido, going through unmolested on the surface on the night of the 25th. We expected that there might be some action in the strait because as we approached we exchanged calls and conversation via the SJ radar interference with, I think, USS DACE, skipper Otis Cole, who informed us that he had created a diversion for us the evening before by shelling the coast of the island forming the edge of the strait. However, the expected hornet's nest did not ensue.

The remainder of the trip back was uneventful. TINOSA stopped at Midway Island on 30 June for fuel. On the evening of 3 July, we met and formed up with SPADEFISH, FLYING FISH, SKATE and BOWFIN. On 4 July at 0800, we all dove on signal and at 0806 all surfaced on signal, for movies I presume, and at 1120, TINOSA moored at pier Sail

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Nine, U.S. Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, T.H. Our credits for this Eleventh Patrol included ten aviators rescued, plus four ships sunk for a total post-war tonnage credit of 6,701 tons.

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EXCERPTS FROM A DIARY WRITTEN BY, "BENNY" BENTHAM WHILE SERVING ON THE U.S.S. TINOSA DURING THE 9th, 10th, and 11th WAR PATROLS - MARCH TO JULY, 1945.

### 9th WAR PATROL

Left Pearl Harbor March 1, 1945.

Days between here and Saipan have been spent in cleaning compartments, making last minute adjustments in equipment of each department to put boat in readiness for what promises to be another "interesting" combat run.

March 11. Arrived at Saipan. Tied up alongside USS FULTON anchored in harbor.

March 12. Are marking time waiting on Admiral Lockwood's return from conference at Guam with Nimitz.

Made a beer party to island of S. this afternoon. Four cans of beer Beverwyck. Drank it between two Jap pillboxes which had caught a Yank Amtrack in converging fire on D-Day. This "floating tank" was just what the name painted on its side stated - "Sad Sack". It got to the beach - just!

I noted with interest that Japs, in frantic haste to prevent Yank landing, had evidently torn up fixed guns from the hills, and set them up right on sandy beach. They obviously would have to pick them up and reset them after each round. I don't recall reading of this in accounts of battle.

It was odd to know at 1100 in the morning that B-29's were going to hit Nago-



ya that night. Sure enough, next day we heard via KSF, San Francisco, that they had struck with incendiaries. Oh, yes! We knew they were to carry them.

Met a soldier in engineers - name of Al, from San F. Has a cousin who is member of crew. Came aboard and I showed him through the boat explaining as we went, how we were able to dive and surface. When I showed him the torpedo tubes and told in brief of how we fire fish, he displayed the usual layman's awe and bewilderment at the maize of pipes and valves strung between, above, and around the tubes. I wonder why?

Al told us his outfit would invade Okinawa Jima on or just prior to April 1. Dogfaces keep no secrets! We couldn't tell him (silent service, you know), but we were there on a special mission over Christmas and New Year's. Took pictures and plotted minefields. On completion of mission (61 days) we returned to Pearl Harbor to receive the plaudits of Admiral Brown (and to get an eighteen day rest at the Royal Hawaiian). The Ad (I always call him Ad) in a short address to officers and crew, told us that the 8th patrol was of greater value to the U. S. than the preceding seven combined. Whew! In seven runs the boat has seventeen ships sunk, totalling 90-odd thousand, and thirteen damaged, totalling 110,000 tons. If the last run was valuable enough to over-shadow this record, then what we did must have been pretty important. Brown also said that what we had accomplished would save many American lives. From all this we figured an invasion was near at hand. We didn't know

when. I wonder if Al has straight dope.

March 13. Admiral is back. Came aboard the "T" first thing this morning. He was wearing knee-length khakis which did not enhance his appearance. There can be little dignity when knobby knees and spindly legs are on display.

There was great to-do and hubbub when the rumor that the Admiral would accompany us on two or three days trials spread through the boat. Some even went so far as to say we'd have to wear whites while he was aboard. He won our hearts, however, when in informing the rumor, Commander Latham, our skipper, said it was the Admiral's desire that the crew dress and act as usual. We knew that would never do, so we changed our crummy dungarees for slightly cleaner ones and acted with decorum. I don't suppose he was aware of this, however, it was a nice gesture on his part and we rose to the situation. We were nice, too!

It was strange to see fellows who ordinarily are blunt and direct in manner, though a little crude, make an abrupt aboutface and present a polished facade. In the Admiral's presence they were very polite. Instead of saying, "For Christ's sake, get the hell out of my way, "they would now tap softly on the shoulder and in the "grande" and best Joseph Kennedy-at-the-Court of St. James-manner, murmur politely, "Pardon me, may I pass?" Submarine protocol. Tch! Tch!

We put to sea just prior to 1200, to demonstrate to the Admiral this new piece of gear referred to only as the "unmention-

able." It is super secret. We were the first submarine to use it, and it has limitless possibilities - but only for war.

It is risky business as we found out at Okinawa Jime and Iwo Jima last patrol. This noon at lunch, Murphy, ship's cook 1/C, apologized for serving ham (generally reserved for the end of a run when we get low on fresh meats,) but explained that when asked by the skipper what he would like for lunch, the Admiral expressed a desire for ham! Probably tired of steaks, pheasant, Saipan grouse, leg of lamb, and roast beef. His palate shrieked for so plebian a dish as ham and cabbage. We were all tempted to go into the "joint next door," but being 20 miles at sea we didn't, and ate ham and cabbage.

March 14, 15, 16. Operate all day and come in at night to deliver the Admiral safe and sound. A routine, humdrum existence, but we don't mind. We aren't getting shot at!

March 17. "Aha! Murphy," I said, "the Top o' the Mornin' to ye."

"Sure, and the rist of the day to yer-self," says he.

Thus we usher in the day. Yes, it's Saint Paddy's Day, but to us it's more than that. It's the day we leave for patrol. The new men are chattering among themselves, buoyed up and expectant. We know what we can expect, so are just a little cynical. We station the maneuvering watch and prepare to get underway. Last minute handshakes from those men who were transferred, grunting "Thanks" in reply to their "Good luck and happy hunting." The usual

amount of good natured kidding. We yell over at them, "We'll fight the war - you buy War Bonds," and "You'll rot in the relief crew."

Our diesels have been running for ten or fifteen minutes, are sufficiently warmed up, and "Doc" Garner relays from the Captain, "Cast off all lines." We are on our way!

March 18. We are running on the surface, but diving on all plane contacts. From time to time we pick up an indication on the SD Radar and when the range narrows to six miles, down we go! We run submerged approximately a half hour, and then come up for a look through the scope at 62 feet. "All clear," then up to 47 feet, "Raise the SD mast, turn on the SD." No indication. "Surface alarm. All ahead full, on four main engines."

March 19, 20, 21, 22, 23. Comparatively uneventful save for a few plane contacts a day. We charged batteries in the torpedoes on the 23rd. This is routine every six days. We probably won't use them at all where we are going. Another special mission!

March 24. We are nearing the island of Yokoate (Jima.) It is in the island group called Ryukyu's. Just a rock. We submerged before dawn this morning. Can't afford to be seen now. We must pass through a narrow strait between two Jimas. If we are spotted, they'll patrol the straits and make it tough for us.

Our bow planes crapped out on us this morning. What a break! During a depth charge attack, we'll need all the skill at

our command. It is hard enough to maintain our control of depth with all equipment science has placed at our disposal, but the bow planes have 80 percent of the control. Tonight, upon surfacing, my old dinkie die cobbler, Warner Cross, Motor Mach. Mate, will be able to climb through the superstructure topside and find out what is wrong. He's a damn good man and he'll fix it if anyone can!

We haven't been looking through the scope because the water is quite calm and very clear. At a depth of 65 feet we would be clearly visible to a plane flying overhead. The water is about 200 feet deep so we can cruise at 150 feet nicely.

I had the watch in the after torpedo room sitting in a camp chair reading Esquire. Everyone else was asleep back there. CRUMP! BUMP! My God! What's that! Everyone woke up and I lurched out of the chair and ran to the bulkhead door ready to seal off the compartment. It felt as though we were rammed, or rammed something. The boat bounced again and shuddered. No explosion! What the hell! Then the word. "We ran aground. All back full".

The Captain had dashed to the conning tower when we hit the first time and now he raised the scope. The word came down, "We are 400 yards off the beach of Yokoate Jima." So close that he cannot see the top of the island. The captain asked for the Kodak and took moving pictures as long as we were that close.

The current evidently was much stronger than the navigator figured. He has lost

face with the crew, but as yet, hasn't committed hari-kari. We backed down and pulled away from there without being detected and got through the straits with no trouble at all. Funny, isn't it? We were worried about patrol craft in the straits when our real danger lay in our own mistakes. Submarine warfare - never a dull moment - always the unexpected happening.

March 25. Now we know for certain what we shall do for Uncle Sam (and Admiral Lockwood) during this patrol. Chart a mine field - again! Most of us breathed a grateful sigh when the last run was over. We knew just how nerve-wracking this kind of work gets. The mine field we are heading into is probably the most extensive in the world. It is 80 miles wide by 400 miles long, running north from a point off the northern mouth of Formosa Straits to within a few hundred miles off southern Kyushu, a main island of Japan. It has been in existence since 1941, augmented from time to time. It affords ideal protection for Jap convoys plying between Japan and Formosa and Chinese coastal cities within the Formosa Straits. Until now, no American craft has been within its confines. It is a singular distinction for us.

March 26. Cross worked on the bow plane rigging all night, both nights since the breakdown. Although they are not fixed, he has not given up on them. For eight to ten hours a night, he was partly submerged in water, all the while working at dismantling this gearing. It is pretty cold, too - water temperature has been 60-

65 and a stiff breeze blowing.

We shot at several drifting mines today. Sunk them with 20 mm fire. They did not explode. We merely hit a buoyant compartment, sea water displaced the air, and they sank. Simple, isn't it?

We travel very slowly while on the surface making good five knots. When a mine is contacted, it is from 150 to 250 feet away - usually off either bow, and necessitates immediate action to avoid it. Upon getting the word (range and bearing) the officer of the deck orders right or left full rudder, and port or starboard ahead full. We than pAss the mine safely - we hope! They usually are about 15 feet below the surface, therefore, cannot be seen from the bridge. An eerie feeling indeed to know that somewhere about 50 away is a tool of destruction which would have done us in if we hit it, and we can't even see the damn things.

A plane (Jap) was sighted today, and we dove before he saw us. On the way down a mine indicated at 100 feet away. We had to keep going down, yet not sure if we had distance enough to veer out of the way of the mine. We did, so I make my entry tonight!

March 27. A bit of scuttlebutt floated through the boat today. We may possibly make a contact today or tonight! I hope so. Evidently we have permission this run to accept engagements with enemy convoys. Last run we saw two ships but were prevented from making an attack until mission was completed. When mission was completed, we returned to Pearl. - - - The day is over

Bong! Bong! Bong! Bong! It's the general alarm calling all hands to battle stations. I was in the after fish house (the after torpedo room) when this started, so had no idea what was up there. We checked valves, etc. on the tubes, built up impulse air. Everything in perfect readiness. This done, I went into the maneuvering to relieve myself. Peculiar this effect produced by going to battle stations. I've noticed it every time since I came aboard. I'm not the only one who takes a nervous "pee" so I suppose it's a normal nervous reaction. When I came back, I found that scuttlebutt had a battle wagon and a cruiser as targets. Wow! If that's so, there'll be big doings in Tokyo tonight, because we'll sure as hell get one of them!

As we close the range and time wore on our nerves, our anxiety became more pressing. "Why in hell don't they put out the dope?" Finally, the Captain spoke. "The twenty and forty mm and 50 cal. gun crews lay up to conn. Battle Surface!"

It was then we knew it was a small target. Very small for they did not call us (5 inch deck gun crew) up.

(Editor's note: This first section of Robert Bentham's diary appeared in the April, 1983 issue of THE TINOSA BLATT. Subsequent sections appeared in the August, 1983 issue, the December 1983 and the April, 1984 issue and are continued on the following pages.)



One has to witness a battle surface to appreciate it, and then actually participating is so much the better. We surfaced. The gun crews flew up the conning tower hatch and poured out onto the bridge. The target was a lifeboat. We did not fire. We took two prisoners aboard and barreled away on four main engines. Why the skipper let the other 15 or 16 bastards go is more than I can fathom. When last seen they were pulling mightily for the China coast. They will be picked up, I think, as we are only 80 miles off the coast.

One of the POW's was sent to each tube room, so here we are with a prisoner to guard for the next 45 days. He is shackled to a torpedo skid which has a torpedo in it. Gross weight - 5,000 pounds, so I hardly think he'll go very far. His pallet consists of a piece of canvas and a blanket on deck. Not very comfortable, but a damn sight better than the lifeboat.

Before orders regarding the handling of prisoners were put out, I had quite a time trying to make him understand my questions. It went something like this. Pointing to myself, I would say, "Ben-ny, Ben-ny." He was quick to pick it up and said, "Ben-ny, Ben-ny: after me. Then I'd point to him with one hand, cupping my ear with the other and lean toward him as if straining to hear. Shortly, he caught on and said something that sounded like "Hommy Oka" to my definitely untrained ear. I took this to be his Shinto name, though it may very well mean, "I don't understand," or even, "You're crazy." He lived in Toyama, is 23 years old, was torpedoed en-

route to Okinawa Jima with marine reinforcements. Toyama is on Honshu. He looks 16. A plane launched the torpedo. The marines never did get to Okinawa.

There was more questioning mostly in pantomime, and more answers accompanied by pre-Pearl Harbor smiles. Those that require much showing of teeth. When the above-mentioned orders came out, it sort of cramped my style, as from then on there could be no more questions.

Doc Garner shaved the prisoner's head and privates and sprinkled insecticide powder lavishly and indiscriminately. He then prescribed a rigid diet which we must see is adhered to. The POW had been adrift in an open boat for nine days, had not eaten in five. He was permitted about two ounces of tepid water at four in the afternoon, and then fed a small to moderate ration at eight in the evening. A significant scene: After being without food for five days and seeing some placed before him, he bowed his head over folded hands in prayer before eating. Shintoism must exert a powerful influence over these people's conduct. Come to think of it, it was a damned short prayer! He has not said Grace since then - just "Ho-Kay" with that infernal grinning. He is served one meal a day, is allowed one smoke directly after.

March 29. Prisoner, of course, is center of attention. I think every one in the crew has seen him and the compartment has been very crowded. I have been aware of someone watching me, and just now caught "Hommy's" eyes and held them. He motioned with his hands to his face that he was

quite taken by my red beard. Such idolatry! I wonder if I can handle it gracefully?

Mr. Oleson, (Ed's note: should be spelled Olsen) one of our junior officers, is quite shocked by my attitude toward the Jap. Mr. Olsen told me they thought both Japs to be officers, and, if so, they probably understood English, and we should be careful what is said in their presence. He said, too, that they might even be able to speak it. I suggested then that if they really wanted to find out, they clear the compartment of men, secure the bulkhead door, and give me fifteen minutes to find out one way or the other.

The trouble with Oleson is he's never been fired upon by Japs who were after his ass. He's never heard a depth charge, nor aerial depth bomb. He didn't see that Yank pilot we picked up out of a life raft near Guam last July 21, who had been riddled by a brave Zero pilot as he drifted helplessly waiting to be picked up. Personally, I have no compassion in my heart for bastards like that. No one felt sorry for John Dillinger when he got it. He was an American, but he was a rat, too.

We are armed with a .45 while guarding the prisoner. If he should make a break or a wrong move, I won't fire because by chance the slug might puncture a high pressure air line, a hydraulic line, or a torpex warhead. The warhead would probable detonate! I would, or will, however, gun-whip him to hell and back. He'll only do it once.

March 30. We are about ten miles off

port of Nagasaki, island of Kyushu, one of the main islands of Japan. We are on the surface, but that won't last long if I know Nagasaki. Captain Weiss thought he could stay up, too, but our first day out here (June, '44) we were forced down seven times by planes. For the 29 days after that, we ran submerged. We are patrolling a certain stipulated area, being careful not to extend into an area patrolled by another boat lest we meet a fate similar to the GUDGEON. She was sunk with all hands by another American sub. What a hell of a way to go out!

I have not set down each dive we made due to Jap aircraft. We've averaged five or six a day since coming out of the mine field. Night patrol planes equipped with radar make patrols much more hazardous than they used to be. Lookouts can't see them, so we must depend solely on our SD radar. We never used to dive between dark and dawn unless making an approach. Now it's commonplace.

We have transmitted to ComSubPac via radio a query as to what method to employ in getting the data on mines to them. Are standing by waiting for instructions.

March 31. Answer from ComSubPac; make rendezvous with TRIGGER and give them the charts showing channel through minefield. They are leaving station in two days, returning to Guam. Meeting is set for 8:00 P.M. tonight. We contacted them on radio (wolfpack frequency.)

We were forced down by plane this noontime and upon manning sound gear picked up screws off port bow. Headed for them -

shortly after, went to stations for battle submerged. Turned out to be six armed trawlers. Too many to battle surface on. They'd ram us before we could get all of them with the 5 inch gun.

It is 9:00 P.M. and we have not seen the TRIGGER. We'll hang around awhile longer. Probably they are having trouble trying to stay on surface. Planes are bad!!!

April 1. Well, here's the dope! We are leaving station. The TRIGGER did not make rendezvous with us. We radioed Com-SubPac to that effect and they sent back "Come in yourself." We are on our way. Should be a week to Guam.

This is a short patrol. If it is counted a successful one, then it's a break for us. It would be hard for a civilian to understand just how much the the term "successful" means to us when applied to a war patrol. Pride in achievement, respect, and admiration of other men in the same racket - all hinge on whether or not ComSubPac thinks work done during patrol was of enough importance and value to say "Well done."

One would think if a skipper took a seven million dollar ship with 80-85 men aboard into enemy waters and patrolled an area, and brought boat and men safely back to port, the patrol would be termed a success. However, to make it hard, they say you must sink at least 5,000 tons or accomplish a special mission with neatness and dispatch.

Actually, the captain is the only man aboard who has a pretty good idea of wheth-

er this is successful or just a waste of time. He alone knows what we were to do. We are to pass through the straits tonight. We must get east of Okinawa. By the way, that dogface on Saipan was right. The marines and army landed on Okinawa today. We are not more than 150 miles from there now. Sky is probably full of Yank planes. Not good for us at all. Stupid airdales never did learn to recognize Yank submarines from Jap. The bastards are all too eager to claim a Navy Cross - "Sighted sub, sank same." They leave a bad taste in my mouth.

April 2. Ran submerged all day. Too many planes to try running on surface. Very quiet day. Began field days to present spic and span appearance in port.

Only significant item in day's happenings - we did not run aground at Yokoata Jima on trip back through straits. Profit by experience!

April 3. Captain came aft inspecting ship. He is very disappointed that we didn't sink anything since he took command. Wesner and I were the only ones back here when he came. He said the room looked good. Also told us he only wanted a short refit, just get the bow planes and a few other major jobs done and then come right out again.

I made the observation that this would likely develop into, all told, a 90 or 100 day run. The captain was quick to say that this would be a separate successful run. He also said we are the only boat in the fleet to have nine successful consecutive runs. Quite an enviable record. It is

envied, too! There are a good many men trying to get this boat for duty.

Before the captain left, he dropped a bombshell! Wesner said it was too bad we didn't see at least one ship, so that by sinking it, we could virtually cinch the Presidential Unit Citation. With that, the Captain smiled and said, "Don't worry about that. We've got it!" God, I hope he knows. That is the finest award an outfit can expect. It is very hard to get. Ask the marines at Guadalcanal. There was even some hesitancy about giving it to them.

At 1100 this morning, we changed course and now instead of heading for Guam, are heading NE. If we continue on this course, we will be off Honshu in 12-15 hours. This may mean we have been assigned a new area. Possibly we may make a long run and get a decent refit and a full two weeks rest period when we get in.

Later in the afternoon, this news came out. We will lay off Honshu tonight standing by to pick up any B-29 crews that are knocked down in a big raid. These planes have sufficient altitude to make the open sea nine times out of ten. When one goes down, he or another one nearby, talks to us by voice radio, giving position and other pertinent information. We then make for that position and try to find them. We call this "lifeguard duty" and it isn't the choicest duty to be had.

April 4. It is 0030 and we are on station. We have had several indications on the SJ surface craft radar. There have been B-29's sweeping in close to the water. They are harder to detect by Jap night

fighters from this position. Some have flown nearly right over us. The noise of their engines plain to the ear, and exhaust flames plain to see. I have just come from the bridge where I watched this procedure for a very few minutes. I know now how the British must have felt when wave after wave of bombers took off over the channel headed for Germany. The captain evidently expects enemy planes attempting to intercept B-29's because he ordered all hands below except lookouts on watch.

And not too soon either, for at 0100, SJ radar picked up a low flying plane at 11,000 yards. He came right in. Was at 2,200 yards when the diving alarm went. On the dive the SD, or aircraft radar, was switched on and it showed the plane to be directly overhead when we were still flooding down. He either did not have a bomb load or did not see us. The later isn't logical, because they have radar too, and the way he came right in on us makes us think he knew just where we were. It was close and I really did sweat it out back here. If he had carried bombs, this document would have come to an abrupt end.

The radio shack is listening on a certain frequency, but as yet nothing concerning us has been heard. Interplane conversation is going on though not to any great extent. I imagine they are busy checking equipment for final readiness much the same as we do just before making a torpedo attack. Too busy to talk much - and no need. We know what we're all thinking, (prior to an encounter with the enemy.) Will we sink them, and then, will we



get away, or will the depth charges crush the bulkheads like an eggshell, leaving steel decking to stand on and sea water to lean against. Who wants to think those thoughts out loud?

It is 0230 and we have had no reports of planes down. We are definitely on our way in to Guam now. Evidently, if any B-29's were knocked down, it was over the island and they were unable to make it to the sea.

"Hop-a-long" Boyd, navigator's assistant, says we'll make port on the morning of the 8th. Sooooo! It won't be long before we can wrap our hands around a beer again. Just to walk off the "T" and step on solid ground again is really something to look forward to. I've called her "home" for 16 months now, and the novelty, long ago, wore off. I've put in a good many hours work on this baby. When I came aboard, she had five ships sunk in four runs. Now after her ninth run, the score is 17 ships sunk - 12 damaged. Captain Weiss got 12 sunk in three runs he was aboard for three Navy Crosses. Damn fine record, but I really do feel that Captain Latham in two runs has earned at least one Cross. Com-SubPac has cramped his style by sending us on special missions both times he took us to sea. The work he's done on these mine charting expeditions merits some sort of award certainly. We haven't the details of course, but I'll bet no ship or landing craft hit mines at Okinawa in the invasion. They knew where they were, because we found them. Mine sweeps were able to dash in and neutralize mines in nothing flat. They

didn't expose themselves to enemy fire for as long a period as usual.

During the days and nights spent fixing positions of mines on the chart, the captain got little or no sleep. I don't know how they can do it for days on end, but most sub skippers have that ability to travel on nerve. That's why they only make four or five runs out here. Enlisted men and junior officers make twice that many because they don't carry the tremendous responsibility, don't burn out that fast.

At 9:00 P.M. tonight, we learned that 300 or more B-29's were involved in last night's low-level attack on three cities of the Tokyo area. Details will follow.

April 5. Nothing very exciting occurred relating to the ship. Just normal cruising on the surface, 80 - 90 on four main engines. One plane contact, a B-24. We dove. When I relieved Wagner at 11:45 P.M., he wasn't especially tired, so we talked until 3:30 A.M.

April 6. Put in the last battery charge on all nine fish. As soon as we make port tomorrow, we'll pull them. We are due to tie up at 1415, so we'll be working until midnight. The last four days we made better time than we'd hoped, thus enabling us to cut a day off traveling time.

I've trimmed my beard, and showered, in preparation for entering port. All of us are looking forward to the mail. Although it hasn't been very long since we got some, a couple of weeks without hearing from home seems an eternity. I don't suppose there is fresh milk on Guam, so we'll miss that. "Wag" and I are going to try

and find a little Chamorro girl to do our laundry. Should be pleasant prowling about finding one.

I rather think our Jap prisoner, whom I have neglected in these columns lately, suspects we are making port. Twice, in the last five days, he has expressed the desire to exterminate himself. I use a word usually in reference to rats.

The other day when Wag used tin snips to cut his own toenails, Hommy made motions as if committing hari-kari and reached out for the snips. Wag scowled fiercely. The Jap then motioned to me that he'd like the gun and when I patted the holster as if to say, "It's right here, and here it shall stay," he made like a gun with his thumb and index finger, vigorously wagging his thumb back and forth a sufficient number of times to blow his brains to hell and gone. It's all quite silly, because if he really wanted to do it, all he'd have to do is smash his head against the torpedo in it'd rack alongside him.

However, I am tempted to hand him the see who he'd aim it at. If he pointed at one of us, I could clout him unmercifully about the nose and jaw, but I'd have a devil of a time convincing the captain that the Nippo took the gun away from me. The guy wouldn't weigh 100 pounds with a sea anchor in his pocket.

April 7. Tied up at Guam at 1030. Tender PROTEUS is to refit the boat. Received our mail and fresh fruit.

April 8. Leave today for Camp Dealey, Submarine Recuperation Center! It is on the opposite side of the island from where

we are now. Should see quite a bit of this rock while driving to camp.

The ten days spent at Camp Dealey were restful and relaxing. We slept in Quonset huts, which were breezy and cool at night - not in the daytime. Meals were very poor, but we didn't mind. We just did not eat. We drank beer every day, played in tournaments, etc. Doc Garner and I played tennis quite a bit and represented the boat in the tournament as the tennis doubles entry.

I shall skip the return to the boat and the ensuing trial operations. The next entry shall be the day we get underway for patrol.

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#### 10th WAR PATROL

Left island of Guam the 28th day of April bound for the by-passed island bastion of Truk in the Carolines. The word has been put out that this is to be a very short patrol - some say 19 or 20 days. It is to be in the nature of lifeguard duty, i.e. hovering around on the surface while the "fly-fly" boys bomb shore installations and any shipping they may find in the lagoon. In the event a plane is knocked down, we are to scurry over to it and affect rescue of pilot and crew. Toward this aim, a rescue team has been selected to swim to aid helpless flyers, who no doubt will be heavily encumbered by clothing. Wagner and Stanford and I have volunteered for this work. Three others have been placed on the team.

## ENCOUNTER:

## APPENDIX III

April 29. Proceeding on course 180 degrees (due south.) Uneventful day.

April 30. Charged batteries of all fish save for one 9th tube.

May 1. At Truk. Dived at dawn for submerged patrol. We are to surface at 1300 when bombers come over.

It is 1300 and twelve B-24's, two B-29's have been sighted through periscope, heading in to island. We are only five or six miles off beach as we surface. Ack-ack is visible from the bridge and so are bomb bursts.

At completion of bombing, raiders left intact. No serious casualties. We submerge until dark. Surface at 6:30 P.M., start air charge, battery charge. I went on the bridge at midnight for fresh air. All is calm, all is bright. Moon has lit up the ocean so it looks like day.

May 2. Submerged at dawn and stayed down all day. We are to surface upon sighting bombers today.

Saw no planes, so we did not surface until 6:30 P.M. While down today, we moved in close to reef-bound lagoon. It was believed that the narrow breaks in reef had been mined at outbreak of war. These openings to lagoon are not used as navigable channels. Surface craft could not elude gaze of Jap lookouts if they tried to come through. A sub quite conceivably could get in, though your life would not be worth a plugged nickel once the Japs were aware of your presence.

To disprove theory of mined entrances, we took pictures of F.M. screen. These showed reefs dark and openings as light.

Nothing in between.

The three or four main navigable channels, are of course, mined. These, we did not play with.

May 3. We stayed on surface today. Getting braver. About 20 miles off shore.

At 6:00 P.M. bombers came and began blasting again. Light, sporadic ack-ack fire met them and occasionally a beam or two from searchlights clutching at a plane can be seen. We have moved in to three or four miles off shore and are hoping that whatever shipping there is in harbor will come tearing out so we pick it off.

We would get credit for a successful run, making us the only boat with ten in a row. If we rescue a plane crew, we'll get credit, also. We are hoping for one or the other.

I forgot to say, earlier, that we have riding with us a Lieutenant-Commander Lankin, Royal Navy, who hails from Oxfordshire, England. He is liason-officer between the British fleet now operating in the Pacific and ComSubPac. His purpose for being aboard: to become familiar with the way we operate our communications system and any other pertinent information he feels will help in his work. He is himself, a British sub skipper, (V.C.) He thinks we are a pretty fair crew. Was heard to say to our captain in the control room, "By Jove, it is a wonderful Navy. By Jove, it IS that!"

May 4. Plenty of excitement today!!! We dove at dawn, surfaced at 1130. Raid was supposed to commence at that time. From noon until 1615, no planes were seen.

At 1500, I went up on bridge for one hour as sun lookout, Equipped with Polaroid sun glasses, we searched area of sky surrounding sun. This area is much too bright to gaze into with naked eye or even binoculars.

I wasn't relieved until 1615. I had been below again perhaps 20 minutes watching a movie in crew's mess, when from the bridge, a voice was heard to say, "Jap plane." Another voice yelled, "Clear the bridge," and a third, "Left full rudder." The diving alarm sounded and a bomb, close at hand, went off. The explosion rocked the boat, knocked cork off the overhead, and jarred electric light bulbs from their sockets, knocked open locker doors, etc.

On the dive we, of course, intended to go down to 180 feet and stay there. The first hitch in our plans occurred when the bow planes refused to rig out. The explosion blew a fuse in the circuit.

In the meantime, the man on the stern planes, who is new, thought we had an alarming down angle, so he put rise on the stern planes. This could very well have been fatal as it served to promptly bring us up to a mere 30 foot depth. Had the Jap been on the ball, he would have swung over and let go his second bomb as we wallowed helplessly in view.

That he had a second bomb was well known as at least three men on the bridge had seen the belly of the plane which was 4-500 feet directly over the "T." These same three men had seen the bomb after it had been released while plummeting down at us. They noted another under the wing.

We can't figure out why the Japs did not strafe the men on the bridge as he swept over us. Luckily, he chose not to.

Negligence, or "doping off" on the part of the lookouts is the sole explanation for the fact that the plane got in on us undetected. The roar of his engines actually gave him away. Ears are less protection than eyes out here.

Frankly, the only reason I am making this entry tonight rather than Davey Jones making 90 in his log is due entirely to Japanese inaccuracy.

The attacking plane was a twin engine job (Betty) not unlike our own B-26. When we had been down about an hour, the captain decided to come up to 65 feet for a look. At that depth, using the scope, he saw the same plane with its big brother, a four engine job. We then went down to 150 feet and stayed until dark.

Our scares for the day were not through by any means as we found out a few hours after surfacing. SJ radar picked up a target - range 1,000 yards. Target is very small, which leads us to believe it is a periscope as it disappears every now and then. We went to flank speed and got away from there - but quick! No doubt though that quaint character in the enemy sub will be seen or heard from again, as we are to be here for twelve days or so.

More information regarding the rescue team was put out today. Wag and 1st Lieutenant Brooks are to be the rescuers in the water. Stanford, Wicker and I rescuers on deck. In the event more than two "fly-fly's" are on hand at one time, Wicker and



I are to accept the next assignments. Of course, unless an airman is wounded or weighted down with clothes, we are to try to affect a rescue without entering the water. Heaving lines and small lifebouy are for this purpose.

May 5. I have allowed this to fall behind. It is now the 15th, but though the dates to follow may not be entirely accurate, the incidents did actually happen in this chronological order.

We patrolled submerged for the next three days as no raids on Truk were scheduled. Surfaced at dark, put in a battery charge, jammed air, an then dove at dawn.

May 8. Surfaced at 1300 for lifeguard duty. About a dozen B-24's swooped over the island, dropped their eggs, gave us the OK (no one in trouble,) and headed back to Guam. We remained on the surface until "Joltin' Joe" was sighted, then dove.

I found out that my informant had the wrong dope as to type of plane that bombed us the other day. It was not a Betty as I reported, but a single engine, single-float plane. A Zero with a pontoon. The same plane forced us down today.

May 9. Surfaced at 1100 today when we sighted bombers (B-24's) making another attack. No casualties; all planes got away. We saw "Joltin' Joe" just as last bomber went out of sight. He is getting clever. Is linking our presence with plane raids. He probably took off the minute Truk radioed "Raid, Raid," and began looking for us as he neared the island. Obviously, he isn't based on Truk or he could get here while the raid is going on.

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May 10. No raid today. Sighted "J.J." about 1300. He just took a flyer. Heh! Heh!

The story ran through the boat this afternoon that the skipper wants to get rid of this bothersome plane. We damn near died when told how he proposed to do it. He believes the plane comes in to a certain reef-sheltered lagoon at night for parking space. His plan is to sneak up to just outside the reef, look around to get the lay of the land, and if the plane is in there, we'll battle surface on it with the five inch deck gun using fragmentation (anti-personnel) shells with special fuses. These shells are designed to go off when shell passes near target spraying air with shrapnel. One near-miss, then, would give the Nippers so many holes to patch, it would take a month to make it airborne again.

Well, we went in there tonight. No plane! It was just a good idea and we'd probably have been the first sub to knock out a Jap plane had it worked.

May 11, 12. Uneventful. Submerged all day.

May 13. Raid today. We surfaced at 1700 and raid commenced. It lasted for an hour or so, and at one time, a plane called us to say that one plane was in trouble, stand by for further word. They (bridge) called the rescue team to control room where we donned "Mae Wests" and broke out the heavies. Plane later called and said, "All OK," so I guess the wounded fly-fly thought he could make it to Guam!

May 14. Today, we leave station! We

are to tie up at Guam for refit. We have just one more job to do which is to come off tonight.

We will shell the island of Ulul (Lulu in reverse,) which is north of here, south of Guam. The rock has a Jap garrison, number unknown, about twelve buildings fairly well grouped, including a radio shack, radar station. Also, there is a water tower.

At 8:30 P.M. under cover of an inky blackness, we moved in. At 8,000 yards, the gun crews went topside. Being topside so far out gave us a fine chance to become dark adapted before we began firing. At 4,000 yard range everything was in readiness. If they had lookouts, they must have seen us silhouetted against the sky. We drew no fire. When at 2,200 yards we made a 180 degree turn to draw their fire, but continued the turn 180 degrees more when none was forthcoming. At 1300 yards, we turned to port, trained to starboard beam and commenced firing. I pulled the first round from the ready locker and passed it to Wicker, who is 1st loader, and he slammed it into the breech. Broom! Believe me, a 5 inch .25 really has a kick to it! We were laying to, dead in the water, but that didn't make our job much easier for our targets were very indistinct.

It is believed we knocked out the water tower and radio shack, but other than that, damage is unknown. We could hear the shells whistle through the coconut trees, slicing off the tops, making a peculiar rustling noise. We saw several lights at different times, but not for long. It was

simple to follow the trajectory of each shell because as they left the muzzle and winged toward the beach, they were blobs of fire. The shells we used were supposed to contain flashless powder, but several were defective, and when these were fired and the resultant blast blew our eyelids apart, the brilliant flash blinded all of us at the gun for a minute or so.

Wicker and I handled a total of 2,376 pounds in about 20 minutes. Quite a workout! We were pretty tired when it was all over. The 40 mm, 20 mm and two 50 cal. opened fire when we were through and raked the beach for another 15 minutes.

When we had secured and had a chance to compare notes, we all discovered little holes in our clothes and burns, particularly on necks and forearms, where paper had blown back from muzzle and fell amongst gun crew. My beard had caught fire in the midst of everything, but a slap put it out and I didn't have time to think of it again until we secured.

We are heading for the barn now! We are happy. This raid served to break the monotony of what had proved to be a humdrum patrol. I think that was the skipper's intention. No one of us was hurt, though we all complained of burning eyes attributed to the acrid powder smoke which blew back in our faces.

May 15. This morning we contacted our escort to Guam, the DD DOWNS, and exchanged recognition signals. They are leading the way, we follow about 3,000 yards behind. We are flying the American flag and mounted our signal light (blinker) again. We know

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we are in friendly waters when this happens. We won't dive unless some stupid fly-fly gets a hair across his fanny.

It seems strange and hard to believe, that only last night we were in close proximity to Japs and tomorrow we'll be in port. We used to require fifteen days in coming off station to Pearl Harbor, fifteen days each way, thirty days on station made for a sixty day run. This patrol w'l be eighteen days when we tie up. This was just a filler, I think until the powers that be decide which mine field they want charted next.

May 16. Tied up alongside the tender PROTEUS. The sub CREVALLE is in, so I'll see my dinkum cobber, Rohraback. The BOW-FIN is in also, and Joe Knox of Litchfield, who is a chief motor machinist on her came aboard when we tied up. We filled in the lapse of time from when we last met over seventeen months ago in Fremantle, Western Australia.

Left for Camp Dealey at 1100. Only have a five day rest due to short run.

Will leave this until we start on next patrol.

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### 11th WAR PATROL

May 29. Left Guam at 1500. In sliding out of the harbor, it was necessary to run down the beam of H.M.S. KING GEORGE I. The first time I had seen a Royal Navy ship close at hand. She needed a paint job!

This run, I shall have the four to eight watch. I prefer this, as it is ea-

sier to skip noon meal when it occurs during my sleeping hours. I only need to eat twice a day.

Of course, there is much scuttlebutt running rampant through the boat in reference to where we are going, what we shall try to accomplish, etc. The officers are reluctant to say anything about it, which action stems probably from one of two possible reasons. The danger to morale if serious implications of run were known, or, and this seems to me more logical, the possibility of capture before mission is accomplished and tortuous grilling that might very well result in disclosure of ComSubPac strategy. Whatever the reason, I'll be able to make my daily entries of what we do and thus, when final notation is made, an overall picture will be obtained.

We are in company with two other boats, FLYING FISH and BOWFIN, comprising a wolfpack of at least three boats. Rumor has it that there will be eight or twelve boats in the thing when on station for patrol, though this is unfounded.

Incidentally, the unofficial dope is that our area or station is to be the Sea of Japan! To a layman, this might not sound startling, but to us, as to any submariner, it is. We know where the boats are operating, have been operating, and we know that in the main, the Sea of Japan was not an area. There have been several boats sent in, but nothing was ever heard from them. They were among those listed as "overdue and presumed lost," with never a mention made of where they were when lost. Just another example of the Navy's some-

times understandable, sometimes peculiar reticence in regard to sub's activities.

Certainly the Japs knew when they got these U.S. Subs. They also knew where they got them. Would it be revealing military secrets then to glorify the 80 or 90 men and officers who left port knowing there was little chance of a return, but knew they would sink Jap ships and kill Jap personnel before they were crushed in an eggshell and drowned horribly like rats in a rainbarrel?

The stoic courage of these men should be made known to the American public now, when to wage war, to be in combat, is the charge of every physically fit American male, and war stories are accepted and included in the daily diet of the 118,000,000 Americans still fortunate enough to be able to read their daily papers as soon as they are off the presses.

If we wait until the war is over, and the civilian populace along with the ex-military, returns to normalcy, then try to cram stories of submarine exploits down their throats. It will be, I'm afraid, rather futile, for everyone will be trying to put war stories from their minds. I shall, too.

It isn't fair to us to be non-entities forever. We had a part in this war, too and though we don't claim a larger role than the next guy, we certainly think that a little more detailed credit can be released.

May 30. Memorial Day and here I am 450 miles north of Guam, heading for the Empire of Japan. My God, sometimes it all seems

like a dream - unbelievable. I never will get used to being on these, the strangest of all war machines, submarines. In '39 if anyone told me I'd be a submariner in '43, I'd have laughed in his face, yet here I am, a qualified submariner.

We are a comparatively small group comprising a mere one percent of the Navy's personnel, so there is a greater esprit de corps here than can be found in most military groups. We know each other. That is to say, when a boat goes down, we have lost a good many friends, fellows we knew in Australia, Midway, Pearl Harbor, Johnston Island, Saipan, Majuro, Guam. I've made many friends, and I've lost a lot of them. Men on the CISCO, ROBALO, DACE, FLYER, TRIGGER, SCAMP, SNOOK, NARWAL, SWORDFISH, RUNNER, TANG, TULLIBEE. All of them happy-go-lucky guys who'd give you the shirt off their backs.

The skipper gave us a message tonight in the press news. He certainly can sense just what we are feeling and covered it nicely. There are too many of the crew who have never heard a depth charge and they think these runs are a Sunday school picnic. We'll have to watch them like hawks during an attack.

From the information I can get, I believe we will enter the Sea of Japan from the western approach, that is the entrance between Kyushu and the Korean Peninsula. The channels are of course mined, so it will be pretty risky entering and departing, not to mention the time spent inside. We will be pretty close to Russia, of course, so the stock gag now is, "Well, it



won't be like this in Vladivostock," and "When Uncle Joe gets to see us, we'll all make Ensign." (Editor's note: Uncle Joe refers to Stalin.)

Sighted several dozen B-29's returning from a large scale raid on Yokohama. Did not communicate with them in any way.

Made a trim dive this morning. Down about an hour, then on our way again. Sea is fairly calm. Very warm on the bridge while sun is out. Cools off at night. It will be quite cold, I expect, when we get on station. Joe Knox told me that they (BOWFIN) were off the NE coast of Honshu last run and the injection temperature was 32 degrees F. Our area will be about the same latitude.

May 31. Made trim dive this morning on my watch. For some obscure reason the torpedo loading hatch decided to give me a bad time. When we ducked under about 30 feet, I heard water spurting from somewhere.

Quickly, I checked all possible sources and discovered the leak. By this time, we were at 120 feet, going to 340. The water was coming in a 50 pound pressure which was increasing as we went deeper.

The grease (Zerk) fitting on the hand wheel, which is used to lock or open the hatch, was dry of grease and water rushed through the restricted opening. Red Stanford's bunk is hung from the overhead about a foot and a half below this hatch, and it was receiving most of the water.

I was in his bunk looking for the leak and getting very wet. When I discovered what it was, I scurried back down and

looked for our small grease gun in the tool box. Someone evidently borrowed it and did not bring it back. The only thing I had was a hand gun with another type of fitting. I picked it up and clambered back to Red's sack and pushed the gun onto the fitting.

It was enough to keep out the water, but I none the less had lost my temper by that time, and cursed the day I ever put in for duty on "one of these pig-iron b---s!" I dried up the water as best I could when we surfaced and put in a new grease fitting. I then sat down to collect my thoughts, and to regain control of my temper.

June 1. Made trim dive at dawn. Surfaced and proceeded on northerly course. We probably shall change course to west (270 degrees) when we reach latitude north of Okinawa. This would take us through the Ryukyu group close by Amami Oshima, which island is most commonly used for designating that passage to the China Sea.

At 1300 today, we had a radio message telling of a plane in distress and forced down 80 miles from our position. We are proceeding there on four main engines.

As I write this, we are about 35 miles from there and have sighted another sub (SKATE) and a destroyer. The SKATE is coming in off patrol. I do not think she is looking for the fly' fly's, though the can is.

June 2. We spent all of last night searching for the crew of that plane reported down. Thought they might have rowed to Safu Gan (Lot's wife), a small uninhab-

ited island, so we ran up to it and fired Very pistols, flares, star shells, etc., and even blew our whistle (fog horn). This was done in an effort to get them to signal us if they were on it. An hour later we assumed they were elsewhere and began racing about the area last given as their position.

Handicapped as we were by heavy fog, our chances of finding them looked mighty slim. Visibility was less than 500 yards.

At this time we were contacted by a Navy search plane, via radio, and told they were circling over the survivors. Another plane began running back and forth over the sea, hoping we would hear their engines and radio them when they passed close by. About two hours later we heard him and told him so. We took off in the direction of the plane and soon after, spotted the boat in which there were survivors.

Ten in all from a B-29. They had raided Osaka and were on their way back to Guam when a prop windmilled, eventually tore off its hub and ripped through the fuselage. Besides cutting a wide swath through the ship, it severed control cables of the ailerons and tail section. With no control, they had to ditch the plane.

They had only been down twenty-two hours when we picked them up. I have outfitted one S/S Ralph Gervais of Chicago with scivvies, dungarees, socks, and sandals. He also has access to my bunk while aboard. I had extra toilet gear so he's all set in that department.

One man was lost when his 'chute failed to open. They were at 2,000 feet.

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## APPENDIX III

I rather doubt that we'll take them on patrol with us. Probably transfer them to a can off Okinawa.

June 3 Made a trim dive at dawn. The soldier back here was rather disappointed he did not wake up to experience the sensation.

He told me more of the raid on Osaka. The targets were a poison gas factory and a grenade plant. On the way out they flew through a huge column of dense, black smoke reaching into the sky for more than 22,000 feet. Even at this altitude the unmistakable smell of burning wood was noticeable. The plane itself (Skyscraper I) was covered with soot when they emerged from the smoke.

June 4 At 0030, on the surface, a plane came in on us and, it being very dark, was heard rather than seen. We dove. No bomb was dropped. Twenty minutes later we surfaced and continued on.

Are approaching the Nansie group. Must run through narrow straits to enter East China Sea. Land-based radar has picked us up, so they know we are coming.

At 0200 are in the East China Sea. Cruising on surface. Forced down by Jap medium bomber at 0545. Will stay submerged. Routined fish from 0800-1430.

2230 we rendezvoused with the SCAB-BARDFISH. Piled the zoomies into rubber boat, and pulled boat back and forth between us three trips before job was done. Before he left, Gervais gave me his flying suit in swap for my dungarees and white hat and submariner's sandals. When this B-29 crew get a replacement for Skyscraper I,

they are going to call it "Tinosa, Jr." It looks as though the Japs will get hell on all sides from the "T".

June 5 Fifteen minutes ago we went to battle stations. We are standing by the tubes now. Target is thought to be a submarine due to certain characteristics of pip on the SJ.

Another false alarm! Decided finally target must be a rock. It's early in the run to fire fish anyway. I think we'll find bigger and better targets inside the Japan Sea. I'll wait.

At 0530 we dove, probably for daylight hours. Too many planes up above. We'd be running elevator service same as yesterday when we were forced down seven times.

Just heard an amusing tale. Last night (or early morning) it was decided by Mr. X, who is an ex-shoe clerk, lately turned Naval officer, to have Red Stanford grease various operating units on deck. For some obscure reason, Mr. X desired to go up with Red, probably to direct the job. Being a very ineffectual, blundering individual, he is not the type one likes to have around when there is work to be done. Red didn't like the idea at all.

When they were rigged to start, and turned on the air to the gun, the air hose parted at a coupling. Red, who is always quick to seize an opportunity, jammed the two lengths of hose together, and with his most gracious smile bestowed only on those few souls whose object in life is to do good unto others, placed the coupling into the hands of the slightly dumb-founded Mr. X who was forced to stand in one spot for

an hour or so holding the hose together. If he had let go, the air running through the hose would have whipped and lashed the end all over topside, and by the time it could be shut off, Mr. X would have been a beaten man. He (seen his duty and he dun it.) He held the hose together - but good!

Surfaced at 2000. After being down fourteen and a half hours, fresh air feels good.

Have some more dope on the SJ contact. It was a good-sized pip at 28,000 yards indicating a large ship. One small pip showed at 20,000. This was probably an escort vessel. At the time, we had only two main engines in commission. The other two could not be started due to salt water in the fuel. We had to throw a long charge in the batteries so used one engine for that. Our top speed then would be 11-12 knots.

We were to rendezvous with the BOWFIN and FLYING FISH at 0230. At the time of the SJ contact, we were quite a few miles from rendezvous. The captain figured we could not get into position for an approach and still get back to the other boats. Our mission is still the important thing. Sooo! Torn between two desires, he made the harder but wiser choice.

June 6. Got together with the two boats on schedule at the entrance of the straits leading into the Sea of Japan and the skippers yelled "Good Luck" to one another. We then spread out a bit and waited for dawn to break.

Dived at dawn and started into the straits. We are the third in line which is

not an enviable position. It is similar to a wingman's spot in flying formation.

Since 0700, we have been getting mine indications on the FM. The straits are choked with them, planted in the conventional way.

At 0830 and again later this afternoon, we heard a mine cable scrape along the side of the hull. An eerie sound to say the least. I recalled the movie "Crash Dive" which I saw while in New London. In one scene Ty Power's sub was passing through a mine field and a mine gently bumped and scraped its way aft. I laughed at that, knowing that mines don't bump and remain intact, but today's experience convinced me that I had lived through a scene so similar that it wasn't funny.

We have carbon dioxide absorbent, which I spread on the deck this morning, purifying the air. We are to be down about twenty hours today. It's the first time we've used this stuff.

Upon surfacing, we had a plane contact at twelve miles and two ships at four miles. Plane drew away and we left the ships alone. Dope now is that we have to wait a few days till all nine subs are in position before any of us make an attack.

We are out of the minefield and in the Sea of Japan proper. It is a very rough sea.

June 7 Some of the fellows who became quite seasick after we surfaced last night, are glad that we dove at 0430 for an all day dive. It is much nicer for sleeping. Last night I laid in my sack from 10 p.m. untill 3:30 a.m. without going to sleep.

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## APPENDIX III

Sharp rolls we took damn near threw me out on deck continuously, so that it was impossible to even relax.

June 8 Dived at 0500 and ran submerged until 2230. The sea was quite calm when we surfaced. I don't believe I mentioned it before, but we are to refrain from making an attack until after sunset on the 9th. At that time, all hell should let loose as nine boats fire fish at targets in nine different harbors.

June 9 We are going into Bokuku, Korea and look it over all day. Then when it's dark, fire at selected targets and get of there. The fish will be routined today, so that they'll be all set to go.

At 1400 went to battle stations. A lone ship up there. The old man has decided to jump the gun and take this one.

At 1500 tubes forward fired three fish and sunk the thing. It split in two and went down in less than fifty seconds. 2300 tons and it was loaded. There were no depth charges, and I doubt if there were survivors.

Before noon, when we got a look at the harbor, there were no ships there and the skipper was so disappointed he'd take a chance and disobey orders - which he did by firing four hours before sunset.

When we fired, the target was only 2300 yards off shore. It was so shallow there that we had to fire from 3800 yards away and then only had 95 feet of water or 30 feet under us.

June 10 At 1215 had a contact at 61,000 yards and it was not land! Picking up a ship at that range indicates it is



big. Tracked him until at 7:30 p.m. we were in position for an attack. We (in the after torpedo room) hoped the Captain would give us a chance to add to our tonnage and he did.

At a range of 1300 yards, target on a steady course, we fired tubes #7, #8, #9, and hoped. A minute and a half later, with no explosions, we knew we'd missed. We hastily made #10 ready and fired it in the hopes that it would make the target swerve from his course. It did. About that time, high speed screws were heard approaching us and the Captain calmly told the chief on the manifold to flood negative. Chief Welch, without answering, did; and we started down. In the meantime, Mr.-----, whose wife had a son recently and he, as a result, has come to value his life more, got excited and screeched, "Flood Negative"! Confusion reigned! It was suddenly clarified for us shortly, as we heard the unmistakable whirr and whine of one of our own torpedoes pass right over us and fade away in the distance on its erratic run. We very nearly were destroyed by our own torpedo.

Anyone who felt chipper after that was not normal. We all very weakly sat down after rigging for depth charge attack. The smoking lamp was out, so we didn't even have the comforting relaxation that is supposed to accompany a smoke. All we had was the comfort of each other's presence. We were all, ironically enough, in the same boat. Believe me, that cliché has taken on new meaning.

As if the foregoing chain of events

were not enough, the guy topside dropped a mere half-dozen s-cans. Just enough to make you wonder if he was going to drop any more. However, he left us then, to our own miseries and brother, we had them!

The torpedomen were marked men. "What the hell was the matter with your fish?" was the eternal cry from the rest of the crew. Submariners are a severely critical group of personalities, and though a man may not be familiar with the idiosyncrasies of torpedoes, he sets himself up as an authority simply because he has known others at another time were fired and ran hot, straight, and normal!

It seems that two others were hits, but failed to blow up. This can be attributed to faulty exploder mechanisms. These two fish actually bounced off the hull of the target!

It is possible that the fish that boomeranged was one of these. I, myself, witnessed the installation of exploders in two of the fish fired, and I know that there were detonators and boosters in them, and that the cavity withstood the leakage test.

It was a harrowing experience, though not uncommon among the boats. Some of them have a dozen or more faulty fish in one load. We've been fortunate until now, never had "duds" or "erratics" since I've been aboard.

One thing is known among Dixon, Wag, and me. The fault lies, not with us, but with the tender. The fish are given to us in a "fully ready" condition, which means they are ready to fire. Our job is to give

them a routine periodically that will keep them in that state. We do not alter anything.

June 11. Trim dive at dawn. Surfaced and were forced down three times during daylight hours by planes.

June 12. Dived at dawn for submerged patrol twenty miles from land, at about the same position when the first ship was sunk.

1030 sighted small ship, 700 tons. Not suitable for torpedo. Too close to land for battle surface.

1245 - Foggy and misty now. Sighted 1500 ton coastal freighter. Surfaced. At 4900 yards opened fire, and when we had expended first three or four rounds, they put a lifeboat over the side and rowed vigorously away from their ship. Though it was armed with at least a .37 mm, they had no intention of manning it, so we ran right in to 600 yards firing all the time. When within range, the 40 mm, 20 mm, and one 50 cal. opened fire also.

We fired 44 rounds of 5 inch, about twenty of which were hits. The ship was of the steel-hull type and took quite a few hits before she started to sink. Finally, twenty-four minutes after we fired the first round, she went under by the stern. Two men jumped off the fan-tail just then and probably were taken under by the suction of the sinking ship. The lifeboat was left unharmed.

Wicker and I are both pretty tired, and our arms and backs ache. We lifted and carried 3,960 pounds apiece in the twenty-four minutes of action, so I guess we should.

By the way, this ship, one of 80 in the same class, was fully loaded.

The danger of being sighted by a patrol plane was a thing to be reckoned with, but none showed up.

June 13. Dived at dawn for submerged patrol. We moved down nearer the strait through which we entered the Sea of Japan since the action yesterday.

Went to battle stations at 1800. Closed in to 600 yards unobserved, made tubes ready, outer doors open - then secured because target was a little too small to bother with.

June 14. 0230 - "Stations for Battle Submerged!" SJ radar has a target at 5,000 yards. We chased him for an hour, but when the captain thought it over, he decided target must be very small, else SJ would have picked him up at 10,000 yards. We are outside the harbor of Pusan, largest port in Korea. An average twenty-two ships a day enter or leave, totalling (average) 134,000 tons. This information comes from intelligence, so we'll establish it as fact or!

Mr. Siegfried was trying to bet \$50 we'd get two ships today. No takers. I expect we'll make out. It's supposed to be a "hot" area.

I saw "Dave" Clutterham today for the first time since we had that "erratic" run back here. He is one of the junior officers. He asked me if I had been in Australia, and I replied yes. "Well, I guess that's where you learned to fire boom-erangs." How about that? He was only kidding, so I laughed, too. The guys have

all forgotten about that incident, and even those ignoramuses who seemed to hold us personally responsible for the near-calamity, have forgiven. Tubes fwd. have found three of theirs with a foreign fluid in the gyro pot, so it's just a generally bum load of fish.

At 1630 went up to sixty-two feet to take a look around. When the O.D. put his eye to the periscope, he saw, dead ahead, thirty yards away, a small fishing boat so down we went to 200 feet. This was to prevent their nets from fouling our screws.

I recall one incident in the Surigao Straits (Philippines) when we came alongside a fishing boat to investigate and finding everything in order, took our leave. We had only moved off a few yards when we noticed the Philipinos gesticulating wildly and yelling at us. Captain Weiss knew what was wrong immediately, so he ordered "All Stop" and they drew along our stern and freed their fishing lines. I was on lookout at the time, so remember well the looks and expressions of gratitude on the native's faces, for to them, those lines meant a great deal. There were no others when they lost them, as the Japs only furnished those fishermen who fished for the Japs.

To show their appreciation, they gave Captain Weiss a chicken, a live one which was kept in the after torpedo room until our arrival in port where it was presented to Admiral Lockwood with due ceremony. We had no report of it after that. While we had it aboard, the steering rams were its roost, and when we tied up she was perched

on the deck gun suitably outfitted with "tailor made" blues and a tres chic white hat, which an ingenious quartermaster had whipped up. I believe he spent as much time on his creation as Mainbocher did in designing the Waves uniform.

June 15. Dived at 0445. Submerged all day. Ran through a fleet of fourteen fishing boats. Linkage on negative flood valve broke. It is closed. Inconvenient, if not dangerous.

Today was first day we did not go to battle stations since arrival.

June 16. It is very foggy and so we shall take advantage of its protection and stay on the surface all day. Routine fish today. Hope we fire them soon.

Being on surface will enable us to get press news. Maybe the war is over! Have been out of contact for five days or so.

Plane contact at 1230 drove us down for half an hour. Surfaced and continued on. At about 2300, rendezvoused with FLYING FISH. BOWFIN was supposed to be there too, but did not show up. We exchanged movie films and also found that F.F. didn't have any more tonnage than us. She had run out of salt, so we gave her fifteen pounds. Did not use rubber boat. Water was calm, so we moved bows together and handed the stuff over.

June 17. Did not dive this morning. No plane contacts until twilight when a radar equipped Jap plane came in on us to six miles. Dived and stayed down one hour and eight minutes. Surfaced at 8:45 P.M. and an hour later, began running through a fleet of twenty or thirty fishing boats.

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## APPENDIX III

They were 3-400 yards away, but did not molest them.

June 18. I relieved Wag at 0340 this morning and at 0415, we had stations for battle submerged. An indication on the SJ was picked up - range 9500 yards. We moved to attack and, just as it was getting daylight, fired tubes #4, 5, 6 on the surface. Visibility was very poor (50-75 yards) due to a dense fog that hung about us hugging the ocean like a blanket. At no time then, could we see the target. We missed with all three fish, so moved in again, and after changing the depth setting from six to four feet, fired #1 and #2. These were misses, too, whereupon we secured and let him go. He must have been very small if the fish passed beneath him. We were only 4000 yards from the Korean coast and land based radar had picked up on us by then. We headed out to sea. We still have eleven fish left. The torpedo run was only 500 yards each time.

Submerged and surfaced after dark, twelve hours later.

June 19. Sighted drifting mine shortly after dawn. Have seen several this run. Stayed up until 1404, then down for submerged patrol. I had the 13-1400 sun lookout so went topside for breath of air and some sunlight. The effect was good! It's been a couple of weeks since I had any. Saw a shark's fin knifing through the water alongside of us.

At 2100 we surfaced. At 2230 SJ had flashes of Jap surface craft radar. We moved in and picked up three very small targets, dead in the water. Something

fishy here! Might be bait. We left and they did not know we'd been. Another false alarm. Battle stations secured.

June 20. At 0315 SJ had an indication, 22,000 yards; tracked him and finally at 0600 went to Stations for Battle Submerged! It was daylight when we made the approach, so the target was plainly seen. 5,000 ton freighter. Made tubes #1, 2, 3, 4 ready, but fired only #1, 2, 3. Result? Three hits! One right after the other only several seconds apart. The ship was only 600 yards away, so the explosions sounded like real sharp cracks. The photographer sent out with us by ComSubPac was unable to get pictures, due to the fact that the ship just flew apart into the air and by the time the guy got his camera on the scope, there was no target. We could hear the sections cracking and snapping as it broke up under pressure as she sank deeper and deeper.

Actually two fish would have done the job with ease, but the "Old Man" has had such rotten luck that he was taking no chances.

There were no depth charges, a fact I still can't get used to. Whenever we sunk a ship, before this, we came in for a good drubbing. It was expected and accepted by us as the price paid for the exultant feeling of sinking a Jap. The half dozen or so dropped on us so far this run, brings to over 400 the total dropped since I've been aboard.

At 1700 Mr. Siegfried saw smoke on the horizon, so we headed over to it and went to battle stations. By 1900 we were in



position to make an approach. The ship was similar to the one sunk this morning, slightly smaller, grossing 4500 tons. Made tubes #2, 3, 4, 5 ready while the range was 1700 yards. Fired much closer than that and got two hits. She went down! While the captain was watching her sink, a plane came in on us and dropped an aerial bomb. While it did no material damage, it certainly served to scare hell out of us as it was within 100 yards of the after torpedo room when it exploded.

We went down to 350 feet and rigged for depth charge, but no more were dropped. We were very lucky as the guy had us cold. We were at sixty feet and the 'scope was leaving a feather and the hull outline would be plainly visible in the daylight. He was probably too excited and in too much of a hurry to calculate accurately.

This all took place only twenty minutes ago and I am trembling a little now as I write this, due to nervous reaction. I felt a bit excited while it was happening, but then it was a pleasant emotion. This thing I'm feeling now is an uncomfortable, wretched, strength-sapping aftermath. I feel as if I should lie down, but that doesn't do any good. I've tried it other times. I don't suppose I can convey to anyone how I felt at this time, but should I ever display a sign of war--hangover in my later life, perhaps my friends can better understand me by reading this particular incidental happening and reaction which is only one of many. They no doubt will have an effect on me.

Surfaced at 2030 and left the area.

June 21, 22 On surface, heading north toward the straits, preparatory to leaving the Sea of Japan.

June 23 Still on the surface, still heading north. Temperature of the water here is 40 degrees, but it is 15 or 20 degrees colder on the bridge. Below decks we are wearing lined jackets. Really cold! We are only 40 miles off the coast of Siberia now. Probably we (nine of us) are the only warships to be this close during the entire war. We expect to sight Russian planes or even ships before long. I doubt if we let them see us.

We are to rendezvous with the other boats tonight and probably go through the straits tomorrow night, possibly tonight. These straits adjoining the home island of Hokkaido to the north are very shallow, so it is likely we'll go through on the surface. One reason for this is the condition of negative tank, another fact that the gradient in this latitude is very great.

This variance in temperature of layers of water tends to very definitely impair the efficiency of the FM gear. We might not see a mine because of this. As a result, we'll have the gun crews stand by all the time we're in the channel, so that we can make approaching enemy craft keep their distance - we hope! We cannot make more than six or seven knots coming through due to the danger of running upon a mine, so we have no advantage of speed this time. Normally we can outrun a PC or SC in heavy seas, even certain types of destroyers.

Actually, we are entering the most dangerous phase of this operation. When we

came in, the Japs didn't know we were coming. Since then however, we have sunk four of their ships and no doubt others met success too. They know we've yet to get out and there are so few exits that it's a simple matter to cover them well. They'll be waiting for us!

Made rendezvous at midnight with the eight other boats. Conversation between boats via the VHF radio. Outcome - among other things, procedure in making departure. The lead boat will start through strait early morning. Six precede us, two follow. All to keep three miles apart. We are to be well inside the straits upon surfacing at dark tomorrow night.

June 24 Down at 0330. FM in operation. It will be a long day. At 0930 we surfaced and blew sanitary which flooded from sea. 1000 submerged again. Had a movie this afternoon in the crew's mess to ease the tension. I went to bed! Surfaced at 2000, and entered the straits at 2300. The 5 inch and 40 mm gun crews remained dark adapted and standing by in crew's mess, but we did not go topside at any time during the night.

June 25 Making flank speed on four main engines. At 0100, still in the straits, had an SJ contact at 16,000 yards. We did not change course and when the range closed to 14,000 yards it was noted the ship was all lit up. As the Russians use this pass, we assumed this to be one of theirs and when, at 1400 yards she directed her one search light on the flag, we knew the Skipper was right. I didn't know it, but one like it was sighted last night

also. At 0220 the Captain secured the gunnery party, so we knew we were in the Sea of Os Kosh - or whatever that Russian sea is. We had no contacts with either patrol craft or shore batteries and are very much surprised at that.

All the boats save the BONEFISH are accounted for. She is still in the mine-field. The TUNNY has stayed behind to see if she can establish contact with the "B" in next twenty-four hours. Hope she's OK.

June 26 From the scant information on hand, it would appear we had better luck than any of the others. Know more later. Message today from CREVALLE. She lost one of her screw guard cables and it fouled on a screw. Coming in on one screw.

Rorry's on her and we're looking forward to three weeks at the Royal together, but maybe this will change our plans.

Went through the Kuriles at about 0100 this morning. Nothing happened. It is still very cold and damp. In two or three days it should warm up, though temperature of the sea water is still 40 - 44 degrees. A man wouldn't last long in it. It is quite rough also, and I find it very annoying to reel around with a cup of coffee in my hand.

We are heading for the barn. Should be in Pearl by the 9th of July. Have quite a few friends I'd like to see when we arrive.

June 27 It is getting warmer as we head south for Midway Island. Should arrive there on the 30th of the month. We'll only be there long enough to top off fuel and get a couple of beers. Leave for Pearl

Harbor the same day. Arrive in Pearl the 4th.

Everyone is in fine spirits of course, being so close to home port. There has been a noticeable lack of the usual snarling and barking at one another this patrol. Probably due to fact there was enough excitement to keep us from becoming bored. In the eleven days on station, we had Battle Stations at least a dozen times. Missed a lot of sleep. Actually we are all pretty well fatigued. Since we left Pearl on March 1, four months ago, we've had only sixteen days rest. We didn't notice it before, but whatever rest we do get in Pearl will be welcomed. I never thought I'd see the day when Honolulu would look good to me, but this is it!

I found out today that the SKATE is with us, and has been from the start. I hope she goes in to Pearl too, and I might see Frankie Hermance if he is still aboard her. I haven't seen him since a year ago in March. That was in Pearl, too.

June 28 The news, unofficial, is that only one other boat did better than the "T" on this jaunt. Out of nine boats this is fine. We beat the SKATE and CREVALLE, so I can give Frankie and Rorry the old business when I see them. The Captain has already sent a message in to Pearl requesting the best rooms available at the Royal for his crew.

June 29 Weather is very mild. Rigged the searchlight today. Always an indication we are in a "safe" area.

Oleson came back aft this afternoon and assured me if I wanted off (and I do)

he was positive Mr. Smith would grant my wish. It looks as though I'll drop the hook in P.H. for a while. My chances of going back for a new boat are enhanced by getting off here. The prospects are bright. I shall ask Mr. Smith for a letter recommending me for new construction. If he does, that will go far toward getting me stateside.

June 30 Still "full on four". Made a short trim dive at 0415. Field day from 0830 to 1130, then routined our three fish this afternoon. May take one off in Midway tomorrow morning. Will get in to port about 0730. Mr Salisbury told me this morning, the Skipper expects there will be some mail there for us. Sal thought we might get a couple of beers, too.

The Captain had a message in last night's press. It would be hard for anyone not a member of the crew to catch the spirit of the thing, but the facts might be interesting.

June 30 (2nd) 0400 sighted our escort to Midway. There is a Jap sub around there again, so the escort will come in handy. Every time we enter or leave Gooney Bird Island we see a periscope, so we expected this report today.

0715 "Station the Manuevering Watch"- We went topside and got a look at Midway again. Held sound tests in channel, tied up at dock by 0820. Band playing "Roll Out the Barrel" and a few marches. Real shipping over music. 0930 up to Gooneyville Lodge for three cans of beer. They have a juke box now. Took my mail up there with me. Had quite a session with all the let-

ters.

Underway for Pearl again at 1330.

July 1. 2 Field day every day until Pearl Harbor. Forgot to mention, we are taking two Jap prisoners in too. Came aboard at Midway. The RAY captured them. One is shackled in tubes aft and he is at present time busily engaged doing my laundry. Somewhere he had acquired the idea that prisoners taken to Hawaii are be-headed. He has asked me if we're going there, and though technically I am not supposed to tell him where we are going, I couldn't pass this up, so he is now sweating it out. His name is (phonetically) Chi-dah-hee, comes from home island of Hokkaido. Is a civilian fisherman. It seems as though he could find fishing grounds handier than the Yellow Sea.

I came very close to kicking out his "honorable teeth" yesterday. I had just relieved Wag and the Nip made it clear he would like a smoke. I said "No." He has his own but no matches, so is dependent upon us for a light. The captain's orders are that he may have one a day and that after his one ration. He put one in his mouth and begged again. I shook my head and scowled at him thinking that would end it. However, as I went back to reading my Esquire, I saw from the corner of my eye a sudden movement from "Bosco." Looking up I noted the cigarette roll to a stop on deck. He had become angry with me, and in a mild temper, threw the butt away.

Well, I saw red! I hopped out of my chair, mouthing all sorts of comments at him, and none of it good. With my key I

unlocked one cuff and took it off his wrist. Not very gently I shoved his head in the direction of the cigarette and pointed. He understood and with many bows and much scraping, picked it up. I snatched it from his fingers and threw it in in the waste basket. When I got through with him, he damn well knew who was the prisoner, which of us was to do the bowing.

My God! The colossal insolent arrogance of even the peasant class of this people is astonishing. It is human nature for the humbled to be humble. Yet here is a thing at a very definite psychological disadvantage (a prisoner of war, in shackles, ill-fitting clothes - an altogether ludicrous and at the same time pitiful wretch) who becomes displeased with his captors because they don't attend his desires. No wonder the people are hard to fathom.

July 3. I know now I am to be transferred in Pearl. Mr. Smith has told me he would give me his highest recommendation for advanced torpedo school, Newport, R.I., and new construction on the East Coast! I am most happy.

We get in at 0900 in the morning. The crew goes to the Royal (Hawaiian Hotel) in the afternoon. The transferees remain aboard until the crew comes back, then we go for a three week rest. Payday just after we tie up and that will go well with me. I won't mind making the refit before the rest period. Mr. Smith told me he thinks my chances of getting back to school and new construction are 100 to 1 in my favor.



## RECOLLECTIONS OF WAR PATROL #4

THE FOLLOWING ARTICLES APPEARED IN THE TINOSA BLATT OF AUGUST, 1981, ISSUE NO. 2, ON PAGES 28 THRU 36.

THAT FOURTH PATROL:

By: Bliss Nisonger

There is no need to tell you of the trouble one has in trying to remember exact details after only 36 years, particularly about events one is trying to forget.

By the time the fourth patrol of the TINOSA rolled around, the crew had begun to meld into a close knit group of submariners who considered themselves amongst the best in the business.

We had been ordered from our original patrol area to Palau to prevent the flow of supplies, keeping that Japanese base as a thorn in the side of "Dougout Doug", (Douglas Mac Arthur's) quest to get back to Manila.

We were cautiously optimistic about the new assignment primarily because of the presence of "SMOKY JOE", (a Japanese anti-submarine vessel), which was already credited with the sinking of three of our subs with no known survivors.

Word came from Navy intelligence that a convoy was headed toward the port we were patrolling. The day in question is not known to me, but I believe it was early December, 1943, as we arrived in Fremantle, Australia, December 17, 1943.

There was double jeopardy to be

watched for, due to the fact that there were Jap planes based there also, that had to be dealt with.

It wasn't too long before we were made very much aware of both hazards.

The night before the attack, the TIN-OSA had a full can on the battery and Captain Daspit was heard to tell Commander Weiss that no matter what else happened, we had a good battery charge. This fact may have saved us.

As day broke, the Captain came to periscope depth to look for the arrival of our contemplated prey. About 6:00 AM, sonar picked up first one ship's screws beat, then another, until four ships were identified. A quick periscope look presented two small cargo ships with two escorts.

Captain Daspit had battle stations submerged, passed over the 1 MC with caution, so as not to make any more noise than necessary, in making preparation for the attack.

As the convoy approached and Captain Daspit made his hurried periscope information available for the TDC (torpedo data computer), he could scarcely believe his eyes, when the two escorts suddenly turned around and headed away from the ships they were escorting.

Miracle of miracles, with a little luck he could get between both of the cargo ships and have a submarine captain's dream come true to fire at two ships at the same time, or nearly the same time.

He immediately ordered, "Make ready all tubes, forward and aft," repeat, "Make

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all ready all tubes, forward and after torpedo rooms."

We could scarcely believe our ears in the after torpedo room, where I had been transferred from the forward torpedo room. This was done to replace a second class torpedoman who had been left in the relief crew at the end of the third war patrol.

Clark Fisher TM 1, was in charge of the after room, myself TM 2, Cooksey TM 3, and others, I don't recall, hurriedly made the torpedo tubes ready and reported to the conning tower, "Torpedo tubes aft ready."

The Captain continued his approach. Then the word came from Conn, "Standby tubes forward and aft."

Three torpedos were fired forward and almost simultaneously, two torpedoes were fired aft.

Immediately after we heard a loud explosion and all sorts of things happened; it was considered that a Japanese plane had dropped a bomb on us, shortly after the torpedoes had been fired, causing several major problems.

- 1- Flooding was reported in the pump room.
- 2- We lost all power to the motors.
- 3- There were no lights, except from battle lanterns.
- 4- Maneuvering reported flooding in the motor room.
- 5- We assumed a 15 to 20 degree down angle with no means outside of hand operated bow and stern planes to off-set the precipitous descent.
- 6- The bilge and trim pumps were

inoperable due to lack of power.

In short, we were in a near hopeless situation.

To make things even worse, we were being depth charged by Smokey Joe and his friend. Things didn't look too good at this point, as we were past test depth and still out of control.

Captain Daspit ordered everyone who could be spared to go to the after part of the sub, to see if the shifting of weight would overcome the down angle of the boat.

At about this time, Smokey Joe, or his buddy, dropped a charge underneath us that gave us an instant up angle.

The order was sent, to send all hands that could be spared to go forward, to counteract the up angle.

Then, joy of joy, maneuvering reported they could put one motor on the port screw.

It had been rumored that Smokey Joe had a method of manufacturing depth charges on board his ship. After counting more than twenty depth charges, we believed very strongly he was making them between runs on us.

Surprisingly enough, we were able to finally draw further and further from the sound of depth charges.

Any old submariner will tell you when depth charges are further away, by the identifiable number of explosions from each charge.

- 1- One loud bang, and you know they are too close.
- 2- Two bangs, one soft and other loud, means they are closer than you'd like them to be.

3- Three explosions- one a click, the next, a soft bang, and the last- louder, means he is only going to replenish his fish supply.

Now comes the interesting part.

It had been determined, when the forward torpedo room had rigged for depth charge, that the outer door could not be closed because of an obstruction. (No one dared to think it could possibly be a torpedo); however, the possibility existed. There was nothing that could be done until the sub could surface, and appraisal of the situation could be made.

We cruised along at minimum turns to save the battery until it was dark enough to surface, or until the battery got so low it would be necessary to surface to prevent loss of all propulsion due to no juice in the batteries.

Both happened at nearly the same time. About 9:00 P.M. it was decided to surface because of the low batteries.

The surface alarm was sounded and TINOSA struggled to surface --- But wait --- Radar had picked up two contacts, one appearing to be rain and the other was certainly a ship, presumably a Japanese destroyer or escort vessel of some type - hopefully not Smokey Joe, but then, who knew. It couldn't be much worse, no matter what or who it was. It surely wasn't anyone bring us mail from home.

Captain Daspit made the most important decision of his life, as another blip showed up on the radar about 5,000 yards away.

He decided to make a bow run on the new target to cut down on the target visibility, then swing to the right and try to pass unseen between the two ships.

If this didn't work, there was nothing left to do but battle surface with two enemy ships with the TINOSA carrying a possibly fully armed torpedo, sticking out of a forward. starboard tube.

Then the Gods of War finally smiled upon us, as one of those torrential tropical rains descended upon us, cutting visibility to zero.

The plan was executed. And it worked! We were able to pass between the two enemy ships till we were over the horizon and away from their search and destroy plans for us.

When we were far enough from our waiting enemies, the captain brought the submarine to a stop about twenty-five miles from where the attack had taken place, but well within range of any patrol plane, eagerly looking for a sitting, badly wounded duck --- us.

This is where the situation gets to the buffo point.

Captain Daspit called Warrent Officer Van Gorder, (I believe later he made regular officer rank) to the conning tower to make preparations to find what pleasant surprise was in store for us, and determine what was obstructing the torpedo tube.

Suddenly, I was ordered to the conning tower. Apparently, I had been made the selective volunteer to help locate the source of the torpedo tube obstruction. (I might possibly have volunteered, but I

swear I don't recall it, as I am and always have been a non-swimmer; not that even being Johnny Weismuller, would have been much help. We were more than 1,000 miles from any U.S. held territory).

The Captain was briefing us on what we were to do. Mr. Van Gorder was to go over the side with a hand-made impeller wedge to put in the impeller of the torpedo, if there was one stuck in the tube.

I recalled my teaching concerning torpedoes learned at the torpedo school in Newport, R.I., just prior to the start of WW II---I recalled the test made on the firing spring of a fully armed torpedo - 16 - 20 ounces, no more nor less, to trip the ring and actuate the three phase procedure of firing a fully armed torpedo. I tried not to think that if the torpedo was fully armed, Mr. Van Gorder could set the torpedo off (start the firing sequence) by jumping on the torpedo. WHEW! What a way to go! But, at least I wouldn't be live shark bait, just tid-bits for the well-fed sharks of that area in the South Pacific.

Mr. Van Gorder must have been thinking along the same lines, as we (I think it was Leo Bonner TM 2 who was the other pigeon with me) gently lowered Mr. Van Gorder over the side.

Almost immediately the information was passed up that - yes; it was a torpedo, and probably fully armed. But that the wedge would be inserted just to be sure, and possibly prevent an explosion, caused by the force exerted in expelling the torpedo.

During our briefing, the Captain had casually mentioned that if, while we were

on deck checking the torpedo, it might be necessary to dive and leave us there, but that he would try to come back and pick us up.

Great! I thought at the time, now all I need is an instant Johnny Wiesmuller course in swimming. As I recall, we wore no life vests because when the sub dived, if it was necessary, we wouldn't give away the subs approximate position.

We returned to the conning tower and was told to go below which we did with undue alacrity.

Once again, Captain Daspit made a momentous decision. He decided to eject the torpedo while the TINOSA was on the surface.

He ordered all four engines and the auxiliary engine be put on the line. He further ordered the impulse on the torpedo tube that carried the fully armed torpedo be brought to 200 pounds hoping this would not cause a force strong enough to fire the torpedo but strong enough to eject it from the tube.

He ordered the forward torpedo room cleared of all personnel except the person who would standby the torpedo hand firing key to insure the tube was fired if something should happen to the torpedo tube electric firing device.

He ordered the forward battery compartment cleared and all unnecessary persons out of the control room and conning tower.

He ordered the maneuvering room to start backing down at minimum turns then as the TINOSA gained way astern, he increased



the speed to all back 2/3rd's. When the sub was at all back 2/3rd's speed, he ordered the torpedo tube fired.

Once again the Gods of War smiled upon the U.S.S. TINOSA and its crew as the torpedo was ejected with no explosion.

An involuntary cheer went up as soon as it was apparent we were, for the time being at least, rid of our potential disaster element, a fully armed Mark 14 torpedo.

We were not scheduled to go to Fremantle, Australia after our 4th run, but this order was changed and we arrived in Fremantle on December 17, 1943.

I had been selected as one of those to go to the relief crew upon arrival and I did, along with Captain Daspit and the usual number of personnel transferred at the end of each run.

During my stay in the relief crew in Fremantle, I had an opportunity to talk to the Squadron Doctor who said that had there been sufficient men available, he would have liked to have transferred the entire crew. This was impossible because there was another submarine that had come much closer than the TINOSA to being sunk and that a larger portion than normal had been transferred from her.

I have talked to Al Watrous concerning TINOSA'S fourth patrol and he concurs that all the events I have described are as vivid as they were those many years ago.

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**FROM A FORWARD ROOM TORPEDOMAN:**

**By: Leo Bonner**

Because of the bad exploders in the torpedoes most of the fish did not explode during one of the patrols. Some of the torpedoes penetrated into the ship that they hit but would not explode. It may have been this fact that saved us on another occasion.

During the fourth patrol, a fish (torpedo) got stuck half way out one of the forward tubes during a battle action. We knew that the outer door would not close and we knew that the depth and gyro spindles could be engaged. This is an indication that the tube was clear. But the outer door did not close.

We ran all night in this condition and the torpedo must have surely armed itself while we were hastily clearing the area of the last action with the enemy. A surface run with a fish sticking out the bow end would allow water to turn a wheel under the torpedo, and after a predetermined number of revolutions, the warhead would become armed.

Once armed it only takes a nine pound impact to explode. We didn't know that a fish was sticking out the bow end.

The next morning, it was decided to examine this possibility. Men were sent topside to dive and see what they could see. Sure enough, there it was, warhead protruding out the outer door.

I stayed in the forward room with some other volunteers to fire that torpedo. We were on the surface and backed down on all

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four engines, charged the impulse tanks way over 600 pounds per square inch and fired that fish. It didn't explode.

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THAT FOURTH PATROL, FROM THE WARD ROOM:

By: Ebbie Bell

While we were having R & R from Patrol #3 in Midway, I was approached by Capt. Dan Daspit at the bar in the Gooneybird Hotel, when he told me he wanted me to be exec. on the fourth patrol. Cdr. Don Weiss was being sent along on a PCO (his second) and with Commander Hunnicutt getting off, Paul Straub became next in line for exec. Paul didn't want the job. Hence, Dan Daspit came to me.

While I told him I wasn't interested, he wanted to know why. I said, "Captain, you're no fun to go to sea with, and I wouldn't enjoy being exec.

He said, "I'll do anything you ask if you'll take the job."

I replied, "Captain, you've got to come out of your room occasionally, play cards, get around the boat more than you do, and you've got to change the officer's watch system. Two hours on and six hours off never permits more than a five hour sleep."

He said, "Fine, go ahead and run it the way you want."

From that point on, morale in the wardroom improved, and we became a much friendlier, close knit group. I got Dan interested in playing Hearts while at sea, and we played almost every day after dinner.

The two most notable incidents of that patrol were the tough depth charging we received, and the torpedo that got stuck halfway out of the tube for most of the day

before we could come to the surface and do something about it. I think the incident of the depth charge attack is pretty well known so I'll cover it briefly.

After the torpedo attack, I was in the control room and so was Leo Bonner whose station, I believe, was the forward torpedo room. (Editors note: Leo went aft to ask permission to pump down the tubes, then was locked in the control room due to closing the watertight doors). After a rather close depth charge, Cdr. Don Weiss yelled, "Blow everything", and Leo Bonner, to my everlasting satisfaction, said something like, "Don't touch those valves and don't blow anything." Leo was right!

On the stuck torpedo, we got up to the surface sometime that afternoon to see what we had on our hands. Although I'm not much of a swimmer, I volunteered to go over the side and try to put a wedge in the impeller, a small wheel which turns like a water wheel as the torpedo goes through the water permitting the detonator to set off the warhead after the torpedo has run 450 yards. I got down beneath the surface and was standing on the torpedo but didn't have the ability to stay under and put wedge into the impeller. I came back up exhausted, and Keith Van Gorder and Wes Fisher went over the side and quickly completed the work. I then asked the captain not to fire the torpedo until we were ready in the forward torpedo room and "vacated" the room, when the Skipper backed down and fired from the conning tower with all of us in there.

We did a lot of running around on this

patrol and when it was about time to go home, we were directed to Darwin, Australia for fuel and then on to Perth. Somewhere along the way we ran out of butter, and we realized we were going to have to wait about a week before we got in where we could receive some. After a few days, the cook came and told that he had found fifteen pounds. I was happy because I thought maybe this would last us until we got in, but when I checked up, I found out the crew ate the whole fifteen pounds at one meal. One of the oddities of submarine war patrols was that you never knew what was going to be the popular item on any particular trip. The fourth patrol it was butter, but on one patrol, it was tuna fish, and on another, it was peanut butter.

Unquestionably, the R & R and Perth/Fremantle was the best of the war and through the friendship I developed with the owner of the biggest department store in town, I decided to eliminate the Navy's medicinal whiskey or brandy, which we used to pass out after a depth charge attack. Instead, we took quart bottles of Australian beer and each time on the fifth patrol that we knew we were going into a torpedo attack, I would have fifteen quarts of beer put into the cold room. Then afterwards, everyone got a full eight-ounce glass of ice cold beer, which to most of us after the heat and humidity of a depth charge attack, tasted as good as champagne.

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PATROL RUN NO. 4 -- AS I REMEMBER IT:

By: Al Watrous

As I remember this patrol, it was noteworthy for having more significant individual events than any other during my tour of duty on board. (First patrol thru the eighth.)

It was the last war patrol for Captain Daspit-and many other plank owners.

It was the first war patrol for Captain Weiss who rode the boat as PCO (Prospective Commending Officer.)

It was the first that we had a full load of good fish.

It was the first run that we sank a ship without having to share the credit with another sub.

We received the most awesome depth charging of my eight runs.

We logged more depth charges on that run than any other.

It was the only time we refit in Australia.

We arrived on station in an area west of the Palau Islands in November and made our way into the western entrance of the harbor of Malakal. Better than anything else that happened on that run I recall the series of haunting and exasperating events that transpired the next couple of days.

As we approached the harbor entrance in the very early morning, we commenced to hear the sound of distant explosions. At first, we thought that we had been detected, but as the depth charges did not get very close to us and were very intermittent it was assumed that they were designed to

make undetected submariners nervous-- a valid conclusion.

It wasn't long before a convoy was sighted leaving the harbor. We went to battle stations and ran north to intercept. The convoy turned south and we were unable to overtake it. Secured from battle stations --- More depth charges.

Smoke was sighted coming our way. Went to battle stations. Targets turned out to be "Spit Kits"-- too small to torpedo. Secured from battle stations. --- More depth charges.

Convoy sighted leaving harbor. Went to battle stations. Unable to get into attack position. Secured from battle stations.---Depth charges continue.

General alarm. Went to battle stations. There was a destroyer lying to, about 900 yards away, a sitting duck. Captain Daspit decided that he did not want to signal our presence for a destroyer that would prevent us from getting a shot at a convoy. Secured from battle stations.---more depth charges.

A ship left the harbor and headed north too far to catch it submerged. As it was getting close to sunset, we decided to try and catch it after dark on the surface.

At the proper time, we surfaced and spent a couple or three hours getting in front of her for an attack. When the target came into view - - it was a hospital ship!

And so it went for two or three days until we came to believe that the enemy had a fix on us. No one was sorry when the captain decided to leave the western ap-



proaches to Palau and see what was doing on the eastern approaches. It had to be better!

And so it was. As we took station off the harbor entrance, a convoy consisting of two freighters and two escorts was sighted making its way to the harbor and TINOSA was in an excellent position to intercept.

Captain Daspit, as was his custom, made a perfect approach that placed us between the two freighters. I believe we fired two, three fish spreads, first aft and then forward. In any case both ships were hit and sank in short order.

Inasmuch as the escorts were nowhere in sight, we remained at periscope depth so as to assess the situation. Our confidence was shaken though, when there was a sudden explosion nearby. Apparently a patrolling aircraft had spotted our scope and dropped a bomb. At that moment the two escorts came into sight heading directly at us. We started deep and rigged for depth charge. It was apparent that they had good contact on us and we knew we were in for it.

The first barrage consisted of nine charges which fell toward the forward end of the ship. The explosions occurred above us and each one drove us deeper and deeper at a steeper down angle. Things were a little touch and go as we passed test depth without complete depth control. The second barrage was also nine charges and fortunately they were over the stern of the TINOSA. This tended to level us off and we regained control. These two attacks had upset the echo ranging of the escorts, and although they dropped charges through sev-

eral more attacks, we were never again in any great danger.

During the attack on the convoy, sonar (Rustad) reported that all but one torpedo had run hot straight and normal. One fish had not been heard running at all! Now the forward room reported that they couldn't close the outer door of one tube. It looked like there was a Mk 14 stuck part way out of the tube.

So there we were, early in the morning, unable to surface until after 2000 and too close to land to surface even at night. So we ran away from the island at slow speed, wondering if there was indeed a torpedo hanging out of the tube and would our progress through the water arm the warhead by the time we could surface. And how do you eject an armed torpedo without blowing the bow off the ship?

We surfaced gingerly after dark and Lt. Van Gorder went over the side and verified that there was a unit protruding from tube No. 5. The impeller was wedged to prevent further arming. During the course of the day, a plan of action had been decided on that would dispose of the unwelcome fish.

The captain assembled those who would take active roles in the process to the conning tower. (I was summoned from my hiding place in the after torpedo room to take the wheel.) He explained that it was his intention to charge the impulse air to reduced pressure, to set the ship in motion astern, slowly increasing speed. I can't remember at what part of this evolution we fired the tube, but I do remember well, the

sigh of relief when the forward room announced that the outer door was closed.

Two more ships were sunk by us on that patrol. The only thing I can recall about these attacks is that we fired a three fish spread at one of them which disappeared with the dust of the third explosion. We simply blew the bottom out of it.

When our patrol time was up, we headed for Fremantle, Western Australia via Darwin where we stopped for fuel. After topping off in Darwin harbor, we took departure, and upon clearing port ran into extremely heavy seas. There was no storm for the skies were clear and cloudless but the swells were enormous. On the way, we fell in company with the USS COD and the two of us wallowed on into port for a well deserved rest.

As I remember it, that rest was well worth remembering.

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THAT FOURTH PATROL  
FROM THE MANEUVERING ROOM  
By: Clyde Lesh

It was late October when we left Midway Island for the same area we just came from on the previous run. We spent twenty days without a battle station, couldn't find a convoy, guess they all pulled out what was left.

We eventually went right into the harbor at Palau. We sighted two 3,000 ton transports and two escorts; sank the transports and got depth charged hard, 38 in all. 8 of them were close. We got knocked below test depth. In fact, we went below 400 feet, lost control of the boat, had men moving from stem to stern and then back trying to level off.

We took on lots of water in the motor room. The (propeller) shafts both sprang leaks. We had men form a line and we bucketed water out of the motor room to the after engine room to the forward engine room, so the water would not get into the main motors.

Again, most of the I.C. equipment was put out of order. We were depth charged for five hours, finally sneaked away. Again we worked 24 hours a day putting the boat back in working order.

Two days later, we sighted another convoy of four ships, two transports and two destroyers.

We took one shot at the biggest transport, but missed. We took on sixteen more depth charges, but no big damage. We surfaced and went around them, got in position

on them the next morning. We sank both transports and in the meantime, we got a torpedo stuck in #5 tube.

We received thirty-two depth charges with the torpedo half in and half out. We stayed down all day, the temperature in the boat got real hot, almost unbearable.

After we surfaced, we made our decision to get rid of the torpedo. We dove as steep as we dared, gave it a shot of air pressure, all we had, and I put both motors in emergency full astern. It came loose and we heard it explode at its depth pressure. The fish had gone far enough in the tube to arm itself.

At the end of November, we had some fish left and were low on fuel. We were on our way to Perth, Australia. We arrived at Darwin for fuel. They had a Jap air attack the day before and some areas were still smoking.

We refueled and left immediately for Perth.

We stayed at the Wentworth Hotel for fourteen days rest and recuperation. We bought every liquor store in town out of booze, which really wasn't much, most of it was already mixed, lots of good beer sold in quart bottles.

(Editor's note: There has been some question about the condition of the boat at the time the stuck fish was fired, surfaced or submerged. Clyde Lesh responded as follows:)

We dove at the sharpest angle we could. I got the word in the maneuvering room full astern. I had to be real careful not to overload the main motors and trip

out the main circuit breakers.

As soon as we started to move backwards, we fired the stuck fish and then we surfaced and got the hell out of there as fast as possible.

I'm sure the fish just sank to the bottom.

I was in the captain's quarters a hour or so before and that is what we decided to do. We were not on the surface and it was on another attack that we had a torpedo come back at us.

That maneuver helped me win the Bronze Star.

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## TINOSA'S FOURTH PATROL

By: Elroy Wilke

Leaving Midway Island on 27 October 1943, we proceeded southwest. The assignment area was between Palau and Truk Islands. On November 7, 1943, we were on station after proceeding north to get into the shipping lanes between the Japanese Empire and Truk.

Approach on several targets were called off after the targets made zigs as much as 50 percent on course.

The TINOSA moved south and was again patrolling the shipping lanes between Palau and Truk. The weather turned heavy with clouds and rough seas. Various patrols and destroyers were sighted. On 17 November, many ships were sighted and the Japanese became aware of our presence in the area. After the convoy got safely into the harbor, the patrols came looking for us.

Another convoy was sighted, but this one had planes guarding it. Later the third convoy of the day was sighted but distances and the reef were in their favor. Depth charges were being dropped periodically.

We surfaced at dark on the 17th and began a battery charge. We sighted a ship and we began an approach - - - it turned out to be a hospital ship, so we withdrew.

The next three days were spent dodging various patrols and planes. On 22 November, a patrol ship was sighted. We dodged it and started an approach on two ships zigging and zagging radically. The escort passed very close and a few minutes later

we fired three torpedoes and got three hits at 700 yards. Target rolled over to port and sank rapidly. The escort was confused and a zig made it impossible to fire on her. The second ship swung hard to right and made an unexpected fine setup. Three torpedoes were fired with two hits. She started down by the stern. We left two sets of torpedo wakes, so the escort knew where we were for sure.

We went deep at high speed and turned 90 degrees. We got thirteen depth charges in one minute followed by fourteen more, within three minutes. None were too close. Later, three more depth charges were dropped at greater distance.

The patrol was still there waiting for us.

Using evasive tactics we were finally able to surface at 1850 that evening. Radar picked up various contacts of patrols and we headed south only to pick up other patrols. Rain squalls helped us evade contact with the patrols. We were able to establish that the Japanese had established shipping lanes east of their normal runs.

The hunt for us continued into the next day. When we were on the surface the SD radar would pick up planes forcing us to dive. Later, echo ranging was picked up shortly after midnight on the 24th. We surfaced and ran towards the echo ranging, stopping periodically to listen. Later it was established that we had picked up that echo ranging at about 18 miles.

Smoke was sighted at 0326 hours at 10,000 yards. There were three ships in a convoy and one or two escorts. We were



trailing the escort when suddenly he turned and came right at us while the convoy opened up the range. We lost both visual and radar contact. Later we picked up the convoy again but it was hopeless to get in an attack before daylight.

Radar kept picking up plane contacts while depth charges were being dropped at a distance.

Shortly after 9:00 A.M. the escort came back at us after we got ourselves between the escort and the convoy. The TINOSA kept boring in and at 1532 hours, three stern tube shots were fired at 900 yard range - - - all missed. We were able to avoid anti-submarine measures at periscope depth. A second escort now joined in the hunt for us. Four depth charges were dropped after we fired our torpedoes.

The following day, at 0711, we sighted smoke. Convoy was zigging radically but we were able to bore in and at 0931 fired three from the bow and got two hits, one amidships and one aft that blew the whole stern off. We swung hard and escorts were confused. Three minutes later we fired three torpedoes at a target at 700 yard range. The second torpedo failed to run or something but the first and third were hits. Hits were not observed as the third ship was being watched and the escorts were headed our way. The first depth charge was dropped at 0939, the second charge was very close with numerous charges over the next forty-five minutes. Number five torpedo failed to run and we were unable to close the outer door. Later it was discovered that a torpedo was stuck in the tube.

We began pumping to get up to periscope depth and at 150 feet, the escort moved in again. Too much noise was made in pumping. At 1117 the escort dropped two more depth charges. We used that noise to flood tanks and get back down deep.

At 1243, we reached periscope depth after getting thirty-four depth charges that morning.

One escort was still in sight as well as a burning ship spewing heavy columns of smoke. At 1527, there was one large billow of smoke from a burning ship then no more. Believe this was the NAGANO MARU as she was sighted badly damaged after the attack.

At 1852, we surfaced and lay to. Lt. Keith Van Gorder went over the side and placed a wedge in the impeller in the torpedo warhead to prevent further rotation. Door seemed clear and at 1954, commenced backing at eight knots and fired the tube. The torpedo cleared and sank and the outer door was closed.

From that time on, through December 3, 1943, we spent patrolling the Molukka Passage - - - Palau Route. At 1730, on Dec. 3rd, one large ship with escort was sighted. They had popped out of a rain squall at 16,000 yards. We turned away to open the range and draw ahead.

Target was zigging often and radically. At 1820 we built up speed and turned toward the ships, picked up targets by radar and got them in sight. At 4500 yards, we submerged and began our approach. A zig spoiled a shot for two ships and at 1946 fired three bow shots. One hit aft set ship afire lighting up the whole ocean.

The range was 520 yards. We swung to get on other target but visibility was too poor so began reloading forward tubes.

At 1953 first depth charge was dropped. Escort passed very close and sound reported another escort coming in, so we went deep. Just 14 minutes later, we came to periscope depth and target was still burning and low in the water aft. High speed screws were heard but we surfaced anyway at 2131 and found that the target was still moving at eight knots and on fire aft with intermittent explosions.

We had six torpedoes left. At 2101 fired one torpedo at 2100 yard range and missed ahead. Target opened fire with machine guns and two large guns while circling with what appeared to be a damaged rudder. Apparently that is why we missed as she could not control left rudder. At 2105, we submerged and worked in close. At 2127, we were nearly run down by the target and forced to make another periscope approach. Visibility was poor due to darkness, furious flames and smoke. At 2120 three bow shots were fired with two hits, one amidships and the other forward. Target disappeared in about one minute and the spot where last seen continued to burn furiously for an hour or more.

At 2127 we surfaced and with only two torpedoes left, our fuel low and the other ships at least 20 miles ahead, we decided not to chase. At 2142, we made radar contact with what appeared to be a Chidori class destroyer that made signals to a boat in the water, believed to be survivors from the sunken ship.

The following day, at 0000 hours, we reported to duty with CTF and set course for Darwin, Australia. From Dec. 3rd and on through Dec. 7th, we sighted many planes and a few escort vessels. At 0824 on Dec. 10th, we arrived in Darwin to take on fuel. We departed from Darwin at 0238 hours for Fremantle, Australia. On Dec. 13th, we were forced to slow because of heavy head seas. On Dec. 16th, we arrived at Fremantle at 1800 hours.

The TINOSA had just completed a very strenuous hard patrol.

Prior to this patrol, I had made two tough runs on the SILVERSIDES. I was ready to stay ashore for awhile. I stayed in the relief crew at Fremantle until March, 1944, and then went to Beloit, Wisconsin to Fairbanks Morse Diesel School. From Beloit, I went to Portsmouth, N.H., and was made an instructor in the advanced submarine school. That school closed and I was assigned to COMSUBPAC and got back on the TINOSA again just as it arrived at Mare Island Navy Yard at the end of the war. In February, 1946, we put the TINOSA out of commission. Some years later it was again commissioned during the Korean War.

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**BURIAL AT SEA**

FROM THE DECEMBER 1980 ISSUE OF THE  
TINOSA BLATT ON PAGE 11.

By: Raffaeli Scalia

Two things stand out vividly in my memory. While on board TINOSA, we picked up and committed to the deep, the body of an aircrewman who had been shot down. He kept a written record of his last days alive while in his small rubber raft. When things get tough for me, all I have to do is recall his encounter with death and my problems are simple.

(Editor's Note: The airman was Jack Cooper who spent thirty days in the rubber raft. It formerly had three men, Theo W. Sterling and a man named Gitelson. The Japs had machine gunned and wounded Cooper who was dead about six days when found.)

The second thing that stands out in my memory is the practice that I instituted regarding loading stores on board. There would be no battery charges, no charging of torpedoes, no charts being prepared, no yeoman reports, etc, etc. All hands loaded stores. If you recall, I took my turn carrying foodstuffs.

Oh yes, why I'm so thankful to the Navy. I took enough courses in engineering to qualify as a marine engineer and an industrial engineer in civil service. I retired from both of the above and am now a cowboy from Brooklyn taking care of a bunch of cows in Dobyville, Ark.

**ENCOUNTER:****APPENDIX V**

FROM THE TINOSA BLATT OF AUGUST, 1981,  
ISSUE NO. 2, PAGE 9.

From: Spaulding Bedford Settle, Sr.

Spaulding delivered a prayer book to the mother of Jack Cooper. This was the book used in the service conducted on board the TINOSA when the body of Jack Cooper was committed to the deep. Cooper was the downed airman who was found in a raft by the TINOSA. This incident was reported in a previous issue of the Blatt.

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**ENCOUNTER:****APPENDIX V**

FROM THE AUGUST, 1985 ISSUE OF THE TINOSA BLATT. THIS EXCERPT IS TAKEN FROM A WRITE-UP WHICH FIRST APPEARED IN A CONNECTICUT NEWSPAPER INTERVIEW OF ROBERT (BOB) BENTHAM BY: HAMILTON FARON.

"On our way in off station, we knew we were going back to the States and everybody was bouyed up. But one day we came across a life raft. In it was an aviator from a Navy plane. When we got him aboard he was dead. He'd kept a diary that started out as a rational diary, but the way it ended, he obviously was out of his head before he died. It was addressed mostly to his mother, but that story has been published by the Associated Press, and I guess we don't need details.

We had a burial at sea, the first most of us had seen, and right after we buried him, we were forced down by a Japanese plane contact. It left us all rather deflated."

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## ENCOUNTER:

## APPENDIX VI

THE FOLLOWING APPEARED IN THE AUGUST, 1980,  
SECOND PART OF THE TINOSA BLATT ON PAGE 7.

### CLYDE LESH RECALLS:

During the seventh patrol, we had battle surfaced on a 150 ton sampan. We opened fire at 600 yards. They just would not sink. Went alongside and dropped eight buckets of fuel oil and set it afire with rags. What a night. Took us two-and-a-half hours (modern warfare.)

The next day we sighted two periscopes. The Japs were charging their batteries in coves and running submerged all night. The following day we battle surfaced on another sampan. This time we were prepared. A torpedoman and I made bombs out of glass jugs with rags tied to the handles which we soaked with fuel and lit.

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THE FOLLOWING APPEARED IN THE SEPTEMBER, 1980 ISSUE OF THE TINOSA BLATT ON PAGE 7.

GILBERT WENDLING RECALLS  
THE FOLLOWING INCIDENTS

I remember one time when we were surfacing with a lot of pressure in the boat. Usually we just cracked the hatch. This time the old man said, "OPEN HATCH." I did and he and I both shot up to the bridge - - - "Why did you do that?", he asked.

"Just following orders, Cap'n."

"I thought you would," he replied. The captain then began to tell me to question commands if I did not understand or thought they were wrong. "After all, submariners are a special breed with inquisitive minds and are accountable for keeping me from making mistakes."

I learned right then to be alert, pay attention, and question some commands which helped clarify the move.

I also remember the time we left Perth, Australia with a group of Aussie Rangers to be put ashore on Borneo.

On the way, we stopped to refuel and practice landings at Exmouth Gulf.

The plan was to inflate and load the rubber rafts with men and equipment, submerge, and let them float free.

About the time the new skipper Captain Weiss, (who was going to remain on the bridge), said, "Flood ballast tanks to put decks awash," Cd'r Bell decided he would come down to the conning tower. At that precise moment, the old man gave the command to flood negative, (you know what that

## ENCOUNTER:

## APPENDIX VI

does!) We submerged immediately.

The water came rushing in the conning tower along with Cd'r Bell with the hatch resting on his chest as Watrous and I were trying to close it.

However, cool heads prevailed. Those in the control room closed the lower hatch, I grabbed the switch on the voicebox and commanded to close vents and blow up, sound the surface alarm. All this while Watrous released the hatch, held on to the lanyard, and pulled Cd'r Bell down and shut the hatch.

Of course, this was only a few seconds which seemed like an eternity. By the time the dive was aborted, we had about a quarter of the conning tower filled with water. Luckily no major damage. However Cd'r Bell's chest was black and blue for the entire patrol.

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## ENCOUNTER:

## APPENDIX VI

THE FOLLOWING APPEARED IN THE DECEMBER, 1981 ISSUE OF THE TINOSA BLATT ON PAGE 14.

During the sixth patrol, TINOSA picked up a (Japanese) civilian survivor (from a prior gun action) who was wounded. (From the patrol report: "We threw him a life ring and hauled him aboard. Some of the crew wanted to turn him in for a newer one, as he was definitely second hand. He had numerous splinter wounds on his back and legs, but we kept him to give the pharmacist's mate something to do on the way home. The other survivors (from the gun action) kept swimming away.)

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THE FOLLOWING LETTER TO BOB BENTHAM'S FATHER APPEARED IN A (CONNECTICUT) NEWSPAPER ARTICLE WHICH WAS COPIED IN THE DECEMBER, 1981 ISSUE OF THE TINOSA BLATT ON PAGE 26.

The headline read:

BENTHAM RECEIVES  
LETTER OF THANKS  
FROM B-29 GUNNER

Thankful for the hospitality shown him by a Seymour man serving on a submarine which has rescued him after he had to bail out of a B-29 Superfort which was badly damaged on a bombing mission over Osha, Japan. Staff Sergeant Ralph T. Gervais, in an interesting letter congratulates J. Laurence Bentham, of 139 Cedar Street for having such a wonderful son in Edward (Robert) E. Bentham, torpedo man 2-C.

(Editor's note: The name Edward was a typographical error that appeared in the newspaper, it should read Robert.)

Early last month The Sentinel carried an interesting Associated Press story about Torpedoman Bentham, and about his experiences in the Pacific war theater. The Seymour submarine torpedoman entered the navy on October 23, 1942, and has been overseas since July, 1943.

The letter follows:

"I imagine you will be rather surprised to get a letter from a total stranger. I am writing this letter for Bob, as he (is) now out to sea and it will be some time before he is able to mail any letters. We both believed that this would help to

fill the gap between his letters."

"I met Bob through very strange circumstances, so maybe it would be a good idea to start from the very beginning and then I believe the mystery will unfold."

"I am central fire control gunner on a B-29 Superfort. On June 1, we bombed Osha and our ship was very badly damaged by flak, and a propeller ran away, finally burning off the end of the propeller shaft. It ended up by cutting through the fuselage, severing the control cable and the controls to number four engine, also cutting two-thirds of the way through the fuselage."

"We managed to fly the plane 150 to 200 miles off the Jap coast, and after a losing battle couldn't keep the plane in the air, so we had to bail out over open water. After floating in the water in a one man life-raft we finally were dropped a 35 foot Higgins boat. We floated around in the open sea for another 20 hours in the Higgins boat, until by chance Bob's ship came across us. It was here that I met Bob. He was good enough to take me in and give me dry, clean clothes, cigarettes and anything else he thought I needed, or wanted. I never could be able to repay his kindness, and am trying in this small way to tell you of the good work he and the men in his service are doing and to thank you from the bottom of my heart for having such a wonderful son."

"I believe this covers most of the high spots of the story, so seeing that it is getting late, I'll have to close now."

The following postscript was added to

the letter:

"I almost forgot the most important part of the letter, and that's to tell you about Bob. He is in the best of health and spirits. From what the fellows said he has put on weight and is looking fine. You will get a big kick out of the fact that he now has grown a full beard and moustache, and they both are a flaming red. He said something about having his picture taken with the beard, to send home."

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THE FOLLOWING LETTER APPEARED IN THE DECEMBER, 1985 ISSUE OF THE TINOSA BLATT ON PAGE 30.

EXCERPTS FROM A LETTER TO AL WATROUS  
FROM BILL CRAIG

Dear Al:

I was on that first patrol that you wrote about. Sorry but I cannot remember you but then you probably don't remember me either.

Your story jogged my memory a little so I thought I'd drop you a line.

First I want to say that there was an occurrence in which I was involved that could have been the end of us all. If you remember the after lookout was responsible for pulling the conning tower hatch shut and someone in the conning tower dogged it down.

Sometime, during the time we were on the surface, someone must have become irritated by the lanyard handle hitting the back of the ladder in the seaway, so they wrapped it around the ladder. When the (diving) alarm sounded, I came down the ladder fast, reached for the lanyard and since there was nothing there fell backwards across the conning tower. Mr. Oakley, who was in the conning tower, called out to close vents and blow ballast. I don't know how close a call we had but we can probably thank Mr. Oakley who wasn't so lucky on the GROWLER.

When we left station to go into the East China Sea, part of that trip was made on the surface in the daylight because I

## ENCOUNTER:

## APPENDIX VI

remember waving to a girl on shore. This is the only patrol I made where this could have happened. I do remember thinking at the time that we were doing pretty good to be able to do that at that period of time.

You mentioned going deep at the time we took that licking. As I remember, there wasn't enough water to go deep in and I believe they had grappling hooks after us because there were noises and when we got into Midway, there were scrape marks on the hull that could have been made by same.

When you mentioned the gyros, you should have said something about Pete Mitchell repairing it or them which I think was (a) considerable accomplishment. Seems I can remember mercury being everywhere.

One fellow who might have been a cook striker, was thin and blonde and had trouble with his heart rate after that bad depth charging. Does that strike a chord?

Did you ever get a line on the seaman by the name of McLaughlin who made the first two patrols? I would sure like to see him again.

Sincerely,  
Bill Craig

### A RESPONSE FROM AL WATROUS FOLLOWS:

I do remember Bill Craig and I do remember the hatch incident and I do remember getting chewed out for securing the lanyard. Thanks, Bill, for your interest and your contribution.

Al Watrous



THE FOLLOWING APPEARED IN THE AUGUST, 1986  
ISSUE OF THE TINOSA BLATT ON PAGES 12 & 13.

**RECOLLECTIONS OF DAN DASPIT:**

by C. E. Bell

Dan Daspit graduated from the Naval Academy in 1927 and subsequently had a post-graduate course in engineering. When the war broke out, he was Executive Officer of the Submarine PIKE which, to the best of my knowledge, was in the Seventh Fleet based at Subic or Pearl. Early in the war, he was ordered to the Mare Island Shipyard as a ship superintendent, notably working with new construction submarines.

In 1942, he was ordered as prospective commanding officer of TINOSA, and I first met him when I reported for duty on November 9, 1942.

As some will remember, Dan looked like a little gnome with a bald head, eye glasses, and appeared older than his actual years. All of us in the wardroom had great respect for his exceptional brains, his ability to concentrate and think, and his dedication to hard work and perfection. At that time, I was torpedo officer.

Our first run out of Pearl Harbor was in late May, 1943, to an area off the east coast of Honshu. In our first attack, which was at night, we fired four torpedoes at a big ship in the convoy from a near perfect position of 1,300 yards torpedo run and a 90 track. Although the sound operator could hear the torpedos hit the target, there were no explosions. We were

forced deep and took very heavy depth charge attacks. The first depth charge knocked the compasses askew and spilled all the mercury. When we got up to the surface some hours later, we found that the inch thick glass cover on the bridge gyro repeater had been pulverized into tiny slivers. We had no means of direction for steering except the stars and subsequently the sun. We headed east while making repairs to damage inside the ship and in about a day had the compasses working again. We were ordered back to Midway.

This attack was in essence the problem many others faced with the faulty torpedoes. In the next few patrols, we made other attacks with frequently disappointing results due to lack of torpedo detonations.

I have many recollections of going to sea with Dan. I remember vividly when we went from Mare Island to San Diego for two weeks of intensive operations and torpedo attack problems. One day at sea, Dan called for a battle surface and as torpedo and gunnery officer, I was up on the topside conducting the simulated gun attack. At the conclusion, I was down on deck with the gun crews when the skipper sounded the diving alarm. Everyone got back inside the ship in time except the gunners mate second class and me who watched the hatch slam shut in our faces. As the ship slowly submerged, we started climbing the periscope shears trying to stay out of the ocean. Fortunately, someone below reported that the two of us were topside, and the surface signal was sounded and the tanks were blown before we got too wet.

Dan was a man who stayed pretty much to himself, usually studying something about the ship or preparing himself for future attack situations. He didn't engage with the other officers in much fun, and he used to complain that the cigar that I had after breakfast woke him up immediately. I didn't realize that they were that bad!

After the third patrol, we were in Midway for rest and repair and one night at the bar in the Gooneyville Hotel, Dan approached me to say that although I was the fourth officer (after Weiss and Straub), he wanted me to be the executive officer on the third run. I told Dan that I didn't really want the job unless a number of things could be changed. He told me to tell him what I wanted, and he would agree to it. My primary complaints were two hours on watch and six hours off never permitted more than five hours of sleep, and the officers were tired. The second thing was that he had to come out of his room and join the other officers occasionally and play hearts and bridge. He agreed to do both.

After that, Dan added a great deal to a comfortable atmosphere in the wardroom, and we all learned a lot from conversations with him. He really was one of the most brilliant men I have known with an intelligent, searching mind.

It was on the second patrol that we made the attack on the unescorted TONAN MARU steaming from Palau to Truck. This was the biggest merchant ship in the Japanese Navy, a 19,500 ton tanker. We had good intelligence on its transit and inter-

cepted when we expected to. It was easy to gain a perfect position on the ship even though it was zig zagging, and we fired from a 900 yard torpedo run and a 90 track. With correct course and speed for the target, it's hard to miss.

Four torpedoes hit the side of the target, which could be heard by the sound operator, and Dan could see little plumes of water alongside the ship but none detonated! Dan was about to break into tears, but Ben Oakley and I noticed that as the target steamed away, the solution to its course and speed was still tracking perfectly in our torpedo data computer. Dan then fired two more torpedoes by periscope on a sharp stern quarter shot. As many of you will remember, one of those torpedoes detonated under his stern under his propellers and left him dead in the water. Over the next four hours, we fired nine more torpedoes one at a time without ever getting an explosion.

After getting clear, we reported to submarine headquarters in Pearl Harbor to say what had transpired and told them we still had one torpedo remaining. We were ordered back to Honolulu with that torpedo.

As you know, the result of that attack was that the war-long torpedo problem was solved. As a result of our experience, it was learned that on a 90 degree track, the warhead crushed before the firing pins set off the detonator. Within a few months, the problem was solved, and we had effective torpedoes for the remainder of the war.

We set out on our fourth patrol with

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renewed confidence in the torpedoes and had excellent results. We successfully attacked one convoy off Palau Islands sometime around the first of December, 1943. After the depth charge attack, we got clear and the forward torpedo room reported that one of our torpedoes was apparently stuck in the tube because they couldn't get the door closed. I reported to the skipper and as soon as he could, some hours later, we surfaced to see what we could find. I tried to get down to check the torpedoes, but I'm not much of a swimmer, and I couldn't stay underwater long enough. Then Keith Van Gorder, and I believe Wes Fisher, went down to verify the torpedo. Van Gorder put a wedge in the arming wheel, and they both came back on deck.

Dan told me that he was going to back down full and fire the torpedo in an effort to dislodge, and I asked him to wait until I got all personnel out of the forward torpedo room and the compartment secured. For unknown reasons, Dan didn't wait because he fired before I could reach the forward torpedo room. We did get rid of the torpedo and it didn't explode, but it was a pretty nervous time for all.

Not long after, we got orders to proceed to Darwin, Australia for refuel and then to Perth-Freemantle W. Australia for refit. We encountered some small Japanese craft en route while going through the Indonesian Islands, but they were small and we couldn't get in a position for an attack. They didn't appear to be worth torpedoes.

The fourth patrol was by far our most

successful under Dan because of the improved torpedoes, but it simply bore out the fact that Dan had many times taken us into excellent firing position and acquired no results because of the defective torpedoes. As a result, he was underestimated as a skipper.

After the fourth patrol, Dan was ordered back to Washington to the Bureau of Ships where he was in charge of the submarine desk having to do with construction and repair of the submarine fleet. Late in the war, he was ordered back to Pearl Harbor to the training command with Admiral Swede Momsen, the "Father of the Momsen Lung".

When the war ended, I was in Midway waiting to take command of a submarine on its next patrol. I was held on Midway for about a month and then ordered to Pearl Harbor as executive officer of the Carp. When I stepped off the plane after thirteen hours sea plane flight from Midway, there was Dan to greet me. I asked him how long I would have in Pearl, and he said we're getting you out of here tomorrow morning before you can get into trouble. Naturally, he must have been kidding.

In about 1947, Dan took command of Sub Squad Four in Key West and a few years later had a final assignment as commandant of the Armed Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Virginia.

To understand the recognition that his intellect received from others, when he retired from the Navy, Dan was hired as the executive director of the National Science Foundation in Washington, D.C. He was one

of the few people the Navy felt they could call upon to deal on equal terms with the nation's top scientists. During those years, Dan lived a few blocks from me in Washington, and I got to know him and his wife, Marjorie, very well. They continued to live there until his death some years later.

I learned over a period of time that Dan had a very wry sense of humor. Many people never saw it because he always seemed so serious, but it was another side of him which was enjoyable. His four patrols on TINOSA might have been outstanding in the war's perspective if he had better torpedoes. That's probably what some other skippers experienced too, but Dan, I observed at first hand and had exceptional chance to study him.

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THE FOLLOWING ARTICLE APPEARED IN THE DECEMBER, 1986 ISSUE OF THE TINOSA BLATT ON PAGE 17.

COMMENTS FROM MILT BROWN:

TINOSA'S fifth war patrol, general area Philippine Islands. After sinking several ships in the Balabac Straits and on one occasion being chased by an ex-American four piper (Destroyer) we were headed for Surigao Strait. During this time we passed many small bancas or native craft. The captain decided to pull alongside two of these which were manned by Philippino's, and being on the bridge at this time as a lookout, I heard them yelling in plain English, "Me no Japanese, me Philippino."

We took one of them aboard the TINOSA to see if we could gain any information on Jap shipping. This little gentleman's name was Rogato Cebugu (spelling may be off). He was pretty upset that night when the Captain didn't release him as he had a wife and children on one of the Islands. There are 7200 Islands in the Philippine Island group.

He spent a lot of time in the forward torpedo room. Benny Bentham and I used to talk to him. He gave out with some hair-raising stories of things they did when they ambushed some Japanese soldiers.

It appears that Rogato was one of the survivors of the original Philippine Army. After examining some Philippine hardware, bolo knives and such, it still makes me shudder.

Later on, in the Marshall Islands, I



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ran across this man who had, enlisted in the U.S. Navy as a steward's mate. I believe it was aboard the Sub Tender U.S.S. Sperry. He seemed happy at this time. After all, who could be recruited by submarine?

This was one of the many functions of the U.S.S. TINOSA; that did many jobs extremely well.

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**MINE DETECTION MISSION REPORTS****EDITOR'S PREFACE:**

The following SPECIAL MISSION REPORTS, pertaining to the new mine detection equipment known as FM (Fox Mike) sonar installed on board TINOSA prior to the eighth war patrol, were received as this book was going to press. This information was deemed so secret at the time of preparation that it was not included in the war patrol reporting system, but handled seperately.

The reports are presented, essentially as written by R. C. Latham in four parts covering war patrols 8, 9, 10 and 11. To our knowledge this declassified top secret information is presented for the first time to men of the TINOSA or for that matter, to any, except those few persons who had a need to know.

The reader should pay particular attention to the FM detection ranges which were measured in feet. All too often, this new equipment detected objects that at the time, had to be assumed to be enemy mines at distances less than half the length of the submarine TINOSA. These first mine detection patrols in enemy waters were a most trying experience.

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**ENCOUNTER:**

**APPENDIX VII**

**Dated:** 29 January, 1945  
**From:** The Commanding Officer.  
**To:** The Commander Submarine Force,  
PACIFIC FLEET.  
**Subject:** Fox Mike Sonar Tests.  
TINOSA WAR PATROL NUMBER EIGHT.

1. If possible and feasible, TINOSA was to conduct the following tests with FM Sonar:

(a.) Actual test of equipment to determine whether it could locate Japanese mines (area North of FORMOSA suggested).

(b.) Use against single patrol vessels to determine whether Japanese can detect FM in operation.

(c.) If (b) was successful, use FM to facilitate evasion during depth charge attack.

2. This report is made up with paragraphs to cover FM operation in chronological order as it was used. No attempt at general analysis will be made until the conclusion of the report. The Commanding Officer's remarks and thoughts during the tests are recorded only in the interests of presenting a complete picture.

3. The restricted area between MIYAKO JIMA and OKINAWA JIMA is believed mined. However, this restricted area is laid out to show a possible passage from each of NANSEI SHOTO close around the south and west tip of OKINAWA JIMA to NAHA, without passing through the restricted zone. This possible passage is mineable, but is not shown as mined. Therefore I decided on a submerged patrol of one day to cover this possible route.

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Submerged at 0627(I) on 22 December, 1944. Commenced closing OKINAWA JIMA. No traffic of any sort sighted. 1237(I) No traffic so decided to test FM sonar in mineable water. Manned FM and commenced closing 100 fathom curve. Keeping accurate log of position but having trouble going exactly where I wish because of currents. 1354(I) This is about right. Will follow 100 fathom curve now. 1441(I) Having trouble staying on curve. Using Bill Irvin's idea of maximum gain, long range on FM, for search. Loud speaker cut down to proper noise level. Water looks clear and gear is working good. Seem to be good sound conditions. No temperature gradient this morning to 340 feet. 1502(I) Exec and I each looked at the other. There was an unmistakable and beautiful bell like tone with small persistent spot on scope at 1400 yards, bearing 010 degrees relative. Contact #1. This was well inside 100 fathom curve and was a definite contact. Closed to 1000 yards, still with good echo. Came left with full rudder. Wiped off perspiration and calmed down. Tracked contact down starboard beam to 110 degrees relative, range 800 yards. Decided to try again. This attempt was with forced cheerfulness. Came right. 1545(I) Contact #2 on port beam. Definite sound, but no distinguishable pip. Started left keeping it about 255 degrees relative. About 1547(I), contact #3, bearing 010 degrees relative, good bell tone, but no pip. We had practiced backing submerged, and now seriously considered it to extricate ourselves from this situation. Contact #1, and maybe others

was to starboard; contact #2 to port; and contact #3 ahead. Decided I could never maneuver quickly enough backing down, so continued turn to port. At 1627(I) picked up contact #4 on port beam, good tone, but no pip distinguishable on scope. Came right to 180 degrees true, and made good about 125 degrees. No other contacts.

My immediate reactions were:

- (a) Contact #1 was definite.
- (b) Contacts #2, #3 and #4 were possible, even probable, but we could hear to perfection then.
- (c) This area is mined.
- (d) If I hadn't been so busy conning the ship and searching for mines, I should have changed my range scale, cut down the gain, and developed my contacts. But it isn't the ones you know are there that bother. It's the one you can't see, and may be turning directly into, that will get you; and so you search.
- (e) I wonder how close the current set me onto contact #2 while I made a left turn around it to avoid contact #3?
- (f) Current here was about 3/4 knot setting about 030 T. It made it difficult to position the ship exactly and also added zest to evasive maneuvers. How would I make out north of FORMOSA in a current of 3-5 knots? Certainly there I'd have to work up against the current. which means I could not start an investigation from

- south of the field.
- (g) Three of our contacts were in 200 fathoms of water. Does that make sense with shallower water available? Maybe the current slides them off the shelf, same as our drill mines at Pearl. Maybe our position was out 500 yards. Was just too busy to use fathometer and QC echo ranging gear for checking. Those mines sounded real.
- (h) Would it be wise to call attention to our presence by using QC? How about a controlled field?
- (i) The following facts are presented:
- (1) Operators on FM, Captain, Exec, and Brady, F.G., RT3c, USNR (FM trained).
  - (2) Sea: Condition 5. Temperature 76 degrees. Direction: From 080 degrees T.
  - (3) Weather - overcast
  - (4) Depth of water 50-200 fathoms.
  - (5) Bottom - rocky and coral.
  - (6) Background - rapid shoaling to 30 fathoms.
  - (7) Current:
 

<u>Time</u>	<u>Degrees T,</u>	<u>kts.</u>
1200-1300 (I):	000,	0.70
1300-1400 (I):	010,	0.75
1400-1500 (I):	025,	0.75
1500-1600 (I):	035,	0.80
1600-1700 (I):	035,	0.90
1700-1800 (I):	030,	0.75
  - (8) BT card - isothermal.
  - (9) Best range 1400 yards, bearing 010 degrees relative.

## (10) Suspected mine locations:

<u>Contact:</u>	<u>Lat.N.</u>	<u>Long.E.</u>
No. 1	26-00'48"	127-36'23"
No. 2	25-59'47"	127-36'41"
No. 3	25-59'43"	127-35'59"
No. 4	25-59'53"	127-37'35"

On 24 December, 1944, used FM to try and attract two Japanese sampans and one radio equipped trawler or sampan. Ranges varied from 10,000 yards to 4,000 yards. Unable to get closer, although came to normal approach course. This is completely inconclusive because do not believe sampans were equipped with sound gear. Sound conditions good.

(Editor's note: #4 missing or assumed to be one of the above paragraphs).

5. This was an extended search of many areas in and around OKINAWA JIMA. The FM sound gear was manned continuously when inside the 100 fathom curve. Weather and sea conditions were as stated in paragraph (i). The FM sound gear was in apparently excellent condition. Search was continued day and night, some of it on the surface at 4 knots and some of it submerged at 2 knots. This three day period of 7, 8 and 9 January, 1945, was extremely trying. The captain and executive officer attempted a watch and watch basis, but for each of us this combined with other duties requiring a status of about 99% "on" and 1% "off". BRADY, F.G., RT3c, USNR and TYLER, J.P., RT1c, USNR, both FM trained, stood a straight watch and watch.

No suspected mine contacts of any sort were made during this entire period.

The strain on the entire ship's company was intense, and it would be unwise to extend such a search period indefinitely.

A program was instituted to train more FM operators, but the value of such a program when no contacts are obtained is questionable.

6. On 12 January, 1945, conducted a submerged reconnaissance in the entrance to NAZE KO, AMAMI O SHIMA. No contacts. This area is believed clear of mines.

7. Despite an intensive search, conducted in the most likely places, only one patrol boat was encountered. This was on 7 January, 1945. He was anchored in shallow water just east of IYE SHIMA and was guarding the narrow channel of IYE SUIDO between OKINAWA JIMA and IYE SHIMA. In view of the U.S.S. SWORDFISH's orders to transit this channel on a special mission following our reconnaissance, it was not wise to alert this patrol, and no FM test with him was conducted. The constant use of FM sonar in the vicinity of the ports of NAHA and NAZE, without detection, may indicate inability of the Japanese to detect this equipment. Since no patrols were encountered, this is inconclusive.

8. Use of FM on this patrol leads to the following general conclusions:

- (a) Under certain conditions it will definitely detect mines, but no proof exists that the object detected is a mine in fact.



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- (b) Failure to detect mines is not proof that mines are not present, but only an indication thereof.
- (c) Practice makes perfect, we hope. At any rate it definitely improves performance.
- (d) The nervous strain imposed on personnel during an FM search for suspected mines is intense. When a contact is actually found, endurance of personnel reaches a limit rapidly.

R. C. LATHAM

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**Dated:** 7 April, 1945  
**From:** The Commanding Officer.  
**To:** The Commander Submarine Force,  
PACIFIC FLEET.  
**Subject:** Report of special Fox Mike Sonar  
mission conducted during TINOSA  
War Patrol Number NINE.

All times are ITEM.

**25 MARCH, 1945**

0641 Position:  
LAT. 28-22N., LONG. 127.07E  
0719 Surfaced.  
0803 Submerged  
0847 Surfaced  
0900 Submerged  
0951 Surfaced  
Sea was condition four and no results were obtained on the surface. Submerged ranges were obtained out to 300 feet. At 200 feet there was excellent tone and perfect image. This was not perfect performance, but FM sonar was at least working. Furthermore, greater ranges could be expected against actual mines.  
Decided on a surface run as far as possible for greater speed, safety, and accuracy in navigation. Our maximum range was the same for surface, periscope depth, 100 and 150 feet during tests at SAIPAN. Will make the run at 5 knots. Figuring a minimum assured range of 100 yards, we should sweep on

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the 400 foot scale at least every 45 seconds to insure detection. Decided to sweep from port beam to starboard beam and back to port beam on 400 yard scale, elapsed time 20 seconds; then sweep from port to starboard and back to port on 400 foot scale, elapsed time 20 seconds. This will give us a second cycle - two sweeps on 400 yard scale alternated with two sweeps on 400 foot scale.

1200 Position:  
LAT. 28-29N., LONG. 127-05E.  
In compliance with orders we are going to sweep a line through the restricted area bearing 304 degrees T, from LAT. 28-28N., to LONG. 126-58E.

1242 A/C #8. Sighted plane distance 6 miles, zero angle on the bow. Submerged to 150 feet.

1355 Surfaced.

1618 Sighted mine afloat. LAT. 28-35N., LONG. 126-51.5E.  
This was a new mine, copper colored, four horns visible on top. Estimated diameter 50 inches, similar to "U.S. designation JH-Japanese designation unknown." Was unsuccessful in attempt to destroy by gunfire at safe range in condition three sea.

1810 FM had doubtful contact. First picked up bearing 090 degrees relative, range 125 feet. Three repetitions of fair pip and fair tone out of several tries. Unable

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to track this object which is not believed to have been a mine.

1810 Position LAT. 28-38N., LONG. 126-46E.

2050 Reversing relay out of commission in Fox Mike Sonar. Technician reports relay is overloaded by newly changed rapid rotation of FM head on 400 yard and 400 foot scales. Stopped; lying to.

2220 Fathometer reading of 74 fathoms. Attempted to anchor to maintain position during sweep, but chain parted with 75 fathoms walked out. Left anchor and chain on bottom. Position:  
LAT. 28-44.6N., LONG. 126-36.6E.

2300 Beautiful moonlight night, sea condition two. Obtained star fix showing position given for anchor.

26 MARCH, 1945.

0147 FM sonar back in commission. Technicians report that reversing relay only was adjusted and characteristics of FM should be exactly the same as when tested on triplane.

0151 Resumed sweep.

0619 Submerged on sighting unidentified plane, range 6 miles.

0653 Surfaced

0758 Sighted old, barnacle-covered mine on surface, similar to type 93 Mod.1. Sank it with 50 cal., and 20 MM gunfire. Position:  
LAT. 28-47N., LONG. 126-11.5E.

1200 Completed sweep. Crossed restric-

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ted area line at LAT. 29-15.4 N.,  
LONG. 125-31.0E.

1618 FM sonar again out of commission.

27 MARCH, 1945

0030 Reported results to date to Com-  
SubPac.

0100 FM sonar back in commission.

0738 Sighted old Type 93 Mod. 1 mine on  
the surface. Sank same with 20 MM  
and 50 cal., gunfire. As mine was  
sinking FM sonar gave an uncoached  
contact bearing 100 degrees rel-  
ative, range 300 feet. FM lost  
contact at 400 feet. This was the  
sinking mine and is the first  
known test of FM on an actual  
sinking mine.  
Position:  
LAT. 29-30N., LONG. 125-02.7E.

1021 Sighted BETTY (aircraft) range 3  
miles.  
Submerged. Visibility was poor.  
No sights were obtained at dawn  
and position is dead reckoning.

1044 While at 80 feet coming up with a  
4 degree bubble FM had a definite  
contact at 040 degrees relative,  
range 150 feet. Maneuvered to  
avoid. Object passed down star-  
board side, closest range 110  
feet. Pip and tone were excel-  
lent. This is thought to have  
been definitely a mine.  
Position:  
LAT. 29-33.2N., LONG. 124-47E  
by dead reckoning.

1051 Surfaced

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1200      Position:  
LAT. 29-36.8N., LONG. 124-39.2E.  
Waiting for good weather before  
continuing.

1935      While on surface, condition three  
sea, made sonar contact on moored  
mine, bearing 350 degrees rela-  
tive, distance 150 feet.  
Position:  
LAT. 29-25.3N., LONG. 124-59E.  
Fox Mike sonar has been out of  
commission numerous times. Tech-  
nicians report reversing relay  
will continue to give trouble at  
unpredictable times. Secured FM  
in order to prolong its life for  
assigned area search, or in case  
of necessity on diving.

2100      Obtained good celestial fix. Pos-  
ition 1935 above has been correc-  
ted to agree with this fix.

28 MARCH, 1945.

0800      Sea condition two. Started in on  
surface to investigate Tunny mine-  
field. Position LAT. 28-55.6N.,  
LONG. 124-52.4E. When one mile  
into area, Fox Mike broke down  
again for tenth time. Retreated  
to westward and started slowly for  
area nine. Reported results to  
ComSubPac and requested permission  
to proceed to area.

1200      Position:  
LAT. 29-13.7N., LONG. 124-56.5E.

1241      Submerged on sighting what was  
thought to be a ship.

1250      At eighty feet depth picked up  
moored mine on FM, bearing 350

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degrees relative, range 125 feet.  
Lost contact inside the 100 foot  
blank spot bearing 290 degrees  
relative.

1350

Surfaced.

1845

FM duties completed in accordance  
with despatch orders.

**2 APRIL, 1945**

While patrolling submerged about  
ten miles north of SOTSUKO ZAKI  
LIGHT on AMAMI O SHIMA, decided to  
close coast to observe for possib-  
le shipping and take photographs.

1615

Although still about 3 miles out-  
side the 100 fathom curve, turned  
on Fox Mike and at periscope depth  
at

1615

Contact. Mine bearing 295 degrees  
relative, range 275 yards.

1616

Bearing 305 degrees relative,  
range 250 yards.

1618

Bearing 008 degrees relative,  
range 150 yards.

At this point we flooded negative  
and went to 150 feet, running with  
a 5 degree up bubble. Reversed  
course.

1631

Bearing 005 degrees relative,  
range 175 yards.

1701

Bearing 049 degrees relative,  
range 175 feet.

Sea condition two, sound con-  
ditions ideal. Our tempermental  
Fox Mike gave excellent perfor-  
mance.

## ENCOUNTER:

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**Dated:** 16 MAY, 1945  
**From:** The Commanding Officer.  
**To:** The Commander Submarine Force,  
PACIFIC FLEET.  
**Subject:** Fox Mike Sonar Operations during  
TENTH War Patrol of U.S.S. TINOSA  
(SS-283).

1. No track chart of FM Sonar operations is submitted because the results described herein are of interest in an academic way and exact positions and locations are not of vital importance in connection with the results obtained.

2. A brief material history follows. The first FM system installed on TINOSA gave erratic results, but several verified ranges in excess of 800 yards were obtained on dummy mines during training. During the EIGHTH War Patrol of TINOSA a contact was obtained on a suspected Japanese mine at a range of 1400 yards. During the refit between the EIGHTH and NINTH War Patrol, the FM projector was replaced because of the appearance of dents in the original head. After this occurrence, the maximum range obtained in training, and on the NINTH War Patrol was 300 yards. During training for the TENTH War Patrol, 300 yards was again the maximum range obtained. Since the circuit had been checked, tuned, and rechecked unnumerable times, a new projector was installed as a desperation measure. TINOSA immediately obtained definite contacts on dummy mines at a range of 1800 yards.

3. On 1 May, 1945, during TENTH War Patrol, TINOSA closely approached NORTH PASS,



## ENCOUNTER:

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mine. Tone varied from a fair to excellent. In many cases the relative movement of the contacts, or the fact that they could not be obtained on the 400 yard scale, was the only means of differentiating from a mine contact. Photographs of the PPI scope were obtained and may add to the accumulation of FM data.

5. A maximum range of 2800 yards was obtained on the reef east of NOMWIN ISLAND. TINOSA was navigated submerged from the excellent FM picture of the reef at 1300 yards.

6. During the bombardment (by TINOSA) of ULUL ISLAND at night, the PPI scope of the FM was used simultaneously with the DRT and fathometer for navigation purposes. A scale reproduction of ULUL ISLAND and reefs to the westward was fixed to the DRT. The combination of fathometer, FM and DRT enabled the plotter to keep the ship's position continuously and accurately plotted. No bearings were necessary from the bridge and the SJ radar was completely free for fire control and general sweeps. It is difficult to praise too highly the beautiful simplicity and accuracy of this system or the clarity of the picture presented.

7. The above notes are submitted as being of general interest in the development of FM Sonar.

R. C. Latham

**ENCOUNTER:****APPENDIX VII**

**Dated:** 4 July, 1945  
**From:** The Commanding Officer.  
**To:** The Commander Submarine Force,  
PACIFIC FLEET.  
**Subject:** Fox Mike Sonar Operations during  
ELEVENTH War Patrol of U.S.S.  
TINOSA (SS-283).

1. The following narrative (#1 of 2) covers the Fox Mike Sonar Operations of U.S.S. TINOSA, during the ELEVENTH War Patrol of U.S.S. TINOSA. Fox Mike Sonar tracked false target shell to 750 yards prior to TSUSHIMA passage.

2. NARRATIVE (All times ITEM, -9)  
6 JUNE, 1945

0244 At rendezvous with U.S.S BOWFIN and U.S.S. FLYING FISH. Lat. 34-03.0N., Long. 128-47.5E.

0253 Manned FM sonar, on surface. Sea condition 1-2.

0255-

0340 Data during this period is missing. Contacts were obtained immediately on manning the FM sonar. Most of these were evaluated as fish, but three probable mine contacts were noted. All contacts were on the 300 foot scale with probable mines appearing at 275 feet, as follows:

Contact No.	Time	Lat N.	Long. E.
1	0257	34-04.4'	128-47.2'
2	0258	34-04.8'	128-47.4'
3	0258-30	34-04.8'	128-47.1'

0414 Entered area. Submerged at TINOSA's initial point Lat. 34-11.5N., Long. 128-51.5E. Making run at 130 feet keel

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depth, 4 degree rise bubble. Depth of 130 feet was chosen to allow a little clearance between periscope shears and possible mines laid at 75 feet, without deviating too far from the optimum depth of 100 feet, for this mount.

Soundings were taken on the NGA fathometer every five minutes and plotted. A current of 1 knot setting along the track was assumed. No periscope observations were made. From soundings, two possible positions were indicated. One position included a one knot current and showed us slightly east of our intended track. The second position, which later proved correct, followed the DRAI and indicated no current. On the basis of the second position, speed was increased to 60 rpm, 3.5 knots, at 1636, to provide greater range on TSUSHIMA ISLAND upon surfacing.

Interference from another submarine's FM was occasionally present, but was never bothersome, indicating a safe range. This interference was always on our starboard bow showing the other submarine to be north and east of us.

Highlights from the log follow:

1114 Four FM contacts on the starboard bow, range 300 feet. Left full rudder.

1115 One FM contact on port bow, 300 feet. Right full rudder.

1116 After engine room, maneuvering room, and after torpedo room reported scraping noise passing aft along port side. This is believed to have been a mine cable from the contact on the port bow.

These mines plotted in a line bearing 110-290 True, spacing 150 as follows:

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Number	LAT N	LONG E.
1	34-28.2N	128-56.7E
2	34-28.9N	128-56.9E
3	34-28.1N	128-56.8E
4	34-28.0N	128-56.7E
5	34-28.2N	128-56.5E

1200      Position:

Lat. 34-30N, Long. 128-57E

1349      Four FM contacts evaluated as mines. All contacted at 300 feet range and plotted in a straight line bearing 130-310 true, spacing 200 feet.

Number	LAT N	LONG E.
1	34-34.0N	128-00.8E
2	34-33.9N	128-00.9E
3	34-33.7N	128-01.0E
4	34-33.7N	128-01.1E

1353      Four more FM contacts evaluated as mines, all contacted at 400 yards. Plotted in a straight line bearing 130-310 True, spacing 200 feet.

Number	LAT N	LONG E.
1	34-34.5N	129-01.2E
2	34-34.4N	129-01.3E
3	34-34.3N	129-01.4E
4	34-34.2N	129-01.5E

1406      Four more FM contacts evaluated as mines, all contacted at 250 yards. Plotted in a straight line bearing 130-310 true, spacing 200 feet.

Number	LAT N	LONG E.
1	34-34.7N	129-02.2E
2	34-34.6N	129-02.3E
3	34-34.5N	129-02.4E
4	34-34.4N	129-02.5E

## ENCOUNTER:

## APPENDIX VII

1545 FM interference from another submarine.

2100 Surfaced.

An analysis of all FM contacts indicated the following probabilities. The contacts at 0253 are in all probability part of the mine fields contacted previously by SEA HORSE and CREVALLE. These are estimated, because of lack of pattern and order, to be part of the old anti-submarine field, perhaps laid in 1941, and since scrambled up by storms and time.

The contacts at 1114, 1349, 1353 and 1406 are evaluated as mine lines laid fairly recently. These four lines showed a regular spacing and line of bearing. The first line at 1114 was on line of bearing 110-290 with spacing at 150 feet. The fact that TINOSA apparently scraped a mine cable of this group doubly verifies its existence. The second, third, and fourth mine lines were on lines of bearing 130-310 with spacing 200 feet. The third line was distant 750 yards bearing 048 from the second, and the fourth line was distant 1150 yards bearing 048 from the third.

The ranges at which lines two, three, and four were contacted may possibly indicate depth settings of 10 feet, 75 feet, and 45 feet, respectively. Admittedly the ranges at which contact was lost would be a better indication, but unfortunately this data was not obtained.

The passage of LA PEROUSE STRAIT was made on the surface at 18 knots on the night of 24-25 JUNE, 1945. FM Sonar was not used and no mine contacts were made.

A large Russian freighter, on a wester-

**ENCOUNTER:****APPENDIX VII**

ly course, was seen leaving the westerly entrance of LA PEROUSE just prior to our passage. This, coupled with our own clear passage on the surface, would seem to indicate that mines in this strait are laid as an anti-submarine measure only.

R. C. LATHAM

**ENCOUNTER:****APPENDIX VII**

Valve. Tank has flooded and is spewing evil contents into ship through leaky flapper valve in crew's head. Not nice for 17 hour dive. Visibility 1000 yards.

0925 Submerged. Trouble remedied.

1200 Position. Lat. 46-12N., Long. 140-02E.

2001 Surfaced. Rendezvoused and commenced passage through LA PEROUSE STRAIT, in column: U.S.S. FLYING FISH, U.S.S. TINOSA, U.S.S. BOWFIN, and U.S.S. SPADEFISH.

2251 S/C #22. Sighted lights and detoured to south to avoid properly illuminated Russian ship on westerly course.

2325 The Russian turned on a searchlight and briefly swung it over our column, then turned it off again. Range about 7000 yards. Visibility fair in light haze.

25 June 1945.

0100 S/C #23. SJ contact on small ship believed to be a patrol. Not sighted. We passed at a least range of 4900 yards, and apparently did not alert him.

0200 Visibility about 1000 yards. Subs in column, speed 18 knots,

0335 Proceeding independently.

0400 Visibility good. Several subs in sight at various times.

1200 Position. Lat. 45-54N., Long. 146-08E.

2344 S/C #24. Exchanged recognition and information with U.S.S. DACE by means of SJ radar.

## ENCOUNTER:

## APPENDIX VII

TABLE OF FM CONTACTS  
U.S.S. TINOSA (SS-283)  
ELEVENTH WAR PATROL

DEPTH FEET	RELATIVE BEARING	RANGE	DATE- TIME	POSITION
130			6-6-45 0415	34-12N. 128-50E.
Contacts on 300 ft. scale. Believed to be fish.				
130	325	200ft.	6-6-45 0555	34-15.2N 128-52.7E
Small round Blob. Clear tone. Believed to be fish. 300 foot scale.				
130	345	200ft.	6-6-45 0600	34-15.3N 128-52.8E
Probably a fish. 300 foot scale.				
130	355	300ft.	6-6-45 0615	34-15.9N 128-52.9E
Possible contact with Mine. 300 foot scale.				
130	090	250ft.	6-6-45 0621	34-16.1N 128-53.0E
Possible contact with Mine. 300 foot scale.				
130	085	150ft.	6-6-45 0649	34-17.2N 128.53.3E
Possible Mine contact. 300 foot scale.				
130	055	150ft.	6-6-45 0704	34-17.8N 128-53.5E
Possible contact. Probably fish. 300 foot scale.				



## ENCOUNTER:

## APPENDIX VII

DEPTH FEET	RELATIVE BEARING	RANGE	DATE- TIME	POSITION
130	300	175ft.	6-6-45 0738	34-19.1N 128-53.9E
Possible contact. Probably fish. 300 foot scale.				
130	355	275ft.	6-6-45 0805	34-20.1N 128-54.2E
Possible Mine. 300 foot scale.				
130	350	150ft.	6-6-45 0843	34-21.6N 128-54.7E
Doubtful contact. Tone only.				
130	270	150ft.	6-6-45 0930	34-23.7E 128-55.3E
Possible Mine.				
DEPTH FEET	TRUE BEARING	RANGE	DATE- TIME	POSITION
130	020	200ft.	6-6-45 1003	34-25.2N 128-55.8E
Possible Mine.				
130	085	250ft.	6-6-45 1102	34-28.1N 128-56.8E
Possible Mine.				
130	075	250ft.	6-6-45 1103	34-28.1N 128-56.8E
Possible Mine.				
130	015	300ft.	6-6-45 1114	34-28.2N 128-56.9E
Probable Mines.				

## ENCOUNTER:

## APPENDIX VII

DEPTH FEET	TRUE BEARING	RANGE	DATE- TIME	POSITION
130	095	100ft.	6-6-45 1114	34-28.9N 128-56.9E
Probable Mines.				
130	020	300ft.	6-6-45 1114	34-28.1N 128-56.8E
Probable Mines.				
130	110	300ft.	6-6-45 1114	34-28.1N 128-56.7
Probable Mines.				
130	315	300ft.	6-6-45 1115	34-28.2N 128-56.5E
Probable Mines.				
130	350	175ft.	6-6-45 1139	34-29.8N 128-57.1E
Possible Fish.				
130	090	75ft.	6-6-45 1151	34-30.1N 128-57.2E
Possible Mine.				
130	040	200yds.	6-6-45 1320	34-33.5N 128-59.8E
Possible large school of fish.				
130	350	125ft.	6-6-45 1320	34-33.5N 128-59.8E
Possible large school of fish.				

## ENCOUNTER:

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DEPTH FEET	TRUE BEARING	RANGE	DATE- TIME	POSITION
130	010	300ft.	6-6-45 1349	34-34.0N 129-00.8E
130	020	300ft.	6-6-45 1349	34-33.9N 129-00.9E
130	030	300ft.	6-6-45 1349	34-33.8N 129-01.0E
130	080	300ft.	6-6-45 1349	34-33.7N 129-01.1E

Probable Mines. In straight line.

130	050	175ft.	6-6-45	34-34.4N 129-00.9E
130	040	175ft.	6-6-45	34-34.4N 129-00.9E
130	280	150ft.	6-6-45	34-34.4N 129-00.9E
130	155	250ft.	6-6-45	34-34.4N 129-00.9E

Probable Mines.

130	340	400yds.	6-6-45	34-34.5N
	020		1353	129-01.2E
				34-34.4N
				129-01.3E
				34-34.3N
				129-01.4E
				34-34.2N
				129-01.5E

Straight line of four (4) across path of advance. Spacing 200 ft. Picked up on 600 yard scale.

## ENCOUNTER:

## APPENDIX VII

DEPTH FEET	TRUE BEARING	RANGE	DATE- TIME	POSITION
130	062	250yds.	6-6-45 1406	34-34.7N 129-02.2E 34-34.6N 129-02.3E 34-34.5N 129-02.4E 34-34.4N 129-02.5E
Mine heard about 400 yards. Line of 4 across path of advance. Sight 250 yards.				
130	132	250ft.	6-6-45 1428	34-35.5N 129-02.0E
Possible Contact.				
130	042	150ft.	6-6-45 1505	34-36.7N 129-03.1E
Probable Fish.				
130	042	150ft.	6-6-45 1657	34-40.6N 129-07.?E
Probable Fish.				
130	050	300ft.	6-6-45 1710	34-40.1N 129-07.9E
Probable Fish.				
130	072	300ft.	6-6-45 1733	34-41.8N 129-08.5E
Possible Mine.				
130	022	300ft.	6-6-45 1735	34-42.2N 129-09.1E
Probable Mine.				

# ENCOUNTER:

# APPENDIX VII

DEPTH FEET	TRUE BEARING	RANGE	DATE- TIME	POSITION
130	082	150ft.	6-6-45 1815	34-44.0N 129-11.0E
Doubtful.				
130	042	150ft.	6-6-45 1841	34-45.3N 129-12.4E
Probable Fish.				
130	122	350ft.	6-6-45	34-46.0N
130	070	150ft.	1903	129-13.3E
Possible Mine.				
130	020	150ft.	6-6-45 1918	34-46.8N 129-14.1E
Probable Fish.				
130	042	100yds.	6-6-45 2005	34-49.1N 129-16.4E
Probable Mine.				

**ENCOUNTER:****GLOSSARY**

DRI:-----DEAD RECKONING INDICATOR  
DRT:-----DEAD RECKONING TRACER  
DUD:-----DID NOT EXPLODE  
ECHO-RANGING:-----UNDERWATER SOUND DEVICE  
EM:-----ELECTRICIANS MATE  
END AROUND:-----RUN AROUND AHEAD OF TARGET  
END RUN:-----SAME AS END AROUND  
ENG:-----ENGINE, ENGINEERING  
ENS:-----ENSIGN RANK  
F:-----FIREMAN  
FBT:-----FUEL BALLAST TANK  
FC:-----FIRECONTROLMAN  
FIRE CONTROL:DIRECTING TORPEDOES or GUNFIRE  
FISH:-----TORPEDO  
FIX:-----AN ACCURATE SHIP'S POSITION  
FM:-----FREQUENCY MODULATED SONAR  
FWD:-----FORWARD  
GM:-----GUNNERS MATE  
GOONEY BIRD:-----ALBATROSS FOUND ON MIDWAY  
GQ:-----GENERAL QUARTERS  
HEAD:-----TOILET  
IC:-----INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS  
JK:-----A SONAR LISTENING DEVICE  
JP:-----AN AMPLIFIED SONIC RECEIVER  
JUICE IN THE CAN---AVAILABLE BATTERY POWER  
Lt.:-----LIEUTENANT  
Lt. Cdr.:-----LIEUTENANT COMMANDER  
Lt.jg.-----LIEUTENANT JUNIOR GRADE  
Matt:-----MESS ATTENDANT  
MBT:-----MAIN BALLAST TANK  
MC:-----INTER-COMMUNICATION SYSTEM  
MGC:-----MEGACYCLES  
MK:-----MARK  
MM:-----MACHINIST MATE  
MoMM:-----MOTOR MACHINIST MATE  
NAV:-----NAVIGATOR  
NEGATIVE:--14,000 lb. NEGATIVE BALLAST TANK  
NIP:-----NIPONESE

## ENCOUNTER:

## GLOSSARY

OD:-----OFFICER OF THE DECK  
OTC:-----OFFICER IN TACTICAL COMMAND  
PC:-----PATROL CRAFT  
PCO:-----PROSPECTIVE CMD. OFFICER  
PhoM:-----PHOTOGRAPHERS MATE  
PhM:-----PHARMACISTS MATE  
PIP:-----INDICATION ON RADAR SCREEN  
POW:-----PRISONER OF WAR  
PPI:--PLAN POSITION INDICATOR/SURFACE RADAR  
PRAU:-----SMALL VESSEL  
QC:---ECHO RANGING PORTION OF A SOUND HEAD  
QM:-----QUARTER MASTER  
RAPID PURSUIT-----FULL SPEED ALL ENGINES  
RELATIVE BEARING:---BEARING FROM SHIP'S BOW  
RM:-----RADIOMAN  
RT:-----RADIO TECHNICIAN  
RUN:-----PATROL RUN, USUALLY 60 DAYS  
S:-----SEAMAN  
SANITARY TANK:-----A WASTE WATER TANK  
SC:-----SHIP'S COOK  
SD (RADAR):-----AIRCRAFT DETECTION DEVICE  
SHEARS:-----PERISCOPE SUPPORT STRUCTURE  
SJ (RADAR):-----SURFACE DETECTION/RANGING  
SM:-----SIGNALMAN  
SONAR:-----ELECTRONIC UNDERWATER SENSOR  
SPIT-KIT:-----SMALL PATROL BOAT  
StM:-----STEWARD  
TDC:-----TORPEDO DATA COMPUTER  
TM:-----TORPEDOMAN  
TOP-HAMPER:-----SUPERSTRUCTURE  
TORPEX:-----A TORPEDO WARHEAD EXPLOSIVE  
TRIM:-----SUBMARINE LONGITUDINAL BALANCE  
TRUE BEARING:--GYROCOMPASS BEARING/EARTH N.  
VHF:-----VERY HIGH FREQUENCY  
WOLF PACK:----USUALLY, GROUP OF THREE SUBS  
XO:-----EXECUTIVE OFFICER  
Y:-----YEOMAN  
ZIG ZAG:-----AN ALTERNATING COURSE

## ENCOUNTER:

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